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THE   PROBLEIVIS   OF 
PHILOSOPHY 


BY   THE   SAME  AUTHOR. 

— ♦ — 

INDUCTIVE   LOGIC.     l2mo    .    .    o    .    $1.50 


THE    PROBLEMS    OF 
PHILOSOPHY 


AN  INTRODUCTION   TO    THE   STUDY 
OF  PHILOSOPHY 


BY 

y 

JOHN   GRIER  HIBBEN,  Ph.D. 

STUART  PROFESSOR   OF  LOGIC  IN   PRINCETON 
UNIVERSITY 


NEW  YORK 
CHARLES   SCRIBNER^S    SONS 


COPYRIGHT,  1898,  BY 
CHARLES  SCRIBNER'S  SONS 


J.  S.  CuBhing  &  Co.  —  Berwick  &  Smith 
Norwood  Mass.  U.S.A. 


PREFACE 

It  has  been  my  aim  in  this  work  to 
give  a  simple  statement  of  the  various 
schools  of  philosophy,  with  the  salient 
features  of  their  teachings,  and  to  indicate 
the  chief  points  at  issue  in  reference  to 
controverted  questions.  There  has  been 
no  attempt  to  present  a  detailed  account 
or  exhaustive  criticism  of  philosophical 
systems ;  but  merely  to  furnish  the  stu- 
dent who  is  beginning  the  study  of  phi- 
losophy a  bird's-eye  view  of  the  general 
philosophical  territory.  It  is  my  earnest 
hope  that  from  these  cursory  glimpses  he 
may  be  led  to  a  more  extended  and  seri- 
ous exploration. 

One  who  is  undertaking  for  the  first 
time  a  course  in  the  history  of  philosophy 
finds  himself  naturally  at  a  loss  to  under- 


VI  PEEFACE 

stand  the  relations  between  earlier  and 
later  periods  of  thought,  and  therefore 
wants  a  proper  perspective  ;  accordingly 
he  fails  to  appreciate  the  drift  of  tilings. 
To  all  such  an  introduction  to  the  main 
problems,  and  general  tendencies  of  phil- 
osophical discussion,  should  prove  an 
invaluable  assistance  in  interpreting  the 
evolution  of  thought  historically. 

I  have  tried  to  define  the  many  techni- 
cal terms  in  such  a  manner  as  to  acquaint 
the  reader  with  the  language  of  philoso- 
phy, and  yet  at  the  same  time  to  avoid 
the  use  of  such  terms  as  far  as  possible 
in  explaining  the  distinctive  doctrines  of 
the  different  philosophical  schools. 

J.  G.   H. 

Redfield,  New  York, 
August  8,  1898. 


CONTENTS 


I.    A  Plea  for  Philosophy        .        .  1 

II.     The  Problems  of  Philosophy      .  14 

III.  The   Problem  of  Being  ("  Ontol- 

ogy")  32 

IV.  The   World    Problem    ("  Cosmol- 

ogy")    59 

V.     The    Problem     of    Mind    ("  Psy- 
chology")    ....         o      78 

VI.     The     Problem     of     Knowledge 

("  Epistemology ")        ...       95 

Vn.    The  Problem  of  Reason  ("  Logic  ")     118 

VIII.    The      Problem     of     Conscience 

("  Ethics  ") 134 

IX.    The  Problem  of  Political  Obli- 
gation ("  Political  Science  ")      .     158 

X.     The    Problem   of   the   Sense   of 

Beauty  ("Esthetics")       .        .     181 

Index 199 

vii 


THE 
PROBLEMS   OF   PHILOSOPHY 

CHAPTER   I 

A   PLEA   FOR    PHILOSOPHY 

THERE  is  ill  the  minds  of  some,  per- 
haps of  many,  a  false  conception  of 
philosophy.  The  popular  verdict  would 
aofree  no  doubt  with  Keats :  — 

"  Do  not  all  charms  fly 
At  the  mere  touch  of  cold  philosophy." 

From  the  days  when  Socrates,  to  the 
delight  of  the  Athenian  audience,  was 
exposed  to  the  good-natured  banter  of 
Aristophanes,  the  philosopher  has  ever 
been  regarded  as  a  visionary  creature, 
essentially  unpractical  in  his  point  of 
view,  repudiating  common-sense  judg- 
ments, his  head  in  the  clouds,  his  feet 
spurning  the  earth. 


2         THE  PEOBLEMS   OF  PHILOSOPHY 

When  Thales  fell  into  a  well,  as  he 
walked  and  gazed  at  the  stars,  a  witty 
Thracian  maiden  remarked  that  he  was 
so  eager  to  know  what  was  going  on  in 
heaven,  that  he  could  not  see  what  was 
before  his  feet.  And  it  is  true  that  many 
have  followed  in  Thales'  footsteps. 

Even  a  more  thoughtful  reflection  may 
still  leave  the  impression  that  the  phi- 
losopher, after  long  years  of  patient  intro- 
spection and  persevering  research,  fails 
at  last  to  contribute  permanently  to  the 
world's  thought,  or  materially  to  further 
its  progress.  The  scientist,  the  inventor, 
the  statesman,  the  man  of  affairs,  leave 
behind  them  visible  and  tangible  results 
which  make  for  prosperity,  and  health, 
and  a  more  abounding  life.  But  of  phi- 
losophy, it  is  urged,  in  the  words  of  Bacon, 
that  "like  a  virgin  consecrated  to  God, 
she  bears  no  fruit."  Even  among  those 
who  would  not  assent  wholly  to  this 
stricture  upon  philosophy,  there  still 
lingers  the  feeling  that  there  is  grave 
danger  lest  philosophic  inquiry  degener- 
ate   into    barren    disputation.      No    one 


A  PLEA  FOR  PHILOSOPHY  3 

could  have  had  a  higher  ideal  of  the 
offices  of  a  true  philosopher  than  Lotze, 
and  yet  this  same  feeling  was  no  doubt  in 
his  mind  when  he  said:  "The  continual 
sharpening  of  the  knife  becomes  tiresome  if, 
after  all,  we  have  nothing  to  cut  with  it." 
A  philosopher,  however,  is  not  fairly 
judged  by  his  eccentricities,  nor  by  the 
frailties  to  which  he  is  liable;  still  less 
should  his  philosophy  as  a  whole  fall  into 
ill-repute  because  of  those  among  its 
devotees  who  have  stumbled  into  wells, 
or  who  aimlessly  pass  their  lives  in 
whetting  their  faculties  and  then  neg- 
lecting to  use  them.  The  problems  of 
philosophy  are,  in  fact,  the  problems 
of  life,  the  burden  and  the  mystery  of 
existence,  the  origin  and  destiny  of 
man,  the  relations  which  he  sustains  to 
the  world  of  which  he  is  a  part,  and  to 
the  unseen  universe  which  lies  round 
about  him.  Though  they  may  not  be 
couched  in  philosophical  language,  such 
questionings  of  heart  and  of  mind  we 
cannot  wholly  silence.  For,  when  we 
are  most  deeply  engrossed  in  the  every- 


4         THE  PKOBLEMS   OF   PHILOSOPHY 

day  round  of  work  and  worry,  and  when 
the  problems  of  life  seem  to  narrow 
down  to  the  problem  of  the  ways  and 
means  of  bare  existence,  then,  — 

"  There's  a  simset-toiich 
A  fancy  from  a  flower-bell,  some  one's  death 
A  chorus-ending  from  Euripides,  — 
And  that's  enough  for  fifty  hopes,  and  fears 
As  old  and  new  at  once  as  Nature's  self." 

In  the  face  of  the  good-natured  gibe  or 
the  ill-natured  sneer,  man  is  a  philoso- 
pher in  spite  of  himself.  It  must  be  al- 
lowed, nevertheless,  that  while  there  is 
a  philosophy  which  is  spontaneous,  vital, 
and  productive,  there  is  also  a  philosophy 
which  is  inert  and  barren.  Much  that 
is  called  discussion  is  a  mere  raising  of 
the  dust  which  obscures  the  vision  and 
irritates  the  disposition.  Goethe,  him- 
self a  philosopher  as  well  as  a  poet,  has 
quite  roundly  abused  a  speculative  spirit 
of  this  kind  in  the  sneer  of  Mephis- 
topheles :  — 

"  Ich  sag'  es  dir ;  ein  Kerl  der  speculirt, 
1st  wie  ein  Thier,  auf  diirrer  Heide 
Von  eitiem  bosen  Geist  im  Kreis  gefiihrt 
Und  rings  umher  liegt  schone  griine  Weide." 


A  PLEA   FOR  PHILOSOPHY  5 

And  yet  Goethe  would  have  been  the 
first  to  defend  that  sort  of  speculation 
which  is  characterized  by  an  open  mind, 
an  earnest  spirit  of  inquiry,  and  a  love  of 
the  truth  which  draws  living  water  from 
the  deep  springs  of  reality. 

Plato  describes  philosophers  as  lovers 
of  the  truth,  of  that  which  is,  —  impas- 
sioned lovers.  This  is  the  most  satisfac- 
tory as  well  as  the  simplest  definition  of 
the  philosopher.  He  is  a  lover  of  that 
which  is,  in  distinction  from  that  which 
seems  to  be.  He  seeks  a  reason  for  the 
phenomena  of  existence;  he  is  not  satis- 
fied with  a  mere  description  of  their  mode 
of  behavior,  or  with  a  mere  formulation 
of  the  laws  which  express  the  causal  re- 
lation of  these  phenomena.  The  prob- 
lem of  philosophy  differs  from  the  problem 
of  science.  It  is  the  problem  of  science, 
as  John  Stuart  Mill  puts  it,  "  to  discover 
what  are  the  fewest  number  of  phenomenal 
data  which,  being  granted,  will  explain 
the  phenomena  of  experience."  Philoso- 
phy probes  deeper.  It  seeks  to  reveal  also 
the    raison   d'Stre   of   these   fundamental 


6         THE  PROBLEMS   OF  PHILOSOPHY 

data,  and  their  relation  to  the  thinking 
self  which  observes  them,  and  reasons 
about  them,  as  well  as  their  relation  to 
the  power  which  constitutes  and  directs 
their  elemental  energy.  The  philosopher 
should  be  the  "synoptic"  man,  one  who 
sees  the  verities  of  life  in  their  true  rela- 
tions, properly  coordinated  or  subordi- 
nated, and  who,  in  particular  pursuits, 
however  absorbing,  does  not  ignore  the 
unity  of  the  whole,  nor  overlook  the  uni- 
versal aspect  even  of  the  commonplaces  of 
life. 

The  philosopher  and  poet  here  meet  on 
common  ground.  Each  strives  to  appre- 
hend the  reality  which  underlies  appear- 
ance, to  discover  the  "open  secret  of  the 
world."  To  appreciate  the  wealth  of 
philosophy's  contribution  to  the  thought 
of  humanity,  we  must  not  forget  that, 
shorn  of  their  technical  terminology,  and 
translated  into  the  living  words  and 
flaming  symbols  of  poetry,  philosophical 
ideas  have  appealed  to  innumerable  minds 
for  whom  formal  philosophy  must  have 
remained    forever   a  sealed    book.      The 


A  PLEA  FOR  PHILOSOPHY  7 

poet  naturally  commands  a  larger  audi- 
ence than  the  philosopher,  because  of  the 
form  in  which  he  casts  his  thought,  and, 
yet,  he  is  truly  a  philosopher,  —  so  far  as 
he  is  a  true  poet,  meditating  upon  the 
deep  things  of  God,  and  hymning  his 
song  "on  man,  on  nature,  and  on  human 
life."  The  poet,  as  well  as  the  philoso- 
pher, sees  in  the  world  in  which  he  lives 
far  more  than  the  fleeting  panorama  of 
events,  and  the  surface  show  of  things. 
We  may  take  the  closing  lines  of  Kip- 
ling's "L'Envoi,"  as  a  just  expression  of 
the  ideal  of  the  poet's  life  and  work:  — 

"And  only  the  Master  shall  praise  us,  and  only  the 

Master  shall  blame ; 
And  no  one  shall  work  for  money,  and  no  one 

shall  work  for  fame; 
But  each  for  the  joy  of  the  working,  and  each  in 

his  separate  star. 
Shall  draw  the  thing  as  he  sees  it  for  the  God  of 

things  as  they  are." 

Deprive  poetry  of  this  which  it  has  in 
common  with  philosophy,  —  the  seeing  of 
things  as  they  are,  —  and  the  beauty  and 
fragrance   of   the   flower  are  gone.     The 


8         THE  PKOBLEMS   OF  PHILOSOPHY 

blending  of  philosophy  and  poetry  appears 
in  consummate  excellence  in  Tennyson's 
"In  Memoriam."  The  following  quota- 
tion from  Tennyson's  biography  will  serve 
to  illustrate  this  somewhat  at  length :  ~ 

"Men  like  Maurice  and  Robertson 
thought  that  the  author  of  '  In  Memo- 
riam '  had  made  a  definite  step  towards 
the  unification  of  the  highest  religion  and 
philosophy  with  the  progressive  science 
of  the  day ;  and  that  he  was  the  one  poet 
who,  'through  almost  the  agonies  of  a 
death-struggle,'  had  made  an  effective 
stand  against  his  own  doubts  and  diffi- 
culties, and  those  of  the  time  'on  behalf 
of  those  first  principles  which  underlie 
all  creeds,  which  belong  to  our  earliest 
childhood,  and  on  which  the  wisest  and 
best  have  rested  through  all  ages.'  "^  It 
is  this  all-embracing  vision  which  consti- 
tutes the  poetic  insight,  and  the  philo- 
sophic insight  as  well.  Though  the  poet 
may  experience  less  sombre  moods  than 
those  which   seem  to   bring  him   to   the 

1  Vol.  I,  p.  298. 


A   PLEA   FOR  PHILOSOPHY  9 

"agonies  of  a  death-struggle"  and  may 
strike  his  lyre  with  lighter  touch,  still, 
his  deeper  themes  are  no  less  susceptible 
of  a  harmonious  expression,  and  the 
chords  of  his  thought  stir  and  soothe  as 
the  more  joyous  strains  cannot  do.  Poetry 
is  but  one  of  the  many  channels  through 
which  the  flow  of  philosophical  ideas  has 
sensibly  swelled  the  world's  store  of  sen- 
timent and  of  knowledge.  The  standards 
of  every  age,  individual,  social,  and  politi- 
cal, have  been  modified  to  a  greater  or 
less  extent  by  the  influence  of  philosophi- 
cal discussion.  The  doctrines  of  the 
schools  become  at  last  the  maxims  of  the 
crowd.  The  eighteenth  century  philoso- 
phers cannot  wash  their  hands  of  the  blood 
of  the  French  Revolution.  Those  essen- 
tial principles  of  Protestantism  which 
gave  rise  to  civil  as  well  as  religious  lib- 
erty, struck  their  roots  deep  in  the  soil  of 
a  religious  philosophy.  In  Germany 
philosophical  enlightenment  gave  stim- 
ulus to  political  life,  and  created  a  lit- 
erature. Kant,  Fichte,  Schelling,  and 
Hegel  claim  spiritual  kinship  with  Her- 


10       THE  PROBLEMS   OF  PHILOSOPHY 

der,  Goethe,  Schiller,  and  Lessing.  In 
England,  we  see  that  Gladstone,  Morley, 
and  Balfour  have  given  serious  thought 
to  the  problems  of  philosophy  in  the  midst 
of  pressing  burdens  of  state,  and  the  per- 
plexities of  public  policy. 

Philosophy,  after  all,  is  no  dry-as-dust 
study.  It  is  not  a  firing  without  aim 
and  without  projectile.  Its  problems 
are  practical  questions  of  the  day.  They 
are  questions  of  every  day,  —  of  all  time. 

The  true  philosopher  is  a  brave  spirit; 
dauntless  to  discover,  and  bold  to  declare 
the  truth  at  all  hazard.  He  feels  the 
inner  constraint  of  his  messages,  and,  as 
a  prophet  to  his  day  and  generation,  he 
must  needs  speak,  though  the  whole  world 
cry  to  him,  silence.  With  singleness 
of  purpose  he  would  cheerfully  sacrifice 
place,  friends,  church,  country,  for  the 
sake  of  truth.  The  philosopher's  pur- 
suits, moreover,  have  always  stood  as  a 
tacit  protest  against  the  debasing  influ- 
ences of  the  materialistic  tendencies  of 
life,  the  greed  of  Mammon,  and  the  dead- 
ening spell  of  utilitarian  ideals ;  for  amidst 


A  PLEA   FOR   PHILOSOPHY  11 

the  levelling  forces  in  the  struggle  for 
existence,  the  philosopher  points  to  a 
higher  ideal,  and  himself  leads  the  way. 
He  is  a  prophet  as  well  as  a  schoolman. 
He  has  a  mission  to  fulfil,  as  well  as  a 
theory  to  propound.  He  is  under  con- 
straint to  utter  a  message,  as  well  as  to 
acquire  knowledge  and  to  solve  the  per- 
plexities of  his  own  mind.  The  philoso- 
pher, nevertheless,  is  not  always  a  poet 
or  a  prophet.  He  may  be  a  man  whose 
special  calling  seems  to  remove  him  very 
far  from  the  sphere  of  philosophy,  and  may 
yet  be  a  philosopher.  A  man's  life,  for 
example,  may  be  devoted  exclusively  to 
the  exacting  demands  of  the  legal  pro- 
fession, his  thoughts  absorbed  in  the  weary 
round  of  law  decisions  and  precedents, 
and  theory  may  seemingly  be  of  small 
concern  to  him,  except  so  far  as  it  may 
illumine  practice;  and  yet  he  does  not 
wholly  ignore  the  philosophy  of  law.  He 
must  be  conversant  with  the  problems 
respecting  the  fundamental  principles 
underlying  equity  and  justice.  The  stu- 
dent of   history  pushes  his    research    for 


12       THE  PROBLEMS   OF  PHILOSOPHY 

facts  with  untiring  perseverance,  and  yet 
the  result  of  his  labor  is  not  a  mere 
bundle  of  facts.  It  is  such  a  grouping  of 
consecutive  events  as  shall  reveal  the 
whole,  of  which  the  separate  facts  are 
logically  related  parts.  Thence  it  is  but 
a  step  to  a  philosophy  of  history,  and  this 
step  the  historian  is  constrained  to  take. 
And  so  throughout  the  various  spheres  of 
life  we  find  philosophical  questions  always 
emerging,  —  a  philosophy  of  conduct,  a 
philosophy  of  nature,  a  philosophy  of  art. 
Of  life  itself  there  must  be  a  philosophy. 
We  therefore  conclude  that  not  to  a 
special  class,  and  that  a  restricted  one, 
must  the  problems  of  philosophy  be  rele- 
gated. Those  problems  are  a  common 
heritage.  He  who  ignores  them  despises 
his  own  birthright.  To  acquaint  oneself 
with  the  questions  which,  in  the  various 
forms  of  statement,  every  generation  from 
time  immemorial  has  been  forced  to  face, 
is  not  a  privilege  merely,  it  is  a  duty  as 
well.  If  it  is  imperative  that  man  should 
know  the  significant  events  of  the  world's 
history,  it  is  equally  imperative  that  he 


A  PLEA   FOR   PHILOSOPHY  13 

should  be  informed  concerning  the  notable 
movements  and  epochs  in  the  history  of 
the  world's  thought,  at  any  rate,  so  far  as 
such  history  touches  upon  the  verities  of 
human  existence  and  human  welfare.  A 
history  of  philosophy  which  records  the 
achievements  of  man  in  the  field  of  mind, 
discloses  the  same  effort,  the  same  strug- 
gle and  conflict,  hope  and  despair,  victory 
and  defeat,  which  characterize  the  more 
material  and  conspicuous  deeds  of  history. 
The  rise  and  fall  of  philosophies  parallel 
the  rise  and  fall  of  nations.  The  fortunes 
of  philosophy  have  also  their  great  motives, 
their  heroes,  their  tragedies  even.  There 
is  here,  also,  onward  movement,  the 
mighty  sweep  of  a  progressive  develop- 
ment, whose  end  is  the  knowledge  of  the 
truth. 


CHAPTER   II 

THE  PEOBLEMS   OF   PHILOSOPHY 

WE  have  seen  that  philosophy  is 
concerned  with  that  which  is,  in 
contrast  witli  that  which  seems  to  be.  Its 
aim  is  to  reveal  the  reality  which  under- 
lies appearance.  Its  problem,  therefore, 
is  to  discover  the  nature  of  reality,  its 
various  modes  of  manifestation,  and  their 
relations  one  to  another.  But  what  is 
reality?  Is  it  not  merely  a  term  for  the 
philosopher  to  conjure  with,  behind  which 
he  may  craftily  conceal  his  ignorance? 
For  the  philosopher  may  prate  about 
truth,  and  reality,  and  the  eternal  veri- 
ties, and  what  not.  But  do  his  words 
stand  for  clear  intelligible  ideas  which 
the  plain  man  can  understand  and  appre- 
ciate? Let  us  examine  more  closely  the 
significance  of  this  vague  word,  reality. 
It  may  have  several  meanings,  according 

to  the  different  points  of  view  which  one 
14 


THE  PROBLEMS  OF  PHILOSOPHY       15 

takes.  We  may  regard  it  as  embodied 
in  the  physical  world,  the  world  of  land 
and  sea,  of  sky  and  trees,  of  sunshine  and 
of  storm.  The  real  therefore  will  be  to 
us  that  which  we  can  touch  and  see,  smell 
and  taste,  as  one  will  say,  "  I  know  that 
is  real  for  I  can  see  it  with  my  eyes." 
Seeing  is  believing,  and  the  testimony  of 
the  senses  is  the  superior  court  of  appeal 
in  controverted  questions.  But  the 
world  of  reality  may  be  regarded  from 
quite  a  different  point  of  view,  as  the 
world  of  consciousness,  the  mind  of  man, 
the  experiences  of  the  inner  self,  the  Ego. 
Here  is  a  world  of  phenomena  interre- 
lated and  reciprocally  dependent.  It  is 
a  realm  of  ideas,  of  memory  images,  of 
fancy,  of  will,  and  of  desire.  The  veri- 
ties in  this  world  cannot  be  seen,  or 
measured,  or  weighed,  and  yet  we  do  not 
hesitate  to  speak  of  them  as  realities; 
they  are  real  as  the  love  of  friends  is 
real,  or  the  anger  of  a  foe.  The  passion 
of  a  Romeo,  the  will  of  a  Napoleon,  the 
genius  of  a  Goethe,  the  conception  of  a 
united  fatherland  in  the  fancy  of  a  Bis- 


16       THE  PKOBLEMS   OF   PHILOSOPHY 

marck,  these  are  realities.  A  deeper  sig- 
nificance of  the  real,  and  still  further 
removed  from  the  sphere  of  sense-percep- 
tion is  that  of  the  reality  wh'ch  lies  behind 
the  world  of  sight  and  of  sound,  of  thought 
and  of  desire,  the  real  as  eternal,  "the 
hidden  purpose  of  that  Power  which  alone 
is  great,  and  the  myriad  world  His 
shadow."  To  some  it  may  seem  that  we 
have  here  undertaken  an  excursion  into 
the  territory  of  the  unreal;  to  others, 
however,  such  an  idea  appeals  as  the  verity 
of  verities. 

The  subject  matter  of  philosophy,  "  that 
which  is,"  that  sphere  of  reality  which 
seemed  at  first  so  obscurely  outlined,  we 
have  found  to  comprise  three  definite 
divisions,  nature,  mind,  and  God.  It 
is  the  province  of  philosophy  not  merely 
to  consider  reality  under  each  one  of 
these  aspects  separately,  but  also  to 
consider  the  relations  which  obtain  be- 
tween them,  that  is,  the  relation  between 
the  world  and  man,  between  man  and 
God,  and  between  God  and  the  world. 
Various  lines   of   inquiry  are   thus   sug- 


THE   PROBLEMS   OF   PHILOSOPHY       17 

gested  which  serve  to  outline  the  separate 
spheres,  and  general  scope  of  the  various 
branches  of  philosophy,  and  to  define  the 
nature  and  manner  of  their  reciprocal  re- 
lations. Such  a  bird's-eye  view  of  the 
territory  of  philosophy  is  called  a  philo- 
sophical encyclopaedia. 

That  portion  of  the  philosophical  ter- 
ritory which  we  will  first  consider,  is 
metaphysics.  This  is  a  term  used  origi- 
nally by  Aristotle  to  designate  that  part 
of  his  philosophy  which  came  after  {/lera} 
his  physics.  It  has  come,  however,  to 
mean  an  inquiry  which  differs  essen- 
tially from  a  physical  mode  of  investi- 
gation. Physical  research  is  connected 
with  phenomena,  their  nature,  description, 
and  measurement,  leading  to  the  discov- 
ery and  formulation  of  the  laws  of  their 
behavior.  Metaphysical  investigation  at- 
tempts to  explain  the  fundamental  nature 
of  that  which  underlies  phenomenal  ap- 
pearance, and  constitutes  its  primary 
essence.  Metaphysics  goes  behind  the 
results  of  physics,  seeking  their  deeper 
significance.  There  is,  moreover,  a  sec- 
c 


18       THE  PROBLEMS   OF  PHILOSOPHY 

ond  point  of  difference:  metaphysics  not 
only  sees  deeper,  but  with  a  more  extended 
vision.  For,  while  phj^sics  deals  prima- 
rily with  special  problems  such  as  elec- 
tricity, magnetism,  or  heat,  metaphysics, 
with  a  .broad  sweep  of  inquiry,  puts  the 
question  as  to  the  nature  of  being  in 
general,  and  not  any  particular  manifes- 
tation of  it.  Metaphysics  is  generally 
regarded  as  restricted  in  its  scope  to  two 
special  lines  of  inquiry:  First,  what  is 
the  nature  of  being  in  general?  This  is 
the  problem  of  ontology.  Second,  what 
is  the  origin  of  the  universe?  This  is 
the  problem  of  cosmology. 

In  the  problem  of  ontology  we  are 
confronted  at  once  by  an  idea  which  is 
enveloped  in  the  mists  of  indefiniteness. 
Being  is  so  vague  a  term  that  it  may 
mean  anything  or  nothing.  When  a 
physical  problem  is  presented  for  inves- 
tigation, as,  for  example,  the  nature  of 
electricity,  the  task  before  us  is  specific 
and  definite;  we  know  the  problem  that  is 
set  us  even  though  we  may  despair  of  an 
adequate  solution.     But  the  question  as 


THE   PROBLEMS   OF   PHILOSOPHY       19 

to  the  nature  of  being  presents  evident 
difficulties;  for  how  can  we  solve  the 
problem  when  its  very  statement  either 
conveys  no  meaning  to  our  minds  or  so 
indefinite  a  one  as  to  preclude  any  spe- 
cific method  of  inquiry?  However,  the 
indefinite  problem  as  to  the  nature  of 
being  has  been  narrowed,  in  metaphysical 
discussion,  to  quite  a  definite  question: 
Are  the  phenomena  of  the  universe 
through  all  possible  phases  of  their 
manifestation,  at  the  last  analysis,  of  a 
material  nature  or  of  a  spiritual,  or  are 
they  of  both  a  material  and  a  spiritual 
nature?  Is  mind  or  matter  at  the  basis 
of  all  things  ?  The  different  theories  ad- 
vanced in  answer  to  this  question,  the 
endless  discussions  and  dis^^utes,  the 
philosophical  schools  which  in  conse- 
quence have  arisen,  all  lie  in  the  sphere 
of  ontology,  or  the  science  of  being. 

In  the  proffered  solutions  of  the  prob- 
lem of  ontology,  two  tendencies  may  be 
indicated,  one  towards  monism,  the  other 
towards  dualism.  Monism  recognizes 
but  one  kind  of  being:     It  is  either  ma- 


20       THE   PROBLEMS   OF   PHILOSOPHY 

terialism,  which  reduces  all  psychical 
phenomena  to  a  physical  basis,  that  is, 
mind  is  regarded  as  a  manifestation  of 
matter,  and  thought,  feeling,  and  Avill  as 
merely  brain  products;  or,  we  may  have 
spiritualism,  which  explains  everything 
material  as  the  manifestation  of  a  force 
which  is  psychical  in  its  origin  and  nat- 
ure, the  world  being  regarded  as  a  shadow 
world  in  which  spirit  embodies  itself  in 
outer  forms  which  are  merely  the  ghosts 
of  reality.  In  one  case  mind  is  inter- 
preted in  terms  of  matter,  and  in  the 
other,  matter  in  terms  of  mind.  Dual- 
ism, however,  holds  that  there  are  two 
kinds  of  being,  matter  and  mind,  separate 
and  distinct,  yet  capable  of  mutual  inter- 
action; and  insists  that  there  is  a  real 
world  of  mind  and  that  there  is  a  real 
world  of  matter. 

The  second  distinctly  metaph5^sical 
problem  is  that  of  cosmology,  or  the 
science  of  the  world;  not  as  to  the 
nature  of  the  world  and  its  phenomena, 
for  that  would  be  the  problem  of  on- 
tology, but  as  to  the  origin  of  the  world. 


THE  PROBLEMS   OF  PHILOSOPHY       21 

quite  irrespective  of  the  question  whether 
the  world  is  all  matter,  or  all  mind,  or 
partly  matter  and  partly  mind.  The 
world  may  be  explained  mechanically, 
that  is,  any  given  phenomenon  may  be 
accounted  for  by  referring  it  to  its  ap- 
propriate cause.  Those  who  are  satis- 
fied with  the  explanation  of  the  universe 
as  an  endless  chain,  or  to  use  a  more 
adequate  simile,  a  network  of  intimately 
related  causes  and  effects,  are  content 
to  rest  the  case  here.  Concerning  the 
supreme  Being  behind  phenomena,  they 
are  either  agnostics  or  atheists.  The 
former  say  we  know  not  whether  there 
be  a  God;  the  latter  say,  we  know  there 
is  no  God. 

In  addition  to  the  mechanical  explana- 
tion of  the  universe,  it  is  urged  that  there 
is  a  teleological  explanation,  that  is,  the 
discernment  of  an  end  (re^Xo?)  or  purpose 
in  the  midst  of  the  mechanically  related 
phenomena  of  existence.  Thus  the  ques- 
tion of  cosmology  leads  to  the  problem 
concerning  the  relation  of  God  to  the 
world.     As    to    this    relation    there    are 


22       THE  PROBLEMS   OF   PHILOSOPHY 

various  answers  :  polytheism,  theism, 
deism,  pantheism.  Polytheism  peoples 
the  world  with  many  gods,  sometimes 
coox3erating,  sometimes  in  conflict,  gods 
of  one  tribe  warring  with  the  god  of  a 
rival  tribe.  Deism,  pantheism,  and 
theism  agree  in  affirming  one  only 
living  and  true  God  in  opposition  to 
polytheism.  Deists  believe  in  a  God  as 
creator  of  the  universe,  which,  however, 
through  the  general  laws  and  constitution 
of  its  elements,  runs  of  itself  without 
divine  cooperation  or  intervention.  Pan- 
theism regards  the  universe  as  the  com- 
prehensive manifestation  of  God;  God  is 
everything,  everything  is  God.  Theism 
mediates  between  the  tenets  of  deism,  on 
the  one  hand,  and  those  of  pantheism,  on 
the  other,  maintaining  the  proposition 
that  God  is  distinct  from  the  world,  as 
opposed  to  pantheism,  and  yet  operative 
in  the  world,  as  opposed  to  deism. 

These  two  branches,  ontology  and  cos- 
mology, comprehend  the  problems  of 
metaphysics.  The  term,  metaphysics, 
however,  is  often  used  in  a  more  general 


THE  PROBLEMS   OF   PHILOSOPHY       23 

sense,  as  equivalent  to  all  that  transcends 
the  physical  methods  of  investigation  and 
the  mechanical  point  of  view.  The 
phrases,  the  metaphysics  of  ethics,  the 
metaphysics  of  law,  the  metaphysics  of 
art,  indicate  the  wider  use  of  the  term. 

The  special  province,  however,  of 
metaphysics  is  that  which  has  been  out- 
lined above,  as  including  ontology  and 
cosmolog}^ 

Of  the  three  aspects  of  reality,  God, 
the  world,  and  man,  the  study  of  man 
forms  a  separate  branch  of  philosophy. 
And  the  term,  man,  as  thus  used,  means 
mind,  the  ^jrvxvi  hence  the  name,  psy- 
chology, or  the  study  of  the  psychical 
part  of  man's  nature.  In  psychology 
we  find  certain  general  questions  as  to 
the  origin,  nature,  or  development  of 
mind,  or  consciousness.  These  questions 
lie  within  the  sphere  of  psychology  con- 
sidered as  essentially  a  philosophical 
discipline.  There  are  special  problems, 
however,  which  require  detailed  investi- 
gation through  observation  and  experi- 
ment.    This  is  the  field  of  experimental 


24       THE  PROBLEMS   OF  PHILOSOPHY 

psycholog}^  and  constitutes  a  special  sci- 
ence, closely  related  to  and  yet  distinct 
from  philosophical  psychology.  For  in- 
stance, in  the  sphere  of  perception,  philo- 
sophical questions  emerge  which  relate  to 
the  theory  of  perception,  the  doctrine  of 
its  space  and  time  conditions,  to  v^hat 
extent  the  mind  contributes  to  the  process 
of  perception,  etc.  Special  psychology 
proceeds  to  investigate  the  phenomena  of 
perception,  to  measure  duration  and  in- 
tensity of  the  stimulus  which  produces 
the  sensation.  The  tendenc}^  of  modern 
research  is  to  reduce  psychology  to  a 
special  experimental  science,  and  to 
overlook  the  more  general  questions  of 
a  philosophical  nature. 

In  the  province  of  mind  we  find  cer- 
tain striking  phenomena,  a  study  of  whose 
nature  has  given  rise  to  much  thought  and 
to  much  discussion,  and  Avhich  has  led 
to  a  special  branch  of  philosophical  in- 
quiry, known  as  epistemology,  or  the 
theory  of  knowledge.  It  is  a  study  of 
mind  under  its  central  aspect,  that  of 
the  knowing  mind.     There  are  here  two 


THE  PROBLEMS   OF  PHILOSOPHY       25 

questions  of  special  interest  and  signifi- 
cance which  suggest  themselves.  The 
first  is,  what  is  the  relation  of  the  self 
which  knows  to  the  world  which  is  known. 
We  found  that  the  question  of  ontology 
and  cosmology  referred  to  the  nature  and 
mutual  relations  of  God  and  the  world. 
The  problems  of  philosophical  psychology 
relate  to  the  nature  and  origin  of  the  con- 
scious self.  The  question  of  episte- 
mology  concerns  the  relation  of  self  in 
one  of  its  principal  functions,  the  self  as 
knowing,  to  the  world  w^hich  the  self 
comes  to  know.  The  answers  to  this 
question  give  rise  to  two  opposed  philo- 
sophical schools,  that  of  realism  and  that 
of  idealism.  The  former  hold  that  the 
world  is  distinct  from  the  self,  which  is 
aware  of  it,  and  Exists  independently  of 
the  observing  consciousness.  The  ideal- 
ist enters  here  a  vigorous  protest:  "Not 
so  fast.  All  that  I  know,  really  know, 
is  at  the  last  analysis  the  idea  which  is 
wholly  within  the  sphere  of  consciousness. 
An  object  I  know  onl}?-  so  far  as  I  appre- 
hend the  idea  which  constitutes  my  per- 


26       THE   PROBLEMS   OF   PHILOSOPHY 

ception  of  it.  The  cliair  before  my  desk 
is  present  to  my  consciousness,  vivid, 
clear,  real;  but  I  close  my  eyes,  the  chair 
vanishes.  My  consciousness  of  the  chair 
is  a  mental  fact,  not  a  material  thing.  I 
know  the  mental  fact,  but  what  assurance 
have  I  that  there  is  a  material  object  cor- 
responding to  the  mental  image  of  it?" 
Has  the  object  an  existence  independent 
of  the  perceiving  mind?  The  idealist 
says  emphatically.  No!  The  realist 
urges  his  affirmative  convictions  quite 
as  emphatically,  and  so  the  time-honored 
discussion  runs  on  from  one  generation  of 
philosophers  to  another. 

There  is  still  a  second  question  as  to 
the  nature  of  knowledge,  and  this  con- 
cerns its  source.  Does  all  our  knowledge 
originate  through  experience,  and  espe- 
cially through  the  avenues  of  the  senses, 
or  is  there  something  in  the  very  constitu- 
tion of  mind  itself,  which  modifies  the 
crude  data  of  sense-perception,  and  thereby 
contributes  in  the  construction  of  our 
world  of  knowledge?  Is  there  anj^thing 
which    I    may  know  to   be   true  without 


THE  PROBLEMS   OF   PHILOSOPHY       27 

putting  it  to  the  trial  of  my  senses,  or  to 
the  test  of  experiment,  such "as  measuring, 
weighing,  or  counting?  Do  I  know,  for 
instance,  prior  to  all  experience,  the  truth 
of  the  proposition'  that  the  things  which 
are  equal  to  the  same  things  are  equal  to 
each  other,  or  must  L  prove  it  by  actual 
experiment?  Do  I  know,  intuitively, 
that  every  event  must  have  a  cause,  or 
does  the  conviction  of  this  truth  grad- 
ually dawn  upon  me  with  the  widen- 
ing spheres  of  observation  and  inference? 
Here,  again,  we  have,  in  answer  to  such 
questions,  two  schools  of  philosophy, 
that  of  empiricism  and  that  of  rational- 
ism. The  empiricist  insists  that  all 
knowledge  is  the  outcome  of  experience, 
while  the  rationalist  refers  knowledofe 
to  the  understanding  as  its  primal 
source,  whence  arise  necessary  and  uni- 
versally valid  principles  of  thought, 
which  are  prior  to  any  experience,  and 
which  also  condition  and  modify  experi- 
ence. The  terms,  a  priori  and  a  poste- 
riori^ are  used  to  express  this  distinction, 
as    regards    knowledge    which    is    before 


28       THE   PROBLEMS   OF   PHILOSOPHY 

and  knowledge  which  is  after  experi- 
ence. 

There  is  still  another  quarter  of  the 
philosophical  territory,  which  comprises 
several  distinct  divisions  which  have 
as  a  common  feature,  that  they  inquire, 
not  as  to  the  nature  of  that  which  is,  but 
of  that  which  should  be.  Hence  they  are 
called  normative ;  that  is,  they  deal  with 
a  norm,  or  standard  of  being,  which  serves 
as  an  ideal  according  to  which  the  phe- 
nomena in  these  several  spheres  are  to  be 
judged.  There  are  three  such  disciplines : 
logic,  which  furnishes  the  norm  of  the 
true;  ethics,  the  norm  of  the  right  or 
the  good;  and  sesthetics,  the  norm  of  the 
beautiful.  The  first  relates  to  the  laws 
of  reason;  the  second  to  an  ideal  of  con- 
duct; the  third  to  the  canons  of  taste. 
Logic,  ethics,  and  sesthetics  correspond 
roughly  to  the  three  main  divisions  of  the 
mind,  the  intellect,  the  will,  and  the 
feelings. 

The  normative  sciences  differ  from  the 
others  in  that  their  judgments  are  judg- 
ments of  valuation  rather  than   of   fact. 


THE   PROBLEMS   OF  PHILOSOPHY       29 

Psychology  deals  with  the  actual  phe- 
nomena of  consciousness,  their  origin, 
their  nature,  their  causes  and  effects. 
Psychology  is  not  concerned  with  the 
worth  of  a  mental  experience;  right  and 
wrong  actions  are  accounted  for  indiffer- 
ently upon  a  strict  basis  of  mental  inter- 
pretation. Ethics,  however,  discriminates 
between  radically  different  kinds  of 
actions,  which  have  a  certain  worth  as 
tested  by  some  definite  standard  of  con- 
duct. In  a  like  manner  logic  discrimi- 
nates between  the  true  and  the  false,  and 
aesthetics  between  the  beautiful,  the  har- 
monious, and  symmetrical,  on  the  one 
hand,  and,  on  the  other,  the  ugly,  the 
discordant,  and  the  unsymmetrical.  The 
relation  between  the  normative  and  the 
factual  sciences,  however,  is  most  inti- 
mate. That  which  is  followed  as  an  ideal 
w^ill  be  visionary  and  misleading  unless 
grounded  upon  a  comprehensive  knowl- 
edge of  the  practical  limitations  and 
possibilities  which  the  facts  of  mind  ne- 
cessitate. A  study  of  the  psychology  of 
the    reason   must    therefore    precede    the 


80       THE   PROBLEMS   OF   PHILOSOPHY 

study  of  logic  itself.  The  psychology  of 
sensibility  and  of  will  must  ground  the 
theory  of  our  moral  consciousness.  A 
fundamental  knowledge  of  the  emotions 
must  precede  an  inquiry  concerning  the 
principles  of  aesthetics. 

To  resume,  we  have  found  that  the 
ideas  of  the  world,  of  man,  and  of  God 
form  the  subject  matter  of  the  various 
philosophical  sciences.  The  most  gen- 
eral problem,  that  of  being,  in  its  most 
comprehensive  significance  without  re- 
garding its  separate  aspects  of  God,  of 
man,  and  of  the  world,  will  lead  us  into 
the  territory  of  ontology.  The  problem 
of  the  world  and  of  the  relation  of  the 
world  to  God,  brings  us  into  the  neigh- 
boring province  of  cosmology.  The 
problem  of  man,  and  by  man  is  meant  the 
mind  in  man,  brings  us  into  the  field  of 
philosophical  psychology,  and  specializing 
in  this  territory  as  regards  the  relation  of 
the  knowing  mind  to  the  world,  we  reach 
the  more  restricted  sphere  of  epistemol- 
ogy.  Shifting  our  point  of  view  to  the 
guiding  principles  which  operate  as  laws 


THE  PROBLEMS   OF   PHILOSOPHY       31 

to  our  mental  activities,  and  represent  the 
ideal  relations  of  the  reasoning,  willing, 
feeling  man  to  the  world,  or  to  God,  we 
find  ourselves  in  the  region  of  ethics, 
logic,  and  aesthetics .  Such  are  the  gen- 
eral features,  roughly  sketched,  of  the 
land  which  invites  a  more  extended 
exploration. 


CHAPTER  III 

THE  PEOBLEM  OF  BEING  ("  ONTOLOGY ") 

THE  problem  of  being,  or  ontology,  is 
that  department  of  philosophy  which 
treats,  in  its  most  comprehensive  signifi- 
cance, the  fundamental  nature  of  that 
which  is.  What  is  the  common  essence 
of  all  substances  midst  their  varying 
forms  of  manifestation?  We  may  com- 
pare a  plant,  a  stone,  an  animal,  a  man, 
and  ask  the  question.  Is  there  a  common 
element  at  the  basis  of  all  these  particu- 
lar things  from  which  the  plant  is  fash- 
ioned after  its  kind,  and  the  animal  after 
its  kind? 

There  is  an  unexpressed  philosophy  in 
the  solemn  words,  "ashes  to  ashes,  and 
dust  to  dust,"  —  a  final  reduction  of  all 
living  forms  to  the  inert  mother  of  them 
all.  But  there  is,  on  the  other  hand,  a 
tendency  to  elevate  matter  into  the  sphere 
of  mind,  which  is  quite  as  pronounced  as 

32 


THE  PROBLEM  OF   BEING  33 

the  attempt  to  reduce  all  things  to  matter. 
The  problem  of  ontology,  translated  into 
popular  phrase,  is  the  much  vexed  ques- 
tion of  the  relations  of  mind  and  matter. 
The  attempted  solutions  of  this  problem 
may  be  classified  according  to  their  ex- 
pression of  any  one  of  the  following  char- 
acteristics :  1.  Pluralism ;  2.  Dualism ; 
3.   Monism. 

Pluralism.  —  Pluralism  is  a  theory  of 
the  universe  which  recognizes  several  fun- 
damental elements  of  being,  which  may  be 
regarded  as  analogous  in  their  nature  to 
the  original  elements  of  chemistry.  They 
cannot  be  farther  reduced  to  simpler 
forms,  nor  derived  from  anything  else, 
nor  from  each  other.  The  earliest  ex- 
pression of  this  theory  is  found  in  the 
atomism  of  Democritus.  He  insisted 
that  the  world  was  made  up  of  innumer- 
able atoms,  independent,  self-existing  bits 
of  being,  which  could  not  be  referred  to 
a  common  source,  and  which  gave  no  in- 
dication of  possessing  a  common  nature. 
Later  in  the  history  of  philosophic  thought 
we  have  another  illustration  of  the  plu- 


34       THE  PROBLEMS   OF   PHILOSOPHY 

ralistic  point  of  view  in  the  so-called 
monads  of  Leibniz.  These  Avere  refined 
atoms;  centres  of  force  rather  than  cen- 
tres of  matter  and  therefore  at  the  last 
analysis  of  a  psychical  rather  than  a  physi- 
cal nature. 

But  even  in  these  pluralistic  explana- 
tions of  being  there  is  a  tendency  towards 
an  indefinite  sort  of  unity  underlying  the 
manifold  differences.  The  teachings  of 
Democritus  imply  a  certain  community 
of  nature  among  his  atoms,  which  were 
regarded  as  alike  qualitatively  though 
differing  constitutionally  in  form  and 
size,  just  as  we  say  a  rough  block  of 
marble  and  a  statue  are  alike,  yet  differ- 
ent. Leibniz's  doctrine  manifested  a  like 
tendency,  inasmuch  as  he  regarded  all  his 
monads  as  possessing  two  fundamental 
characteristics  in  common,  namely,  the 
elements  of  perceiving  and  of  striving. 
We  find,  therefore,  that  beneath  the  many 
of  Democritus  there  was  a  materialistic 
substratum,  indicating  a  oneness  of  ori- 
gin, while  beneath  the  many  of  Leibniz 
there  was  a  psychical  or  soul  basis  as  an 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  BEING  35 

abiding  unity  in  the  midst  of  the  indefi- 
nite variety  of  monads. 

Dualism. — If  we  imagine  the  tenden- 
cies in  Democritus,  and  in  Leibniz,  as 
emerging  at  a  common  point,  we  will  find 
the  materialistic  and  spiritualistic  concep- 
tions uniting  in  that  explanation  of  the 
nature  of  being  which  is  known  as  dual- 
ism. This  explanation  conceives  being 
in  general,  as  partly  material  and  partly 
spiritual  in  its  manifestation.  The  ex- 
pression of  dualism  is  represented  by  the 
doctrines  of  Descartes,  who  is  regarded  as 
the  father  of  modern  philosophy.  Accord- 
ing to  hiiji  the  essence  of  matter  is  exten- 
sion, that  is,  the  occupying  of  some  portion 
of  space,  the  spread-outedness  of  a  body. 
The  essence  of  mind,  however,  is  thought. 
These  two  essences  are  radically  distinct, 
the  one,  res  extensa^  extended  being,  the 
other,  res  cogitans^  or  thinking  being. 
The  theory  of  dualism  further  holds  that 
the  relation  of  extended  matter  to  the 
thinking  mind  is  one  of  mutual  interac- 
tion. It  is  known  as  the  "reaction" 
theory,'   at  the  presence  of   one   form  of 


36       THE  PROBLEMS   OF  PHILOSOPHY 

being,  as  stimulus  operating  according  to 
its  proper  mode  of  activity,  the  corre- 
sponding form  of  being  reacts  in  response 
according  to  its  own  mode  of  manifesta- 
tion. There  are  many  difficulties,  how- 
ever, which  are  connected  with  this 
theory.  All  sensory  stimulus  is  essen- 
tially motion,  as  is  seen  in  the  waves  of 
sound  vibrations  which  strike  the  ear,  or 
the  light  waves  impinging  upon  the 
retina.  How,  then,  can  that  which  is 
essentially  motion  influence  or  act  upon 
that  whose  essence  is  thought?  There  is 
no  common  denominator  here. 

No  theory  of  cause  and  effect,  as  we 
understand  cause,  can  explain  the  rela- 
tion between  such  disparate  phenomena. 
There  have  been,  however,  several  at- 
tempts to  explain  this  difficulty,  as  Leib- 
niz's celebrated  doctrine  of  preestablished 
harmony.  Leibniz  maintained  that  body 
and  mind  only  seem  to  interact,  but  that 
there  is  no  real  connection  between  the 
two.  The  mind  wills  and  an  arm  moves 
simultaneously,  but  the  Avill  does  not 
move  the  arm.     The  thought-sphere  is  a 


THE  PROBLEM  OF   BEING  37 

closed  circle;  so,  also,  tlie  motor-sphere. 
They  act,  however,  in  unison  according 
to  a  prearranged  programme,  —  a  preestab- 
lished  harmony  which  a  divine  mind  alone 
could  conceive,  establish,  and  execute. 
Another  device  to  reconcile  the  difficul- 
ties in  the  case  is  that  known  as  occasion- 
alism, a  theory  associated  with  the  name 
of  Geulincx,  the  most  brilliant  represent- 
ative of  the  Cartesian  school.  He  held 
that  God  intervenes  upon  the  occasion  of 
every  volition  in  order  to  stimulate  the 
motor  activity  which  the  mind  by  itself 
is  incapable  of  originating,  and  in  like 
manner  upon  the  occasion  of  every  physi- 
cal stimulus,  there  is  a  similar  interven- 
tion to  produce  a  corresponding  mental 
activity  resulting  in  sensation  and  per- 
ception. 

Both  of  these  views  negative  the  free- 
dom of  man.  The  power  of  human  initia- 
tive is  lost.  Man  becomes  virtually  an 
automaton  in  the  loss  of  his  individuality 
and  responsibility.  He  is  the  harp  of  a 
thousand  strings  played  upon  by  a  divine 
hand,  but  not  a  man! 


38       THE   PROBLEMS   OF  PHILOSOPHY 

Monism.  —  This  is  the  theory  of  being 
which  recognizes  but  one  sort  of  essence 
in  everything,  however  manifold  may 
seem  the  variety  of  nature's  manifesta- 
tions. There  are  three  distinct  forms  of 
monism:  — 

(a)  Materialism,  which  regards  mind 
as  a  form  or  product  of  matter. 

(5)  Spiritualism,  which  regards  matter 
as  a  form  or  product  of  mind. 

(c)  The  Identity  theory,  which  regards 
matter  and  mind  as  different  phases  in  the 
manifestation  of  one  and  the  same  being, 
which  is  itself  neither  matter  nor  mind. 

Materialism.  —  Materialism  would  re- 
duce all  mental  phenomena  to  simple 
effects  or  by-products  of  matter.  This 
theory  fortifies  itself  by  the  evident  fact 
that  there  is  no  perception,  no  memorj^, 
no  will,  no  emotion,  without  a  correspond- 
ing modification  of  the  brain  tissue.  The 
philosophical  postulate  of  materialism  is 
expressed  in  the  epigrammatical  propo- 
sition, "No  psychosis  without  neurosis," 
i.e.  it  is  impossible  to  have  mind  func- 
tion without  brain  function,  no  thought 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  BEING  39 

without  an  indispensable  accompanying 
change  in  the  cerebral  centres.  If  you 
injure  the  brain,  consciousness  ceases 
wholly,  or  in  part;  or,  at  least,  the  normal 
functions  are  seriously  deranged.  Stimu- 
lants excite,  ansesthetics  benumb  the 
sensibilities.  In  the  light  of  these  in- 
disputable facts  many  are  led  to  the  con- 
viction which  is  expressed  in  the  words 
of  the  eminent  French  ph3^sician,  Cabanis : 
"Thought  is  a  function  of  the  brain  as 
digestion  is  a  function  of  the  stomach, 
and  the  secretion  of  bile  the  function  of 
the  liver."  The  tenets  of  materialism  are 
nowhere  more  sententiously  epitomized 
than  in  the  gross  pun  of  Feuerbach,  one 
of  the  most  pronounced  of  the  German 
materialists :  "Der  Mensch  ist  was  er  isst," 
Man  is  (ist)  what  he  eats  (isst). 

The  materialist  claims  that  he  holds  an 
impregnable  position  in  entrenching  him- 
self behind  the  accepted  doctrine  of  the 
conservation  of  energy,  which  precludes 
the  possibility  of  there  being  any  force  in 
the  universe  which  cannot  be  expressed  in 
mechanical  terms.     For,  as  heat  generates 


40       THE  PROBLEMS   OF   PHILOSOPHY 

steam,  and  steam  produces  motion,  and 
motion  initiates  an  electric  current  Avhich 
appears  as  transformed  energy  in  the  arc 
light  or  motor  appliances,  and  yet  through 
all  these  different  manifestations  there  is 
only  a  transfer  of  energy  from  one  form 
to  another,  no  new  energy  being  added, 
and  none  lost,  so,  also,  the  energy  pro- 
duced by  vibratory  sound  waves  is  trans- 
formed by  impact  upon  the  tympanum  of 
the  ear  into  a  nerve  disturbance,  which,  in 
turn,  is  transmitted  by  the  sensory  nerve 
channels  to  the  brain,  there  producing  an 
effect  after  its  kind.  The  idea  of  a  mani- 
festation other  than  material  appearing  at 
the  end  of  a  series  of  causally  related  phe- 
nomena, which,  at  the  beginning  and 
through  all  the  intermediate  stages,  is 
essentially  mechanical,  does  violence,  the 
materialist  would  insist,  to  the  fundamen- 
tal and  universal  laws  of  matter  as  ex- 
pressed in  the  doctrine  of  the  conservation 
of  energy.  The  materialists,  therefore, 
in  their  line  of  defence  maintain  these 
two  closely  allied  positions,  the  unbroken 
continuity  of  the  physiological  nerve-brain 


THE   PROBLEM   OF   BEING  41 

circuit,  and  the  law  of  the  conservation  of 
energy;  they  insist  that  not  only  is  there 
then  no  place,  but  also  no  necessity  for 
any  additional  force  which  differs  in  kind 
from  matter. 

There  is  still  another  doctrine,  known 
as  the  parsimony  of  causes,  to  which  the 
materialists  appeal.  The  doctrine  is,  that 
when  a  known  cause  will  adequately  ac- 
count for  any  given  effect,  it  is  a  work  of 
supererogation  to  search  for  additional 
causes  to  explain  the  effect  in  question. 
Physical  causes  are  all  sufficient;  why 
then  waste  time  and  thought  in  a  fruitless 
quest  beyond  the  sphere  of  the  known  and 
the  material? 

We  come  now  to  consider  some  of  the 
difficulties  of  the  materialistic  position 
which  naturally  suggest  themselves.  In 
the  first  place,  their  argument,  based  upon 
the  doctrine  of  the  conservation  of  energy, 
may  be  turned  against  themselves.  It  is 
in  this  respect  a  veritable  two-edged 
sword,  for  inasmuch  as  at  the  beginning 
of  the  series  and  through  all  its  sequences 
we  have  an  unbroken  line  of  mechanical 


42       THE  PROBLEMS   OF   PHILOSOPHY 

causation,  and  yet  the  fact  remains  tliat 
the  final  term  is  manifestly  of  such  a 
nature  that  between  it  and  the  other  terms 
of  the  series  there  is  no  likeness,  and  no 
common  factor,  the  conclusion  seems  ne- 
cessitated that  this  final  term  cannot  be 
referred  to  a  mechanical  antecedent  as  its 
sole  cause.  It  must  be  other  than  mate- 
rial, namely,  that  which  we  call  psychical. 
With  the  same  premises  there  are  thus  two 
conflicting  inferences.  Given  a  mechanical 
series  ending  in  a  psychical  phenomenon, 
the  materialist  draws  the  inference,  that 
the  psychical  phenomenon  is  not  really 
such  but  only  seems  to  be;  that  it  is  in 
reality  purely  physical,  for  the  matrix 
from  which  it  emerges  is  physical.  The 
opposed  view  insists  that  the  final  term  is 
so  radically  different  in  kind  as  to  enjoin 
the  materialist  from  attempting  to  corre- 
late the  material  and  mental  phenomena 
under  one  and  the  same  law  of  universal 
causation.  This  latter  view  acknowledges 
that  the  mental  and  material  are  invari- 
ably found  together,  and  yet  contends 
that  it  is  a  gratuitous  assumption  to  in- 


THE  PROBLEM   OF  BEING  43 

sist  tliat  they  are  connected  as  cause   and 
effect. 

In  any  effect,  moreover,  there  is  always 
evidence  of  the  energy  which  was  present 
in  the  cause  and  was  operative  in  produc- 
ing that  effect.  That  energy  may  be,  it 
is  true,  transformed  to  a  great  extent,  but 
the  form,  however  changed,  will  always 
readily  show  traces  of  a  material  origin, 
inasmuch  as  it  will  evidence  itself  in  some 
one  or  other  of  the  various  manifestations 
of  motion.  In  the  phenomena  of  con- 
sciousness, however,  in  our  thoughts,  de- 
sires, volitions,  we  have  no  trace  of  a 
material  origin.  That  which  is  thought  or 
feeling  cannot  be  translated  into  terms  of 
matter  and  motion.  Moreover,  if  the  ma- 
terial energy  has  been  transformed  into 
psychical  force,  there  is  an  evident  loss  of 
material  energy  as  such.  This,  however, 
would  contravene  the  doctrine  of  the 
conservation  of  energy  which  requires  a 
constant  amount  of  energy  which  cannot 
possibly  sustain  a  loss,  however  insignifi- 
cant that  loss  may  seem  to  be.  The  con- 
ception of  an  endless  series  of  cause  and 


44       THE  PROBLEMS   OF   PHILOSOPHY 

effect  in  which  all  phenomena  of  the  nni- 
verse,  without  exception,  are  to  be  found, 
is  a  convenient  and  most  comfortable 
theory.  It  simplifies  the  problems  of  ex- 
istence, and  dismisses  many  perplexing 
questions.  The  phenomena  of  experi- 
ence, however,  as  they  appear  in  con- 
sciousness are  too  complex,  too  unique,  to 
be  forced  into  the  closed  circle  of  physical 
phenomena.  The  explanation  of  mind,  as 
the  product  of  material  forces,  is,  more- 
over, necessarily  stated  in  terms  and  by 
means  of  concepts  essentially  mental. 
We  are  confronted,  therefore,  with  this 
anomaly,  that  the  mind  is  accounted  for 
by  an  idea,  namely,  the  idea  of  universal 
causation,  which  idea  must  have  been  it- 
self constructed  by  the  mind  which  it 
purports  to  explain.  There  is  here  evi- 
dently a  "weak  arguing  and  a  fallacious 
drift." 

The  doctrine  of  materialism  runs  coun- 
ter to  the  theory  of  evolution,  although 
the  materialists  very  confidently  refer 
to  this  theory  as  fortifying  their  own 
position.     If  consciousness  is  a  by-prod- 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  BEING  45 

uct  of  cerebral  functions,  and  is  in  no 
sense  a  real  factor  amid  the  causal  series 
of  pli3'siological  excitations  and  corre- 
sponding reactions,,  then  the  phenomena 
of  consciousness  can  have  been  of  no  real 
advantage  to  the  organism  in  the  process 
of  its  development.  For,  if  it  is  not  a  real 
factor  and  does  not  initiate  any  activity 
or  modify,  in  any  degree  whatever,  its 
physical  accompaniments,  then  it  cannot 
influence  the  develoj)ment  of  the  organ- 
ism one  way  or  the  other.  But  it  is  one 
of  the  essentials  of  evolution  that  what- 
ever function  fails  to  influence  the  growth 
of  the  organism  tends  therefore  to  disap- 
pear entirely  in  the  process  of  develop- 
ment. In  passing,  however,  from  a  lower 
to  a  higher  order  of  animal  life  we  are 
struck  with  the  growing  complexity  and 
scope  of  the  phenomena  of  consciousness. 
They  do  not  tend  to  disappear.  On  the 
contrary,  we  are  confronted  with  the  pal- 
pable fact  that  consciousness  with  its 
power  of  initiative  has  proved  the  potent 
factor  in  the  activities  and  achievements 
of  man,  which  has  assured  the  preservation 


46       THE   PROBLEMS    OF   PHILOSOPHY 

of  the  species  and  its  dominance  over  the 
entire  reahii  of  nature.  Consciousness  is 
therefore  a  principal  factor  and  not  a  sec- 
ondary product  in  the  evolution  of  man. 

Materialism  is  an  insidious  doctrine, 
appealing  especially  to  many  in  this  age, 
because  it  seems  to  be  confirmed  by  the 
results  of  science  and  to  be  in  strict  accord 
with  the  scientific  spirit  and  point  of 
view.  For  this  reason  Lange,  in  his  His- 
tory of  Materialism^  speaks  of  Democritus 
as  the  one  among  all  the  ancient  philoso- 
phers who  was  most  truly  modern,  because 
his  essentially  materialistic  conceptions 
were  most  akin  to  the  present  day  mode 
of  regarding  the  universe  of  physical  phe- 
nomena. The  brilliant  coterie  of  eigh- 
teenth century  philosophers  in  France, 
among  whom  La  Mettrie,  Diderot,  D'Hol- 
bach,  Helvetius,  and  Cabanis  shone  con- 
spicuously, clothed  their  teachings  in  the 
garb  of  such  fascinating  plausibility  that  to 
a  superficial  mind  they  seem  to  be  demon- 
stratively conclusive.  In  the  nineteenth 
century,  materialism  is  more  distinctively 
German  than  French ;  the  chief  apostles  of 


THE  PROBLEM   OF  BEING  47 

German  materialism  are  Feuerbach,  Mole- 
schott,  Biichner,  Vogt,  and  Haeckel. 
They  reinforced  the  earlier  position  by 
an  appeal  to  the  enormous  mass  of  scien- 
tific facts  which  the  marvellous  researches 
of  the  nineteenth  century  have  revealed. 
The  influence  of  such  teaching  has  been 
far-reaching  and  pervasive. 

Professor  Flint,  in  his  Anti-Theistic 
Theories^  has  spoken  very  significantly  of 
this  influence:  "But  it  is  not  to  be 
hoped  that  materialism  will  ever  quite  be 
got  rid  of,  so  long  as  the  constitution  of 
the  human  mind  and  the  character  of 
human  society  remain  substantially  what 
they  are.  Physical  nature  and  its  laws 
explain  much,  and  so  long  as  the  human 
mind  is  prone  to  exaggeration,  and  edu- 
cation is  imperfect  and  one-sided,  and 
society  is  more  under  the  influence  of  the 
seen  than  the  unseen,  of  the  temporal  than 
the  eternal,  it  may  be  anticipated  that 
many  will  fancy  that  matter  and  motion 
explain  everything,  and  this  fancy  is 
the  essence  of  materialism.  Thus,  mate- 
rialism is  a  danger  to  which  individuals 


48       THE  PEOBLEMS   OF  PHILOSOPHY 

and  societies  will  always  be  more  or  less 
exposed.  The  present  generation,  how- 
ever, which  is  growing  up,  will  obviously 
be  very  specially  exposed  to  it;  as  much 
so,  perhaps,  as  any  generation  in  the  his- 
tory of  the  world.  Within  the  last  thirty 
years  the  great  wave  of  spiritualistic  or 
idealistic  thought,  which  has  borne  to  us 
on  its  bosom  most  of  what  is  of  chief  value 
in  the  nineteenth  century,  has  been  re- 
ceding and  decreasing;  and  another,  which 
is  in  the  main  driven  by  materialistic 
forces,  has  been  gradually  rising  behind 
it,  vast  and  threatening.  It  is  but  its 
crests  that  we  at  present  see;  it  is  but  a 
certain  vague  shaking  produced  by  it  that 
we  at  present  feel ;  but  we  shall  probably 
soon  enough  fail  not  both  to  see  and  feel 
it  fully  and  distinctly."^ 

Spiritualism.  —  The  view  of  the  uni- 
verse which  reduces  all  phenomena  to  a 
manifestation  of  some  kind  of  psychical 
force  is  spiritualism.  Leibniz  may  be  re- 
garded as  the  father  of  this  theory  in  its 

1  Flint,  Anti-Theistic  Theories,  pp.  98,  99. 


THE  PROBLEM   OF  BEING  49 

modern  form  at  least.  In  ancient  times 
Plato  was  as  essentially  spiritualistic  in 
his  teachings  as  Democritus  was  material- 
istic. Leibniz's  monads  were  regarded  as 
centres  of  force  which,  in  all  cases,  could 
be  traced  to  a  common  source,  essentially 
psychical  in  its  nature.  Schopenhauer 
defined  this  psychic  force  underlying 
material  phenomena  as  essentially  will 
whose  striving  initiates  motion.  As  spir- 
itualism is  a  view  diametrically  opposed  to 
materialism,  it  might  seem  at  first  glance 
that  the  arguments  which  are  valid  against 
materialism  would  make  for  the  support 
of  spiritualism.  Yet  materialism  false 
does  not  argue  spiritualism  true ;  for  the 
most  cogent  arguments  against  material- 
ism bear  upon  its  monistic  features,  and 
these  arguments  also  make  against  spir- 
itualism regarded  as  a  monistic  philosophy. 
The  transition  from  mind  to  matter  is  as 
bewilderingly  mysterious  as  the  transition 
from  matter  to  mind.  The  two  disparate 
phenomena  cannot  be  brought  under  the 
single  category  either  of  matter  or  of 
mind.     Spiritualism,  however,  as  a  mon- 


50       THE  PROBLEMS   OF   PHILOSOPHY 

istic  system  has  a  more  rational  ground  for 
claiming  to  be  an  exclusive  philosophy 
than  materialism,  for  the  elements  of  con- 
sciousness, the  psychical  j^art  of  man's 
nature,  are  more  adequately  expressive  of 
the  Ego,  the  real  self,  than  the  material. 
The  world  with  its  phenomena  of  cause 
and  effect,  the  endless  series  of  mechani- 
cal sequences,  and  of  chemical  reactions, 
the  manifold  processes  of  vital  growth, 
seem  foreign  to  the  inner  world  of  self, 
which  is  essentially  a  world  of  conscious- 
ness. We  know  nothing  of  matter  pure 
and  simple,  only  of  matter  as  it  is  per- 
ceived and  translated  into  the  terms  of 
conscious  experience.  The  spiritualist, 
therefore,  insists  that  it  is  easier  to  ex- 
plain matter  by  mind  than  to  explain 
mind  by  matter,  inasmuch  as  the  mental 
is  the  more  familiar  of  the  two,  being,  as 
it  is,  the  mode  in  which  the  self  finds  its 
essential  expression. 

The  hypothesis,  however,  which  con- 
ceives all  phenomena  as  the  manifestation 
of  a  psychical  energy  presupposes  rather 
gratuitously,     it    must    be    confessed,    a 


THE   PROBLEM   OF   BEING  51 

knowledge  of  the  fundamental  constitu- 
tion of  matter  which  the  possibilities  of 
exact  observation  do  not  warrant.  Every 
atom  in  the  universe  may  be  only  a  centre 
of  psychical  force,  and  yet,  as  we  cannot 
demonstrate  this,  we  should  not  attempt 
to  construct  a  theory  upon  it. 

The  Theory  of  Identity.  —  This  theory 
regards  mind  and  matter  as  different 
phases  of  one  and  the  same  being,  which 
is  neither  mind  nor  matter.  The  physical 
and  the  psychical  phenomena  are  regarded 
as  two  closed  circuits,  each  complete  in 
itself;  the  movements,  however,  within 
the  one  sphere  run  parallel  to  the  activi- 
ties of  the  other.  The  theory  is  often 
called  the  theory  of  parallelism.  Physi- 
cal energy  is  wholly  accounted  for  in  the 
physiological  effects  upon  the  nervous 
system;  no  vestige  of  it  is  available  to 
account  for  the  psychical  manifestations. 
The  latter,  therefore,  must  be  referred  to 
a  sphere  of  activity  of  their  own  kind,  in 
which  they  operate  in  such  a  manner  that 
the  phenomena  of  the  two  spheres  mani- 
fest  themselves    synchronously   and   har- 


62       THE  PROBLEMS   OF   PHILOSOPHY 

moniously.  The  parallelism  of  the  two 
spheres  may  be  illustrated  by  the  corre- 
spondence which  exists  between  a  con- 
nected series  of  sounds  on  the  one  hand, 
and  the  interpretation  of  these  sounds  in  a 
series  of  connected  thoughts.  The  sound 
is  physical  merely,  but  the  mind  recog- 
nizes a  thought  value  corresponding  to 
each  varying  shade  of  sound.  When, 
however,  a  foreigner  hears  a  language  un- 
known to  him,  there  is  no  such  mental 
correspondence,  the  inner  circuit  is  not 
paralleled  to  the  outer.  The  sounds  are 
unintelligible  and  remain  sounds,  mere 
sounds.  But  even  a  bare  sound  without 
significance  has  a  corresponding  psychical 
value,  for  the  sensation  of  the  sound 
differs  from  the  stimulus,  which  is  the 
antecedent  of  the  sensation.  This  paral- 
lelism obtains  throughout  our  whole  con- 
scious experience  from  the  lower  level 
of  correspondence  between  stimulus  and 
sensation,  to  the  higher  plain  of  corre- 
spondence between  outer  symbols  and  the 
inner  thought  processes  which  interpret 
these  symbols. 


TFIE   PKOBLEM   OF   BEING  53 

It  is  urged,  moreover,  that  there  is  a 
proportionality  as  well  as  parallelism 
between  the  two  spheres,  so  that  the  ratio 
between  the  amount  of  stimulus  and  the 
corresponding  intensity  of  the  sensation 
can  be  definitely  measured,  and  that  the 
resulting  law  which  formulates  such  a 
relation  is  capable  of  precise  expression. 
As  thus  stated,  parallelism  has  become  a 
working  hypothesis  which  underlies  all 
investigations  in  experimental  psychology, 
and  is  accepted  as  such  by  monists  and 
dualists  alike.  There  is,  however,  an  ad- 
ditional assumption  which  some  would 
regard  as  a  necessary  consequence  of  the 
foregoing,  and  which,  in  attempting  to 
discover  the  ground  of  the  parallelism  in 
addition  to  the  statement  of  it  as  a  fact, 
transforms  the  working  hypothesis  into  a 
metaphysical  explanation.  It  is  contended 
that  the  parallelism  of  the  physical  phe- 
nomena of  the  one  sphere  and  the  activities 
of  consciousness  in  the  other  implies  a 
substantial  identity  underlying  this  two- 
fold manifestation.  Matter  and  mind, 
therefore,   must   be   regarded   as   comple- 


54       THE  PEOBLEMS   OF  PHILOSOPHY 

mentary  phases  of  one  and  the  same 
ground  substance  which  is  neither  matter 
nor  mind.  This  is  the  view  of  Spinoza  in 
earlier  times,  more  recently  of  Herbert 
Spencer,  and,  in  the  circle  of  experimental 
psychologists,  the  view  substantially  of 
Fechner.  This  theory  is  often  called  Neo- 
Spinozism.  The  popularity  of  this  view 
is  indicated,  in  a  measure,  by  the  pres- 
ent revival  of  interest  in  the  writings  of 
Spinoza. 

It  is  to  be  noticed  that  there  is  a  ten- 
dency to  emphasize  either  the  material  or 
the  mental  in  one's  conception  of  the 
nature  of  the  underlying  substance  in 
which  the  two  are  supposed  to  inhere. 
Thus  Leibniz,  in  following  Spinoza, 
placed  the  emphasis  upon  the  psychical 
phase  to  such  an  extent  as  to  make  it  the 
sole  essence  of  all  being.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  English  philosopher,  Hobbes, 
regarded  the  material  rather  than  the  psy- 
chical as  the  more  fundamental  and  essen- 
tial of  the  two.  In  this  Hobbes  expresses 
the  conviction  of  many  of  the  modern 
scientific  investigators  in  the  field  of  ex- 


THE   PROBLEM   OF   BEING  55 

perimental  psychology.  The  doctrine  of 
parallelism  has  this  to  its  credit,  that  it 
has  brought  the  psychical  activities  to 
the  fore  as  something  not  wholly  ex- 
plained, at  least  as  by-products  of  the 
material. 

A  criticism  of  the  theory  will  reveal 
several  weak  points  in  its  structure.  In 
the  first  place  it  assumes  an  accompany- 
ing psychical  manifestation  for  every 
physical  phenomenon,  whereas  we  are  only 
aware  of  this  parallelism  in  connection 
with  a  limited  portion  of  the  material 
universe,  namely,  the  sphere  of  brain 
modifications.  Mr.  Romanes,  in  his  ad- 
mirable essay,  The  World  as  Ejects  indi- 
cates the  possibility  of  there  being  a  world 
consciousness  in  connection  with  all  forms 
of  matter,  similar  to  the  consciousness 
which  is  manifest  in  connection  with  brain 
activities.  He  sj)eaks  of  the  world  as 
eject,  using  that  term  to  suggest  the  pos- 
sible function  of  consciousness  associated 
with  the  world,  which  may  correspond  to 
that  form  of  consciousness  which  we  have 
always   associated    exclusively   with   the 


56       THE   PROBLEMS   OF   PHILOSOPHY 

Ego,   or  the  subject.     A  similar  idea  we 
find  in  the  lines  of  Browning:  — 

"  For  many  a  thrill 
Of  kinship  I  confess  to,  with  the  powers 
Called  Nature ;  animate,  inanimate. 
In  parts  or  in  the  whole,  there's  something  there 
Man-like  that  somehow  meets  the  man  in  me." 

There  may  be  a  soul  of  the  world,  there 
may  be,  as  has  already  been  said,  a  psy- 
chical side,  of  which  we  are  not  aware, 
to  every  atom  in  the  universe,  and  the 
psychical  side,  like  the  moon,  may  show 
us  ever  but  the  one  face,  the  other  forever 
in  the  shadow;  but,  at  best,  this  is  only  a 
conjecture,  it  presents  no  solid  foundation 
upon  which  to  rest  a  theory. 

Moreover,  we  know  from  psychological 
investigation  that  the  physiological  circuit 
must  reach  a  certain  degree  of  intensity 
as  regards  any  stimulus,  before  there  is 
a  corresponding  sensation.  We  do  not 
always  hear  the  persistent  summons  of  the 
alarm  clock.  The  degree  of  intensity 
which  the  stimulus  must  reach  in  order 
to  produce  consciousness  of  a  sensation,  is 
not  a  constant  quantity.     It  differs  with 


THE  PROBLEM   OF  BEING  57 

individuals;  it  differs  in  the  experience 
of  a  single  person  at  different  times,  and 
under  different  circumstances,  depending 
largely  upon  his  attention  at  the  moment, 
or  upon  his  passing  interests.  The  Indian 
guide  perceives  a  whole  world  of  sights 
and  sounds  to  which  his  companion  is 
blind ;  or,  if  that  same  Indian  is  hot  on 
the  trail  of  a  foe,  he,  too,  may  find  his 
field  of  perception  restricted  by  the  fever 
of  warfare.  We  find,  again,  that  there  is 
a  complete  cessation  of  consciousness  in 
sleep;  stimulation  of  the  end-organs  of 
sense  is  followed  by  no  parallel  manifesta- 
tion in  consciousness.  In  an  extreme 
manner,  this  is  seen  in  cases  of  brain 
injury,  where  consciousness  in  certain 
modes  of  its  manifestation  ceases  alto- 
gether, yet  upon  restoration  of  the  injured 
part,  the  chain  of  ideas  is  resumed  pre- 
cisely at  the  point  where  it  was  broken 
off.  The  physiological  circuit  is  active 
throughout  the  interval  of  sleep  or  brain 
injury.  What  psychical  activity  has  been 
going  on  parallel  to  it,  and  yet  of  which 
there  is  no  consciousness  whatsoever? 


58       THE   PKOBLEMS    OF   PHILOSOPHY 

These  considerations  indicate  certain 
gaps  in  the  continuity  of  parallelism,  and 
prove  the  extreme  difficulty  of  coordinat- 
ing perfectly  the  two  systems  of  material 
and  conscious  activities. 

There  is,  moreover,  a  vagueness  which 
envelops  that  indefinite  something  which 
is  neither  matter  nor  mind,  yet  lies  at  the 
basis  of  either  system,  synthesizing  the 
two. 

However  the  point  of  view  may  be 
shifted,  the  manifest  disparity  between 
motion  and  thought,  between  matter  and 
mind,  still  confronts  us.  It  was  the 
despair  of  reaching  any  satisfactory  solu- 
tion of  this  perplexing  problem  which  led 
Du  Bois-Reymond  to  utter  his  famous 
comment  concerning  it :  "  Ignoramus  ! 
Ignorabimus!  '* 


CHAPTER  IV 

THE  ^VORLD  PEOBLEM  ("  COSMOLOGY  ") 

THE  world  problem,  or  cosmology, 
proved  of  special  interest  to  the 
ancient  Greek  mind.  The  earliest  philo- 
sophical inquiries  were  concerned  with  the 
possibility  of  discovering  some  primal  ele- 
ment in  the  world  structure  to  which 
the  various  conflicting  and  interacting 
phenomena  might  be  reduced.  The 
speculations  which  mark  the  beginnings 
of  Greek  philosophy  were  crude  and  fan- 
ciful, and  yet  the  spirit  of  these  early 
thinkers  was  commendable,  for  they  were 
searchers  after  a  unity  underlying  the 
world  phenomena,  and  as  such  they  are 
worthy  the  name  of  philosophers.  Of  these 
thinkers,  one  of  the  earliest  was  Thales, 
who  lived  about  600  B.C.  He  regarded 
water  as  the  universal  substratum,  of 
which  all  things  were  more  or  less  com- 
plex manifestations.  To  Anaximander, 
59 


60       THE   PROBLEMS   OF   PHILOSOPHY 

however,  the  universal  atmosphere  seemed 
to  be  the  true  mother  of  all  existing  things ; 
and,  in  a  similar  manner,  Anaximenes  re- 
garded air,  or  breath,  as  the  source  of  all 
being.  Heraclitus  saw  in  fire  the  essence 
of  all  things.  He  regarded  fire  as  the 
cause  of  a  universal  motion,  everything 
being  derived  from  it  and  everything  striv- 
ing to  return  to  the  source  whence  it 
emanated.  The  universe  presented  to 
him  a  scene  of  constant  change,  of  per- 
petual flow ;  there  was  no  stability  and  no 
abiding  unity.  Still  another  old  Greek, 
Empedocles,  had  his  peculiar  view  of  the 
elemental  source,  which  he  declared  to  be 
of  a  fourfold  nature,  —  earth,  air,  fire,  and 
water. 

In  the  midst  of  these  puerile  conjectures 
there  were,  however,  certain  intimations 
of  a  more  philosophical  explanation. 
There  was  a  tendencj^  early  manifesting 
itself,  to  discern  beneath  all  phenomena  a 
substantial  unity,  and,  moreover,  to  regard 
this  unifying  principle  as  something  other 
than  material.  Thus  Xenophanes  speaks 
of  the  source  of  all  things  as   a  Being 


THE   WORLD  PROBLEM  61 

which  is  one  and  infinite;  and  Parmenides 
speaks  of  the  same  as  the  All-One.  Also, 
in  addition  to  the  four  material  elements 
of  Empedocles,  —  earth,  air,  fire,  and 
water,  —  that  philosopher  insists  upon  a 
spiritual  principle,  love,  as  the  actuating 
force  behind  the  material  elements,  which 
are  to  be  regarded  merely  as  its  agents. 

According  to  Anaxagoras,  there  is  in 
the  universe  an  organizing  and  unifying 
power,  which  he  calls  the  vov^,  i.e.  the 
mind,  or  reason,  and  this  principle  renders 
the  world  a  cosmos  instead  of  a  chaos ;  to 
its  purposeful  activity  are  due  the  order, 
harmony,  and  beauty  of  the  universe. 

Thus  it  may  be  seen  that  while  the 
question  of  the  underlying  world  structure 
was  originally  answered  in  material  terms, 
yet  a  stage  was  soon  reached  in  the  unfold- 
ing and  deepening  thought  of  the  old 
world  where  only  a  spiritualistic  answer 
was  deemed  satisfactory.  The  problems 
of  cosmology  resulting  in  a  solution  which 
maintained  a  spiritual  principle  at  the 
basis  of  the  world  fabric,  naturally  led 
to  deeper  questions  as  to  the  more  precise 


62       THE  PROBLEMS   OF  PHILOSOPHY 

nature  of  such  a  spiritual  principle.  Thus 
the  world  problem  became  at  its  last 
analysis  an  inquiry  concerning  the  being 
and  nature  of  God.  Is  there  an  underly- 
ing unity  amidst  the  manifold  world  phe- 
nomena? and  is  this  unity  a  spiritual 
principle,  which  manifests  itself  in  a  su- 
preme Being,  whom  we  may  regard  as  the 
Author  and  Governor  of  the  universe  ? 

The  answers  to  these  questions  vary 
from  an  absolute  denial  of  the  being  of 
God,  on  the  one  hand  to  an  absolute 
identification  of  all  existence  with  the 
being  of  God,  on  the  other.  The  early 
negative  position  was  formulated  in  the 
atomism  of  Democritus.  According  to 
his  teaching,  as  we  have  seen,  the  world 
was  composed  of  an  indefinite  number  of 
indestructible  particles  acting  indepen- 
dently through  forces  within  themselves 
toward  necessarily  determined  ends.  All 
phenomena  were  thus  reduced  to  the 
"mechanics  of  atoms."  There  was  no 
such  thing  as  purpose  or  design,  only  an 
inevitable  fate  swaying  the  affairs  of  men. 
In  such  a  system,  there  is  no  need,  and  in 


THE   WORLD   PROBLEM  63 

fact  no  place  for  the  being  of  God.  De- 
mocritus  was  the  natural  father  of  mate- 
rialism with  its  atheistical  implications. 
The  atomism  of  Democritus  was  developed 
at  length  in  the  system  of  Lucretius  as 
expressed  in  his  didactic  poem,  De  natura 
rerum.  We  find  it  also  in  the  teachings 
of  Epicurus  and  of  the  Epicurean  school. 
The  mechanical  explanation  of  the  uni- 
verse, however,  was  not  satisfactory  to 
the  Greek  mind,  and  therefore  from  that 
early  day  to  the  present  there  have  always 
been  many  w^ho  have  sought  a  more  philo- 
sophical solution  of  the  problem.  The 
inadequacy  of  the  mechanical  view  of  the 
universe  is  aptly  stated  by  Windelband :  — 
"An  archseologist  of  nature  may  trace 
back  the  genealogy  of  life,  the  origination 
of  one  species  from  another,  according  to 
mechanical  principles  as  far  as  possible; 
he  will  always  be  obliged  to  stop  with 
an  original  organization.^  which  he  cannot 
explain  through  the  mere  mechanism  of 
inorganic  matter."^ 

1  Windelband,  History  of  Philosophy,  p.  565. 


64       THE  PROBLEMS   OF  PHILOSOPHY 

Among  those,  however,  who  are  not  sat- 
isfied with  the  mechanical  explanation  of 
the  universe,  there  is  a  considerable  diver- 
sity of  opinion  concerning  the  being  and 
nature  of  that  spiritualistic  principle 
which,  it  is  affirmed,  must  lie  at  the  basis 
of  all  the  world  phenomena.  The  result- 
ing theories  are  known  under  the  names 
of  polytheism,  theism,  deism,  and  pan- 
theism. They  form  the  several  positive 
answers  to  the  great  world  problem.  We 
will  consider  them  separately. 

Polytheism.  —  This  was  the  early  super- 
stitious belief  in  gods  many  and  lords 
many.  As  a  philosophy  it  has  no  valid 
claim  for  serious  consideration,  and  may 
be  relegated  to  the  sphere  of  mythological 
speculation.  The  dawning  philosophical 
sense  of  the  Greeks  could  not  abide  the 
crude  anthropomorphism  of  the  polythe- 
istic belief,  that  is,  the  representation  of 
the  gods  in  the  form  of  men  with  like  pas- 
sions and  limitations.  There  was  an  early 
recognition  of  the  fact  that  God  must  be 
one  and  spiritual,  rather  than  many  and 
of    human    habits   and   propensities,      A 


THE   WOULD   PROBLEM  65 

most  earnest  protest  against  these  human 
gods  was  raised  by  Xenophanes,  one  of 
the  earliest  of  the  Greek  philosophers. 
Aristotle's  description  of  him  is  very 
striking:  "Casting  his  eyes  upwards  at 
the  immensity  of  heaven  he  declared  that 
The  One  is  God."  Xenophanes  thus 
became  the  father  of  a  monotheistic  phi- 
losophy, which  regards  God  as  one  and 
spiritual. 

3Ionotheism.  —  This  theory,  whose  very 
name  sharply  contrasts  it  with  polytheism, 
is  a  belief  in  the  one  supreme  Being,  the 
power  behind  the  world  and  its  phe- 
nomena and  the  unifying  principle  in 
nature  and  in  human  life.  Monotheism 
in  its  distinction  from  polytheism  em- 
braces the  several  systems  of  theism, 
deism,  and  pantheism. 

Of  these,  deism  is  the  belief  which  re- 
gards the  Deity  as  existing  outside  the 
world  which  He  once  created,  sustain- 
ing to  it  a  relation  similar  to  that  which 
the  artisan  sustains  to  the  work  which 
his  hands  and  brain  have  fashioned. 
Deism,  therefore,  emphasizes  that  attribute 


66       THE   PROBLEMS   OF   PHILOSOPHY 

of  God,  which  is  designated  as  His  tran- 
scendence, that  is,  the  idea  of  God  as 
dwelling  apart  from  the  universe  of  men 
and  things.  Pantheism  is  a  natural  reac- 
tion from  deism;  as  the  latter  emphasizes 
the  transcendence  of  God  to  the  exclusion 
of  His  immanence,  so  the  former  empha- 
sizes His  immanence  to  the  exclusion  of 
His  transcendence.  God's  immanence  is 
the  manifestation  of  Himself  in  His 
works;  if,  therefore,  God  manifests  Him- 
self completely  in  His  works,  and  His 
transcendence  is  denied  or  ignored,  then 
it  follows  that  God  is  everything,  and 
everything  is  God.  Theism  holds  a  mean 
between  these  two  extremes. 

Theism.  —  This  attempts  to  harmonize 
in  one  consistent  theory  the  tAvo  seemingly 
conflicting  ideas  of  God's  transcendence 
and  of  God's  immanence.  It  is  differen- 
tiated from  deism  in  that  it  insists  upon 
the  sustaining  and  operating  presence  of 
God  in  all  phenomena  of  the  universe. 
Theism  denies  the  possibility  of  an  "  ab- 
sentee God."  It  differs,  however,  on  the 
other  hand,  from  pantheism  in  affirming 


THE   WORLD   PROBLEM  67 

the  existence  of  a  real  distinction  between 
God  and  His  works,  between  the  Creator 
and  the  creature,  especially  as  this  dis- 
tinction is  emphasized  in  the  conscious- 
ness of  a  self  which  refuses  to  be  absorbed 
in  the  great  All  of  pantheism.  Thus 
theism  is  an  attempt  to  synthesize  within 
a  higher  unity  the  two  opposed  ideas  of 
transcendence  and  immanence,  and  which 
regards  God  as  manifesting  Himself  in 
and  through  His  works,  and  yet  as  a 
personality,  distinct  from  them. 

Deism.  —  Deism  has  a  greater  affinity 
with  polytheism  than  either  pantheism 
or  theism.  It  is  a  refined  form  of  poly- 
theism. It  is  true  that  it  disavows  gods 
many,  but  its  one  god  is  conceived  after 
the  similitude  of  human  beings  according 
to  the  manner  of  the  polytheistic  concep- 
tion. The  God  of  the  deist  is  an  "en- 
larged man,"  an  artificer  rather  than  a 
creator ;  the  world  is  regarded  as  a  stu- 
pendous mechanism  rather  than  a  mani- 
festation of  the  life  of  the  supreme  Being. 
Deism  flourished  in  the  eighteenth  cen- 
tury.    Its  founder  was  Lord  Herbert  of. 


68       THE   PEOBLEMS   OF   PHILOSOPHY 

Clierbury.  Among  its  most  eminent  rep- 
resentatives we  find  Locke  and  Voltaire. 
It  developed  within  the  sphere  of  its  ad- 
herents two  opposed  tendencies,  one  lead- 
ing towards  pantheism,  the  other  towards 
atheism.  They  were  natural  reactions 
from  the  artificial  doctrines  of  deism. 
The  violent  separation  of  God  and  nature 
might  leave  the  impression,  on  the  one 
hand,  that  nature  needs  no  God  to  ex- 
plain her  manifestations  and  phenomena, 
or,  on  the  other  hand,  the  felt  need  of 
God  in  and  through  nature's  manifold 
being  might  become  so  emphasized  as  to 
result  in  pantheism,  —  the  swing  of  the 
pendulum  to  the  extreme  opposite  of 
deism. 

Pantheism,  —  The  universe  is  regarded 
as  the  manifestation  of  God,  solely  and 
completely.  God  is  all.  A  striking 
statement  of  pantheistic  belief,  at  the 
same  time  a  criticism  of  deism,  we  find 
in  the  words  of  Goethe :  "  What  were  a 
God  who  only  gave  the  w^orld  a  push  from 
without,  or  let  it  spin  around  His  finger? 
I  look  for  a  God  who  moves  the  world 


THE  WORLD   PROBLEM  69 

from  within,  who  fosters  nature  in  Him- 
self, Himself  in  nature;  so  that  naught 
of  all  that  lives  and  moves  and  has  its 
being  in  Him  ever  forgets  His  force  or 
His  spirit."  1 

Dr.  Martineau  has  said  that  pantheism 
marks  a  temperament  rather  than  a  system, 
the  immediate  vision  of  the  poet  rather 
than  the  reflective  interpretation  of  the 
philosopher. 2  The  atmosphere  of  mysti- 
cism which  envelops  pantheistic  specula- 
tion is  naturally  most  alluring  to  the  poet, 
and  especially  the  poet  to  whom  nature 
has  revealed  the  spirit  of  its  being.  One 
of  the  most  profound  and  subtle  expres- 
sions of  pantheistic  interpretation  we  find 
in  the  "Lines  Composed  above  Tintern 
Abbey,"  where  Wordsworth  speaks  in  the 
following  vein  of  nature's  spell  over  his 
soul :  — 

1  "Was  war'  ein  Gott,  der  nur  von  aussen  stiesse 
Im  Kreis  das  All  am  Finger  laufen  liesse  ! 
Ihm  ziemt's,  die  Welt  im  Innern  zu  bewegen, 
Natur  in  Sich,  Sich  in  Xatur  zu  hegen 

So  dass,  was  in  Ihm  lebt  und  webt  und  ist, 
Me  Seine  Kraft,  nie  Seinen  Geist  vermisst. 

2  Ma;rtineau,  A  Study  of  Beligion,  Vol.  II,  p.  141. 


70       THE  PROBLEMS   OF  PHILOSOPHY 

"  For  I  have  learned 
To  look  on  nature,  not  as  in  the  hour 
Of  thoughtless  youth ;  but  hearing  oftentimes 
The  still,  sad  music  of  humanity, 
Nor  harsh  nor  grating,  though  of  ample  power 
To  chasten  and  subdue.     And  I  have  felt 
A  presence  that  disturbs  me  with  the  joy 
Of  elevated  thoughts  :  a  sense  sublime 
Of  something  far  more  deeply  interfused, 
"Wliose  dwelling  is  the  light  of  setting  suns, 
And  the  round  ocean,  and  the  living  air, 
And  the  blue  sky,  and  in  the  mind  of  man : 
A  motion  and  a  spirit  that  impels 
All  thinking  things,  all  objects  of  all  thought, 
And  rolls  through  all  things." 

Pantheism  takes  two  forms,  which  do 
not  differ,  however,  fundamentally.  The 
one  identifies  God  completely  with  the 
world  of  being,  coming  to  His  highest 
manifestation  in  the  consciousness  of  man. 
From  the  lowest  to  the  highest,  from  the 
simplest  to  the  most  complex  forms  of  this 
manifestation,  all  is  God.  The  other  view 
emphasizes  the  divine  as  the  only  reality 
and  reduces  the  facts  of  existence  to  a 
mere  appearance,  the  shadowy  semblance 
of  realit}^  While  the  former  view  denies 
all  difference  between  God  and  the  world, 
including  man,  the  latter  insists  that  the 


THE   WORLD   PROBLEM  71 

seeming  difference  must  be  regarded  as  a 
mental  illusion,  having  no  basis  in  reality. 
In  either  case,  God's  immanence  is  mag- 
nified to  the  exclusion  of  His  transcen- 
dence. It  is  a  convenient  philosophy, 
the  reference  of  everything  to  God;  it 
unties  many  hard  knots,  it  cuts  in  twain 
many  more.  It  was  a  veritable  stroke  of 
genius  that  suggested  the  reduction  of  the 
manifold  variety  of  the  universe  to  one 
simple  category.  We  feel  instinctively 
the  seriousness  and  the  profundity  of 
thought  which  characterizes  the  creed  of 
pantheism.  This  is  felt  in  a  peculiar 
manner  in  Hegel's  admirable  statement 
of  the  pantheistic  belief:  — 

"The  ancient  philosophers  have  de- 
scribed God  under  the  image  of  a  round 
ball.  But  if  that  be  His  nature,  God  has 
unfolded  it;  and  in  the  actual  world  He 
has  opened  the  closed  shell  of  truth  into  a 
system  of  Nature,  into  a  State-system,  a 
system  of  Law  and  Morality,  into  the  sys- 
tem of  the  world's  History.  The  shut  fist 
has  become  an  open  hand,  the  fingers  of 
which  reach  out  to  lay  hold  of  man's  mind, 


72       THE  PROBLEMS   OF  PHILOSOPHY 

and  draw  it  to  Himself.  Nor  is  the  human 
mind  a  self-involved  intelligence,  blindly 
moving  within  its  own  secret  recesses.  It 
is  no  mere  feeling  and  groping  about  in 
a  vacuum,  but  an  intelligent  system  of 
rational  organization.  Of  that  system, 
Thought  is  the  summit  in  point  of  form, 
and  Thought  may  be  described  as  the  capa- 
bility of  going  beyond  the  mere  surface  of 
God's  self -expansion,  —  or  rather  as  the 
capability,  b}^  means  of  reflection  upon  it, 
of  entering  into  it,  and  then,  when  the 
entrance  has  been  secured,  of  retracing  in 
thought  God's  expansion  of  Himself.  To 
take  this  trouble  is  the  express  duty  and 
end  of  ends  set  before  the  thinking  mind, 
ever  since  God  laid  aside  His  rolled-up 
form  and  revealed  Himself."^ 

That  which  characterizes  the  point  of 
view  of  pantheism,  and  at  the  same  time 
marks  the  point  of  departure  from  deistic 
conceptions,  is  the  pantheistic  interpreta- 
tion of  the  teleological  argument  for  the 
being  of  God.  The  teleological  argument 
is  based  upon  the  evidence  of  design  which 

1  Wallace,  The  Logic  of  Hegel,  p.  26. 


THE  WORLD   PROBLEM  73 

is  manifested  throughout  the  varied  adap- 
tations of  means  to  ends  in  nature.  The 
teleological  ideas  of  the  deists  may  be 
most  adequately  represented  by  an  analogy 
which  they  insist  exists  between  the  prod- 
uct of  a  mechanic's  labor,  such  as  a  watch, 
and  the  world  which  is  similarly  conceived 
as  the  handiwork  of  God.  As  the  watch 
contains  within  its  own  mechanism  evi- 
dence of  a  designer  and  maker,  so  the 
orderly  adjustments  and  purposeful  con- 
trivances in  nature  indicate  a  great  and 
wise  Designer. 

The  pantheist,  however,  repudiates  this 
conception  of  teleology  as  being  external 
and  mechanical.  In  its  stead,  he  would 
substitute  an  immanent  teleology,  that  is, 
a  force  within  the  organism  moulding  it 
into  its  proper  form  and  adapting  its  or- 
gans to  their  appropriate  functions,  and  all 
parts  to  harmonious  ends.  Instead  of  the 
conception  of  an  architect  planning  and 
fashioning  an  organism  from  without, 
there  is  the  conception  of  an  architectonic 
principle  operative  within  the  organism, 
fulfilling  its  own  ends.     This  immanent 


74       THE  PROBLEMS   OF  PHILOSOPHY 

finality  reaches  its  most  perfect  develop- 
ment and  highest  realization  in  the  pur- 
posive activities  of  man.  It  is  the  power 
within  nature  and  man  which  to  the  pan- 
theist evidences  the  Divine  Being.  The 
great  Designer,  therefore,  could  not  have 
worked  upon  the  world  materials,  and 
have  fashioned  them  into  form  and  life 
from  without,  for  only  in  and  through 
them  does  He  manifest  Himself. 

At  this  point,  theism  is  in  perfect  ac- 
cord with  pantheism.  The  immanence 
of  God  and  the  doctrine  of  immanent 
finality  ajDpeal  to  the  theist  as  well. 
The  theist  takes  exception,  not  to  that 
which  pantheism  asserts,  but  to  that 
which  pantheism  denies,  or  ignores, 
namely,  the  transcendence  of  God.  To 
equate  God  with  the  universe  without 
remainder,  exhausts  His  being  and  mani- 
festly limits  Him  to  a  definite  compre- 
hension within  finite  bounds.  He  is  no 
longer  the  Eternal,  the  Infinite  One !  God 
is  in  nature,  and  yet  He  is  more  than 
nature.  Spinoza,  the  pantheist  who  was 
styled  the  God-intoxicated  man,  was  led 


THE   WORLD   PROBLEM  75 

to  acknowledge  a  real  distinction,  first 
insisted  upon  in  Arabian  philosophy, 
between  Natura  naturans  and  Natura 
naturata^  that  is,  nature  as  Creator  and 
nature  as  creature.  In  this  distinction 
lies  the  essence  of  the  theistic  conten- 
tion. Moreover,  the  absorption  of  all 
things  in  God  reduces  man's  personality 
to  zero.  This  meets  with  a  very  deter- 
mined protest  from  our  self-asserting  con- 
sciousness, which  refuses  to  be  merged  in 
the  universal  All.  In  the  relations 
between  God  and  man,  as  in  the  relations 
between  God  and  the  world,  it  is  still 
possible  to  hold  that  God  manifests  Him- 
self to  man  in  the  still  small  voice  within, 
and  yet  that  man  himself  is  more  than  a 
manifestation  of  God.  There  is  a  revela- 
tion of  God  to  man  in  the  light  of  reason, 
in  the  voice  of  conscience,  and  in  the  in- 
spiration of  the  truth,  yet  it  is  a  revela- 
tion to  man ;  the  self  receives,  the  self  is 
moved,  the  self  is  preserved  in  its  integ- 
rity as  the  self,  the  man,  and  not  as  God. 
Dr.  Martineau  enters  a  most  earnest  plea 
for    the    due    recognition    of    a    distinct 


76       THE  PROBLEMS   OF  PHILOSOPHY 

selfhood:  "What  then  becomes  of  the 
human  personality  when  all  its  character- 
istics are  thus  conveyed  over  to  the  Su- 
preme Mind?  The  very  terms  in  which 
it  is  described  abolish  it.  If  truth,  if 
righteousness,  if  love  and  faith,  are  all  an 
influx  of  foreign  light,  the  endowments, 
in  virtue  of  which  we  are  susceptible  of 
them,  are  mere  passive  and  recipient  or- 
gans on  to  which  they  are  delivered,  and 
we  have  no  agency  of  our  own.  But  a 
reason  that  does  no  thinking  for  itself,  a 
conscience  that  flings  aside  no  temptation 
and  springs  to  no  duty,  affection  that  toils 
in  no  chosen  service  of  love,  a  religious 
sentiment  that  waits  for  such  faith  as  may 
come  into  it,  simply  negative  their  own 
functions  and  disappear."^ 

There  is  a  tendency,  strange  to  say,  in 
the  development  of  pantheistic  thought 
towards  materialism.  It  is  characteristic 
of  any  extreme  position  that  it  provokes 
a  reactionary  movement  in  the  direction 
of  its  opposite.  Pantheism,  in  identify- 
ing God  with  the  world,  leads  some  of  its 
1  Martineau,  A  Study  of  Betigiou,  Vol.  II,  p.  180. 


THE   WORLD  PROBLEM  77 

adherents  to  ask  the  question:  "If  the 
world  is  everything,  why  call  it  God? 
The  only  story  the  world  tells  us  of  it- 
self, is  the  story  of  material  atoms  and 
mechanical  relations.  Is  not  the  idea  of 
God,  therefore,  wholly  illusory?" 

Such  questioning  has  appealed  to  many 
who  were  originally  avowed  pantheists. 
Several  of  the  Hegelian  pantheists  devel- 
oped along  these  lines.  They  are  spoken 
of  as  "Hegelians  of  the  Left."  The 
change  of  front  is  notably  illustrated  in 
the  dissolving  views  of  Feuerbach,  who, 
in  his  Thoughts  on  Death  ayid  Immortality^ 
regards  the  disappearance  of  man's  per- 
sonality in  the  divine  All  as  the  true 
immortality,  and  yet,  nevertheless,  be- 
came later  one  of  the  most  pronounced 
advocates  of  a  gross  materialism. 

Materialism  is  the  bringing  of  God 
down  to  the  level  of  nature,  and  pan- 
theism is  bringing  nature  up  to  God. 
It  is  easy  to  see,  therefore,  how  a  com- 
mon point  of  view  may  prove  to  be  a 
point  of  departure  whence  diverge  lines 
of  opposed  thought. 


CHAPTER  V 

THE  PROBLEM  OF   MIND  ("PSYCHOLOGY") 

THE  study  of  the  mind  suggests  cer- 
tain philosophical  questions  of  a  gen- 
eral nature,  as  well  as  the  special  problems 
of  a  strict  psychology.  The  distinction 
between  the  philosophy  of  mind,  and  the 
mind  considered  as  the  subject  matter  of 
a  special  science,  is  a  distinction  as  old  as 
Aristotle,  and  yet  one  which,  in  the  his- 
tory of  philosophy,  has  often  been  over- 
looked or  ignored.  The  modern  point  of 
view  regards  psychology  exclusively  as  a 
special  science.  The  philosophical  aspect 
of  psychology  is  flatly  questioned.  There 
are,  however,  certain  philosophical  ques- 
tions which  thrust  themselves  upon  one's 
consideration,  although  it  may  be  main- 
tained that  there  are  no  satisfactory  an- 
swers to  them. 

Of    these  questions    there   are   two   of 

chief  importance. 

78 


THE  PROBLEM   OF   MIND  79 

1.  As  to  the  being  and  nature  of  the 
soul,  the  '^vxv  of  man. 

2.  As  to  the  primaiy  mode  of  psychical 
activit}^,  whether  it  is  of  the  nature  of 
intellection  or  volition. 

The  Sichstandalists  and  Actualists.  — 
The  problem  as  to  the  being  and  nature 
of  a  soul  starts  the  inquiry,  whether  there 
is  a  separate  self  distinct  from  the  phe- 
nomena of  consciousness,  or  whether  the 
term,  soul,  is  merely  an  expression  de- 
noting the  sum  total  of  conscious  activi- 
ties. The  former  is  the  view  of  the 
so-called  substantialists,  of  whom  Des- 
cartes is  an  eminent  representative.  They 
regard  the  soul  as  a  real  substance,  a 
unifying  principle,  of  which  the  several 
mental  modes  and  activities  are  separate 
manifestations. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  view  of  the 
opposed  school,  the  actualists,  is  that  all 
that  we  know  are  merely  the  states  of 
consciousness,  actual  happenings,  related 
to  each  other,  it  is  true,  and  mutually 
modifying  each  other,  but  in  no  way 
unified  in  the  sense  of  being  all  manifes- 


80       THE   PROBLEMS   OF   PHILOSOPHY 

tations    of    an    underlying    substance    in 
which  they  all  inhere. 

According  to  this  idea,  consciousness  is 
represented  as  a  stream  of  passing  events, 
with  no  enduring  and  abiding  ground. 
This  view  Ave  find  expressed  in_  the  an- 
cient teachings  of  Indian  philosophy. 
Gautama,  the  Buddha,  insisted  that  be- 
lief in  Attavada,  the  doctrine  of  the  sepa- 
rate individuality  of  the  self,  was  one  of 
the  chief  heresies  by  which  man  is  insidi- 
ously led  into  error.  He  compared  the 
human  individual  to  a  chariot,  which  was 
only  a  chariot  so  long  as  it  was  a  com- 
plete whole,  of  seat,  axle,  wheels,  pole, 
etc.,  — beneath  the  sum  of  the  parts  there 
was  no  substratum  which  was  the  real 
chariot,  —  so  there  can  be  no  substance 
underlying  the  ever  changing  experiences 
of  consciousness.  There  being  no  sepa- 
rate self,  the  idea  of  a  soul  and  an  immor- 
tal existence  apart  from  an  absorption  in 
the  Eternal  Being  was  a  delusion  of  the 
mind  and  a  snare  of  the  heart.  Such  was 
the  doctrine  of  Buddha,  and  it  has  its 
modern  counterpart. 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  MIND  81 

From  the  standpoint  of  the  substantial- 
ist  it  is  urged  that  as  the  material  phe- 
nomena of  the  world  are  referred,  each 
to  some  appropriate  material  substance  of 
which  it  is  the  manifestation,  so,  also,  in 
reference  to  the  consciousness  the  various 
phenomena  must  inhere  in  some  analo- 
gous mental  substratum,  which  we  call 
mind,  or  the  soul,  or  the  self.  As  we 
say  that  odor,  color,  form  are  attributes 
of  one  and  the  same  substance,  as  a 
flower,  so  also  the  will,  desire,  emotion 
are  functions  of  one  and  the  same  mental 
substance,  the  underlying  self.  From  the 
necessities  of  the  case  there  can  be  no 
froof  of  the  existence  of  the  self,  for  the 
self  cannot  demonstrate  its  own  existence 
except  in  a  direct  awareness  of  a  contin- 
ued identity  and  prevailing  unity  in  the 
midst  of  the  varying  experiences  of  time 
and  space.  As  Kant  says,  the  idea  of  the 
soul  as  an  unconditioned  real  unity  of  all 
the  phenomena  of  the  inner  sense  is  in- 
deed as  little  capable  of  proof  as  it  is  of 
refutation.  It  must  be  regarded  simply 
as  evidencing  itself  in  an  immediate  de- 


82       THE   PROBLEMS   OF   PHILOSOPHY 

liverance  of  consciousness.  This  direct 
testimony  of  consciousness  is  held,  on  the 
part  of  the  actualists,  to  be  wholl}^  illu- 
soiy.  It  is  urged  that  there  are  certain 
purely  physical  feelings  which  we  confuse 
and  misinterpret  as  psychical  assurances 
of  a  self  distinct  from  the  perceptions, 
volitions,  or  emotions  which  occupy,  at 
the  time,  the  field  of  consciousness.  Thus 
we  fancy  that  we  are  conscious  of  a  self 
distinct  from  the  fleeting  feelings  of  the 
moment,  whereas  it  is  only  a  nervous  or 
muscular  strain  which  is  experienced,  and 
which  is  interpreted  as  an  experience  of  a 
self.  It  is  insisted  that  this  is  but  one  of 
the  many  by-products  of  consciousness,  a 
phenomenon  so  constant  and  yet  withal  so 
colorless  that  it  cannot  be  referred  to  any 
particular  state  of  consciousness,  to  any 
definite  idea,  or  feeling,  or  to  any  exter- 
nal object  of  perception;  and  therefore 
because  of  this  very  vagueness  and  indefi- 
niteness  it  is  believed  to  be  the  founda- 
tion and  the  unifying  principle  itself  of 
consciousness. 

As  an  illustration  of  this  theory,   the 


THE  PEOBLEM   OF   MIND  g3 

following  experience  of  Professor  James 
will  no  doubt  prove  of  interest:  "It  is 
difficult  for  me  to  detect  in  mental  activ- 
ity any  purely  spiritual  element  at  all. 
Whenever  my  introspective  glance  suc- 
ceeds in  turning  around  quickly  enough 
to  catch  one  of  .these  manifestations  of 
spontaneity  in  the  act,  all  it  can  ever  feel 
distinctly  is  some  bodily  process,  for  the 
most  part  taking  place  within  the  head. 
I  cannot  think  in  visual  terms,  for  ex- 
ample, without  feeling  a  fluctuating  play 
of  pressures,  convergences,  divergences, 
and  accommodations  in  my  eyeballs.  In 
reasoning,  I  find  that  I  am  apt  to  have 
a  kind  of  vaguely  localized  diagram  in  my 
mind,  with  the  various  fractional  objects 
of  the  thought  disposed  at  particular 
points  thereof;  and  the  oscillations  of 
my  attention  from  one  of  them  to  another 
are  most  distinctly  felt  as  alternations  of 
direction  in  movements  occurring  inside 
the  head.  In  consenting  and  negating, 
and  in  making  a  mental  effort,  the  move- 
ments seem  more  complex,  and  I  find 
them  harder  to  describe.      The  opening 


84       THE  PROBLEMS   OF   PHILOSOPHY 

and  closing  of  the  glottis  play  a  great 
part  in  these  operations,  and,  less  dis- 
tinctly, the  movements  of  the  soft  palate, 
etc.,  shutting  off  the  posterior  nares  from 
the  mouth.  My  glottis  is  like  a  sensitive 
valve,  intercepting  my  breath  instantane- 
ously at  every  mental  hesitation  or  felt 
aversion  to  the  object  of  my  thought,  and 
as  quickly  opening  to  let  the  air  pass 
through  my  throat  and  nose,  the  moment 
the  repugnance  is  overcome.  The  feeling 
of  the  movement  of  this  air  is,  in  me,  one 
strong  ingredient  of  the  feeling  of  assent. 
The  movements  of  the  muscles  of  the 
brow  and  eyelids  also  respond  very  sen- 
sitively to  every  fluctuation  in  the  agree- 
ableness  or  disagreeableness  of  what  comes 
before  my  mind.  In  a  sense,  then,  it  may 
be  truly  said,  that  in  one  person  at  least 
the  'self  of  selves,'  when  carefully  exam- 
ined, is  found  to  consist  mainly  of  the 
collection  of  these  peculiar  motions  in  the 
head,  or  between  the  head  and  throat."^ 
By   others    it   is    urged    that    the    self 

1  James,  Psychology^  Vol.  I,  pp.  300-30L 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  MIND  85 

which  is  fancied  is  really  nothing  more 
nor  less  than  the  visual  picture  of  one's 
person,  rising  in  consciousness  and  barely 
recognized  as  a  visual  picture,  and  so,  in 
a  half  dreamy  way,  it  is  confused  with 
the  idea  of  a  distinct  selfhood. 

Others,  again,  refer  the  idea  of  self  to 
the  verbal  idea  of  "I,"  "my,"  or  "mine," 
which,  inasmuch  as  it  is  no  longer  recog- 
nized as  a  verbal  idea,  lends  itself  readily 
to  a  like  confusion,  and  a  similar  inter- 
pretation. 

In  reference  to  all  of  these  explanations 
of  the  self,  which  explain  by  explaining 
away,  it  is  well  to  call  to  mind  the  pos- 
sibility of  there  being  a  real  self,  or  a 
metaphysical  self,  in  distinction  from  the 
empirical  or  psychological  self.  The  con- 
sciousness of  the  empirical  self,  i.e.  the 
self  evidenced  by  these  physiological  ac- 
companiments, may  be  mediated  through 
a  physical  feeling,  or  a  visual  or  verbal 
idea;  and  yet,  this  does  not  preclude 
the  possibility  of  the  real  self  underly- 
ing all  of  these  manifestations  of  the 
empirical  self.     The  Greeks  drew  a  simi- 


86       THE  PROBLEMS   OF  PHILOSOPHY 

lar  distinction  between  the  '^IrvxVi  the 
psychological  self,  and  the  1^01)9,  the  ra- 
tional self.  There  is  a  like  distinction 
in  the  German  between  Seele  and  Geist. 
The  soul,  the  vov^,  the  Creist^  is  some- 
thing more  than  conscious  states ;  it  is,  in 
the  words  of  Dr.  Martineau,  "the  reflec- 
tive knowledge  of  having  such  states."^ 

It  may  be  well  at  this  point  to  recall 
Hume's  famous  paragraph  concerning  the 
impossibility  of  there  being  any  such 
thing  as  a  distinct  self:  — 

"  For  my  part,  when  I  enter  most  inti- 
mately into  what  I  call  myself^  I  always 
stumble  on  some  particular  perception  or 
other  of  heat  or  cold,  light  or  shade,  love 
or  hatred,  pain  or  pleasure.  I  never  can 
catch  myself  at  any  time  without  a  per- 
ception, and  never  can  observe  anything 
but  the  perception.  When  my  percep- 
tions are  removed  for  any  time,  as  by 
sound  sleep,  so  long  am  I  insensible  of 
myself  and  may  truly  be  said  not  to  exist. 
And  were  all  my  perceptions  removed  by 

1  Martineau,  A  Study  of  Beligion,  Vol.  II,  p.  190. 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  MIND  87 

death,  and  could  I  neither  think,  nor 
feel,  nor  see,  nor  love,  nor  hate  after  the 
dissolution  of  my  body,  I  should  be  en- 
tirely annihilated;  nor  do  I  conceive  what 
is  farther  requisite  to  make  me  a  perfect 
nonentity.  If  any  one,  upon  serious  and 
unprejudiced  reflection,  thinks  he  has  a 
different  notion  of  himself^  I  must  confess 
I  can  reason  no  longer  with  him.  All  I 
can  allow  him  is,  that  he  may  be  in  the 
right  as  well  as  I,  and  that  we  are  essen- 
tially different  in  this  particular.  He 
may,  perhaps,  perceive  something  simple 
and  continued  which  he  calls  himself; 
though  I  am  certain  there  is  no  such 
principle  in  me.  But,  setting  aside  some 
metaphysicians  of  this  kind,  I  may  vent- 
ure to  affirm  of  the  rest  of  mankind  that 
they  are  nothing  hut  a  hu7idle  or  collection 
of  different  perceptions  which  succeed  each 
other  with  an  inconceivable  rapidity,  and 
are  in  a  perpetual  flux  and  movement."^ 

Hume  may  not  be  able  to  find  the  self 
as  object,  but  in  the  very  language  which 

1  Treatise  on  Human  Nature^  Vol.  I,  Ft.  iv,  sec.  6. 


88       THE   PROBLEMS   OF   PHILOSOPHY 

he  uses  he  seems  to  be  vaguely  aware  of 
the  self  as  subject.  There  is  a  self  con- 
sciously striving  to  find  the  self.  The 
self  which  is  searching  is  implied  even  in 
the  confession  of  the  elusiveness  of  the 
self  which  is  sought  for.  Hume,  more- 
over, makes  an  unreasonable  demand  in 
insisting  that  the  self,  if  discovered,  must 
be  found  stripped  of  all  its  activities.  The 
self  can  never  be  revealed  in  its  naked 
state.  We  naturally  expect  it  to  appear 
clothed  in  its  attributes,  and  it  is  to  be 
recognized  through  the  manifestations  of 
its  own  nature,  which  are  the  varied  phe- 
nomena of  consciousness.  Man  may  be 
regarded  as  a  bundle  of  perceptions,  but 
that  which  unites  the  perceptions  and 
holds  together  the  bundle,  must  be  some- 
thing more  than  the  sum  of  the  percep- 
tions themselves.  The  discrete  parts  do 
not  unite  themselves,  but  remain  discrete 
parts,  unless  we  conceive  of  a  unifying 
principle  which  integrates  the  separate 
parts  into  one  systematic  whole. 

It  is  urged,  moreover,   that  the   unity 
of  our  mental  states  is  provided  for  by 


THE  PROBLEM   OF  MIND  89 

the  law  of  the  association  of  ideas,  inas- 
much as  every  idea  present  in  conscious- 
ness is  capable  of  calling  up  another  idea 
or  ideas  which  are  associated  with  it  by 
similarity,  contiguity,  cause  and  effect,  or 
b}^  some  kindred  relation.  It  is  true  that 
a  certain  unity  is  thus  attained,  but  the 
scenes  are  shifted  so  rapidly  on  the  stage 
of  consciousness  that  we  have  a  series  of 
unified  states  rather  than  an  underlying 
unity  which  perdures  through  all  states, 
and  to  which  all  must  be  directly  related, 
however  diverse  they  may  be.  I  may  have 
an  experience  A,  a  definite  state  of  con- 
sciousness which  suggests  B,  and  B  in 
turn  suggests  C,  and  so  on  to  D,  E,  F, 
G,  etc.  There  is  a  connecting  link  of 
association  between  consecutive  terms  at 
any  given  point  in  the  series.  But  A 
may  be  related  to  B  through  an  associa- 
tion of  A  with  a  part  of  B.  A  totally 
different  part  of  B  may  be  associated  with 
C.  If  this  is  the  case,  the  continuity  of 
relation  between  A  and  C  is  broken.  As 
the  series  increases,  the  impossibility  of 
detecting  the  underlying  unity  of  associa- 


90       THE  PEOBLEMS   OF  PHILOSOPHY 

tion  between  A  and  some  far  removed 
term  in  the  series,  or  between  an  expe- 
rience of  last  year,  or  even  of  yesterday, 
and  the  present  moment  of  consciousness, 
is  apparent.  The  necessity,  therefore,  of 
an  identical  centre  of  reference  for  all 
states  of  consciousness,  however  widely 
separated  and  disparate,  forces  itself  upon 
us.  In  this  representation,  the  relation 
of  ideas  to  each  other  has  been  regarded 
as  a  chain  or  a  series  of  simply  connected 
terms,  whereas,  in  fact,  the  true  represen- 
tation of  our  states  of  consciousness  is 
that  of  an  extremely  complex  web  of  in- 
terrelated ideas  at  any  one  given  instant 
of  time.  This  complexity  increases  the 
difficulty  of  regarding  the  conscious  un- 
derlying unity  experienced  throughout  the 
manifold  variety  of  life's  experience,  as  a 
mere  unity  of  similarity  which  associated 
ideas  bear  to  one  another.  Paulsen  feels 
this  when  he  defines  the  soul  as  a  "plu- 
rality of  psychical  experiences  Compre- 
hended into  the  unity  of  consciousness  in 
a  manner  not  further  definable."^ 

1  Paulsen,  Introduction  to  Philosophy,  p.  129. 


THE  PROBLEM  OF   MIND  91 

In  this  definition  there  is  a  recognition 
of  the  fact  that  the  self  must  be  some- 
thing more  than  the  sum  of  the  conscious 
states  of  experience,  and  that  a  unity  is 
necessary  in  which  these  several  states 
may  be  merged,  even  though  the  precise 
nature  of  that  unity  may  not  be  further 
defined.  Whatever  the  nature  of  that 
unity  may  be,  it  certainly  is  something 
more  than  an  association  of  ideas,  which 
can  mean  only  the  logical  and  orderly 
relation  of  ideas.  Underlying  all  such 
relations  there  is  need  of  a  unifying 
self. 

The  testimony  of  Kant,  and  of  Green, 
to  the  truth  of  this  doctrine  is  found  in 
a  very  forcible  statement  of  Professor 
Green:  "We  have  followed  him  (i.e, 
Kant)  also,  as  we  believe  every  one 
must  who  has  once  faced  the  question, 
in  maintaining  that  a  single  active 
self-conscious  principle,  by  whatever 
name  it  be  called,  is  necessary  to  con- 
stitute a  world  of  experience,  as  the 
condition  under  which  alone  phenomena, 
i.e,    appearances     to    consciousness,    can 


92       THE  PROBLEMS   OF  PHILOSOPHY 


be  related  to  each  other  in  a  single  uni- 


verse. 


"1 


From  the  point  of  view  of  genetic  psy- 
chology, that  is,  the  special  inquiry  con- 
cerning the  beginnings  and  development 
of  mental  life,  it  is  urged  that  there  is 
a  gradual  evolution  from  simple  to  in- 
creasingly complex  states  of  conscious- 
ness throughout  all  the  successive  stages 
of  progressive  psychical  experiences ;  and 
that,  therefore,  the  idea  of  a  separate  per- 
manent self  is  incongruous  to  this  con- 
ception of  tRe  constant  change  and  the 
shifting  scenes  of  our  inner  life.  Such 
a  development,  however,  does  not  seem 
necessarily  to  preclude  the  idea  of  an 
original  nucleus  of  growth  which  pre- 
serves its  own  identity  amid  the  in- 
definite variety  of  conscious  states,  and 
which,  at  the  same  time,  acts  as  a  unify- 
ing principle  in  coordinating  all  the  sev- 
eral stages  of  development  within  the 
sphere  of  a  permanent  personality. 

The  Intellectualists  and  Voluntaryists.  — 
We  come  now  to  a  second  problem 
1  Green,  Prolegomena  to  Ethics^  §  38. 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  MIND  93 

within  the  domain  of  philosophical  psy- 
chology, as  to  the  primary  and  essential 
nature  of  consciousness.  Is  conscious- 
ness to  be  regarded  as  essentially  intel- 
lect, or  as  will?  This  question  gives 
rise  to  two  schools.  The  intellectualist 
insists  that  the  processes  of  perception, 
conception,  judgment,  inference,  etc.,  con- 
stitute the  foundation  of  all  other  men- 
tal experiences.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
theory  of  voluntaryism  would  find  the 
beginnings  of  mental  life  in  the  crude 
phenomena  of  will,  in  appetites  seeking 
gratification,  in  desires  seeking  satisfac- 
tion, in  the  interminable  striving  and 
struggling  which  characterize  all  forms 
of  life  from  the  lowest  to  the  highest. 

Intellectualism  received  a  very  hearty 
support  from  Descartes,  who  emphasized 
the  rational  as  the  primal  element  of 
mind;  in  this  he  was  followed  by  Spinoza 
and  Leibniz.  Later,  Herbart,  as  one  of  the 
prominent  articles  of  his  creed,  regarded 
ideas  as  primary,  whose  attraction  and 
repulsion,  after  the  analogy  of  material 
bodies,  result  in  desire,  feeling,  and  will. 


94       THE   PROBLEMS    OF   PHILOSOPHY 

On  the  other  hand,  Schopenhauer  is  the 
chief  champion  of  the  school  of  volun- 
taryism. He  insisted  that  the  underlying 
and  controlling  principle  in  all  mental 
life  was  the  will  to  live;  and  that  all 
other  mental  experiences,  either  directly 
or  indirectly,  may  be  reduced  to  this  as 
the  original  source  of  them  all.  The  ten- 
dency, to-day,  among  philosophical  think- 
ers, is  to  magnify  the  importance  of  the 
will,  and  this  because  it  is  urged  that  in 
the  will  there  is  a  possible  point  where 
the  forces  of  nature  and  the  forces  of 
mind  may  unite.  If  matter  can  be  re- 
duced to  force,  and  mind  to  will,  then  it 
is  maintained  the  synthesis  of  material 
force  and  mental  effort  under  the  category 
of  the  will  may  not  be  wholly  visionary. 

In  reference  to  the  question  of  the 
primacy  of  the  will  or  of  the  intellect, 
it  seems  that  the  truth  may  most  probably 
lie  in  the  direction  of  Lotze's  position 
that  neither  to  the  intellect  nor  to  the  will 
is  primacy  to  be  conceded,  but  that  they 
are  to  be  regarded  as  coordinate  powers  of 
the  mind. 


CHAPTER  VI 

THE  PROBLEM  OF   KNOWLEDGE 
(  "  EPISTEMOLOGY  "  ) 

OF  the  general  problems  of  mind,  there 
is  one  special  problem,  whose  discus- 
sion forms  a  distinct  discipline  in  philos- 
ophy, namely,  the  problem  of  knowledge, 
or  epistemology.  This  problem,  which, 
in  modern  philosophy,  was  started  by 
Locke  in  1690,  presents  a  twofold  as- 
pect, first,  respecting  the  source  of  our 
knowledge,  and,  second,  respecting  its 
nature. 

As  to  the  former  question,  concerning 
the  origin  of  knowledge,  there  are  two 
views,  indicating  opposite  tendencies  in 
thought,  known  as  rationalism  and  em- 
piricism. 

Rationalism.  —  The  former  insists  that 
the  source  of  all  knowledge  is  primarily 
in  the  mind,  inasmuch  as  there  are  cer- 
tain fundamental  principles  of  which  the 


96       THE   PROBLEMS   OF  PHILOSOPHY 

mind  is  immediately  aware,  and  which 
give  form  and  system  to  the  crude  mate- 
rials of  sensation,  and  which,  therefore, 
so  far  forth,  modify  and  condition  all  ex- 
perience. Such  a  view  allows  as  primal 
elements  of  knowledge  the  original  data 
given  through  sense-perception.  It  only 
insists  that  such  data  are  not  the  sole 
source  of  knowledge,  but  that  the  mind 
also  furnishes  its  own  contributing  factors 
to  the  complete  result.  For,  it  is  held 
that  the  mind  does  not  simply  receive 
the  impressions  of  the  outer  world,  as 
though  they  were  photographed  upon  a 
sensitive  plate.  The  mind  is  regarded 
as  active  and  not  passive  in  the  act  of 
perception.  The  mind  stamps  the  raw 
material  of  the  senses  with  its  own  die, 
gives  a  character  to  that  which  would  fee 
merely  a  confused  blending  of  chaotic 
sensations  and  automatic  reactions,  and 
which  would  lack  wholly  that  orderly  ar- 
rangement which  characterizes  our  world 
of  perceptions,  ideas,  and  feelings.  These 
controlling  principles  of  the  mind  which, 
it  is  held,  give  form  to  the  crude  data 


THE  PROBLEM  OF   KNOWLEDGE  97 

of  perception,  are  such  general  ideas  as 
those  of  time,  of  space,  of  causation,  of  logi- 
cal relation,  and  similar  ideas  which  are 
regarded  as  of  an  a  priori  nature,  to  dis- 
tinguish them  from  purely  a  posteriori 
knowledge.  The  former  phrase  refers,  as 
has  been  before  indicated,  to  knowledge 
which  is  prior  to  and  conditions  expe- 
rience; the  latter  expression  refers  to 
knowledge  which  is  solely  the  result  of 
experience. 

Empiricism.  —  We  will  now  consider 
the  theory  which  refers  all  knowledge  to 
experience  as  its  source,  namely,  empiri- 
cism. If  such  experience,  as  some  hold, 
is  essentially  and  solely  the  product  of 
sensations  received  in  consciousness,  then 
it  is  known  as  the  theory  of  sensational- 
ism; of  which  form  of  empiricism,  the 
brilliant  French  philosopher,  Condillac,  is 
an  eminent  representative.  The  key-note 
of  empiricism  is  found  in  Locke's  oft-re- 
peated and  oft-quoted  phrase,  occurring 
in  his  Essay  on  Human  Understanding^ 
"No  innate  ideas."  The  Empiricist  holds 
that  the  mind  is  a  tabula  rasa,  a  surface 


98       THE  PROBLEMS   OF  PHILOSOPHY 

smooth  and  clean,  impressionable  to  the 
various  sensory  stimulations  which  write 
upon  it  the  records  of  experience.  The 
adherents  of  this  doctrine  very  stoutly 
maintain  that  the  so-called  innate  ideas, 
when  subjected  to  the  nearer  scrutiny  of 
a  critical  analysis,  will  be  found  reducible 
to  simpler  elements,  which  are  manifestly 
the  product  of  experience.  Our  idea  of 
causation,  it  is  insisted,  is  not  an  intui- 
tive possession,  but  it  has  grown  with  our 
growth,  through  repeated  observations  of 
nature,  which  indicate  an  invariability 
and  uniformity  which  we  unconsciously 
generalize  into  an  all-embracing  formula 
of  universal  causation.  When  it  is  ob- 
jected that  even  a  small  child  gives  evi- 
dence of  possessing  general  ideas,  out  of 
all  proportion  in  point  of  completeness 
to  the  extreme  brevity  of  its  limited  expe- 
rience, the  reply  is  made,  that  the  seem- 
ingly original  mental  possessions  of  the 
child,  which  its  individual  experience  is 
utterly  inadequate  to  account  for,  may 
nevertheless  be  explained  by  a  race  expe- 
rience which  the  child  inherits  and  which 


THE  PROBLEM  OF   KNOWLEDGE  99 

in  its  dawning  consciousness  appears  as 
intuitive  knowledge. 

The  distinction  between  rationalism 
and  empiricism  marks  one  of  the  chief 
points  of  difference  between  the  conti- 
nental and  the  British  philosophers.  Of 
the  rationalistic  school  we  have  Des- 
cartes, Spinoza,  and  Leibniz  as  the  chief 
representatives,  while  of  the  school  of 
Empiricism  are  found  Locke,  Hume,  and 
John  Stuart  Mill. 

The  Critical  School.  —  Kant,  as  a  repre- 
sentative of  the  so-called  critical  school, 
insisted  upon  the  empirical  origin  of  the"' 
gross  material  elements  of  knowledge 
through  the  avenues  of  the  senses,  but, 
on  the  other  hand,  upon  the  rationalistic 
origin  of  the  same  as  regards  the  formal 
element,  which  is  manifested  in  the  con- 
structive function  of  the  mind.  Kant 
expressed  this  thought  in  his  famous  doc- 
trine: "Macht  zwar  Verstand  die  Natur, 
aber  er  schafft  sie  nicht."  "The  under- 
standing constructs  nature,  but  does  not 
create  it."  The  crude  data  of  nature  the 
mind  fashions  into  ideas  through  its  own 


100        THE  PROBLEMS   OF   PHILOSOPHY 

thought  functions.     The  mind  is  an  archi- 
tect, though  not  the  creator  of  thought. 

Positivism.  —  A  modified  form  of  empir- 
icism is  that  which  is  known  as  positiv- 
ism, a  philosophic  system  associated  with 
the  name  of  its  founder,  August  Comte, 
born  in  1789.  He  insisted  upon  the  posi- 
tive facts  of  experience,  the  facts  which 
form  the  subject  matter  of  science,  as  the 
sole  basis  of  our  knowledge.  In  refer- 
ence to  all  speculation  concerning  theo- 
ries which  such  facts  may  suggest,  he 
declares  that  man  must  remain  agnostic. 
Comte,  moreover,  maintained  that  man- 
kind passes  through  certain  phases  of 
thought  in  an  upward  development. 
These  phases  are  three  in  number,  the 
theological,  the  metaphysical,  and  the 
positive,  the  latter  being  the  final  goal 
of  knowledge.  In  the  first  stage,  Comte 
says,  phenomena  are  regarded  as  caused 
by  wills  similar  to  ours ;  the  progress  of 
thought  in  this  stage  passes  from  a  grossly 
superstitious  fetichism,  through  polythe- 
ism, to  the  more  refined  form  of  monothe- 
ism.    In  the  metaphysical  stage,  certain 


THE   PKOBLEM  OF  KNOWLEDGE       101 

mental  abstractions  are  held  to  constitute 
the  power  underlying  all  nature,  such  as 
the  idea  of  force,  of  occult  powers  or  vir- 
tues inherent  in  substances.     In  the  third 
and  advanced  stage,    Comte   regards   all 
knowledge  as  circumscribed  by  the  gen- 
eral  laws   of    science   which    have    been 
experimentally  determined,  and  which  ac- 
count for  the  sequence  of  phenomena,  the 
measurement  of  their  intensity,   and  all 
their  quantitative   relations,   but  which, 
however,  are  silent  concerning  the  under- 
lying ground  of  these  phenomena,  and  their 
significance  in  the  light  of  the  purposes  or 
ends  which  they  subserve.      The  end  of 
knowledge,   according   to   Comte,   is   the 
more  perfect  systematization  of  the  sci- 
ences, in  which  task  all  metaphysical  pre- 
suppositions must  be  strenuously  avoided. 
It  is  evident,  however,  that  such  proced- 
ure would  leave  no  place  for  a  philosophy 
of  knowledge. 

The  Nature  of  Knowledge.  —  A  second 
problem  is  the  nature  of  knowledge  as 
the  expression  of  reality.  In  what  way 
is  our  knowledge  related  to  reality?     In 


102        THE  PROBLEMS   OF  PHILOSOPHY 

what  sense  is  tlie  inner  world  of  con- 
sciousness a  real  world?  It  is  of  su- 
preme importance  that  the  student  of 
philosophy  should  appreciate  the  nature 
of  this  problem,  its  many  difficulties,  and 
the  main  points  at  issue.  To  grasp  appre- 
ciatively the  difficulties  of  a  problem,  is 
the  first  step  towards  a  solution.  Let  us, 
therefore,  attempt  a  more  detailed  state- 
ment of  this  question,  and  the  perplexi- 
ties which  arise  in  its  wake. 

Whatever  our  theory  of  the  source  of 
knowledge  may  be,  we  are  constrained  to 
recognize  the  senses  as  the  organs  of  medi- 
ation between  us  and  the  external  world. 
An  outer  stimulus  is  followed  by  a  corre- 
sponding sensation.  The  sensation,  how- 
ever, is  not  the  stimulus,  however  much 
it  may  be  modified  in  transmission  through 
the  neural  circuit  to  the  brain ;  nor  is  the 
sensation  a  copy  of  the  object  which 
caused  the  stimulus.  In  vision,  the  outer 
stimulus  is  a  vibratory  movement  in  the 
ether,  which  is  an  invisible,  highly  elas- 
tic medium,  filling  all  space  and  pene- 
trating   all    bodies.     The    corresponding 


THE  problem' OF   KNOWLEDGE       103 

perception,  however,  is  of  an  object  pos- 
sessing  definite  color,  form,  and  location 
in  space.  The  difference  between  the 
colors  red  and  green,  as  regards  the 
stimulus,  is  a  difference  in  the  number  of 
vibrations  in  a  second.  In  the  finished 
perception  it  is  a  qualitative  difference; 
as  regards  the  stimulus,  however,  it  is 
quantitative. 

Here,  in  the  problem  of  knowledge, 
emerges  the  old  difficulty,  which  we 
found  in  the  problem  of  ontology,  the 
evident  gap  between  physical  antecedents 
and  the  psychical  consequents.  In  the 
problem  of  knowledge,  the  question  which 
confronts  us  is,  how  far  the  inner  percep- 
tion is  a  true  representation  of  the  world 
of  reality.  Are  the  relations  of  time  and 
space,  of  cause  and  effect,  merely  pro- 
jections of  the  mind  upon  the  field  of 
perception  ?  May  it  not  be  true  that  our 
perceptions  which  seem  to  be  perceptions 
of  things  are,  after  all,  only  mental  expe- 
riences which  have  no  corresponding  real- 
ity, or  a  reality  different  from  our  mind's 
representation  of  it?     May  it  not  be  pos- 


104        THE  PROBLEMS   OF   PHILOSOPHY 

sible  even  that  the  world  of  experience 
manifested  in  consciousness  as  a  world  of 
order,  of  law,  of  harmony,  and  of  beauty, 
is  a  work  solely  of  the  constructive  pro- 
cesses of  the  mind,  so  that  a  chaos  without 
is  transmuted  into  a  cosmos  within,  as 
irregular,  broken  bits  of  glass  in  a  kalei- 
doscope appear  to  the  viewing  eye  as  elabo- 
rate designs,  accurately  proportioned  and 
exquisitely  colored?  We  find  these  diffi- 
culties graphically  portrayed  in  the  cele- 
brated allegory  of  Plato :  — 

"'Let  me  show  you,  in  a  figure,  how 
far  our  nature  is  enlightened  or  unen- 
lightened: Behold!  human  beings  living 
in  an  underground  den,  which  has  a 
mouth  open  towards  the  light,  and  reach- 
ing all  along  the  den;  they  have  been 
here  from  their  childhood,  and  have  their 
legs  and  necks  chained  so  that  they  can- 
not move,  and  can  only  see  before  them ; 
for  the  chains  are  arranged  in  such  a 
manner  as  to  prevent  them  from  turning 
round  their  heads.  Above  and  behind 
them  the  light  of  a  fire  is  blazing  at  a 
distance,   and   between   the   fire  and   the 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  KNOWLEDGE       105 

prisoners  there  is  a  raised  way;  and  you 
will  see,  if  you  look,  a  low  wall  built 
along  the  way,  like  the  screen  which 
marionette  players  have  in  front  of  them, 
over  which  they  show  the  puppets.' 

"'I  see.' 

"'And  do  you  see,'  I  said,  'men  pass- 
ing along  the  wall,  some  ajDparently  talk- 
ing and  others  silent,  carrying  vessels  and 
statues  and  figures  of  animals,  made  of 
wood  and  stone  and  various  materials,  and 
which  appear  over  the  wall  ? ' 

"'You  have  shown  me  a  strange  image, 
and  they  are  strange  prisoners.' 

"'Like  ourselves,'  I  replied,  'and  they 
see  only  their  own  shadows,  or  the  shad- 
ows of  one  another,  which  the  fire  throws 
on  the  opposite  wall  of  the  cave  ?  ' 

"'True,'  he  said;  'how  could  they  see 
anything  but  the  shadows,  if  they  were 
never  allowed  to  move  their  heads  ? ' 

"'And  of  the  objects  which  are  being 
carried  in  like  manner  they  would  only 
see  the  shadows?' 

"'Yes,'  he  said. 

"'And  if  they  were  able  to  talk  with 


106        THE  PROBLEMS   OF  PHILOSOPHY 

one  another,  would  tliey  not  suppose  that 
they  were  naming  what  was  actually  before 
them?' 

"'Very  true.' 

"'And  suppose,  further,  that  the  prison 
had  an  echo  which  came  from  the  other 
side,  would  they  not  be  sure  to  fancy  that 
the  voice  which  they  heard  was  that  of  a 
passing  shadow  ? ' 

"'No  question,'  he  replied. 

"'Beyond  question,'  I  said,  'the  truth 
would  be  to  them  just  nothing  but  the 
shadows  of  the  images.'"^ 

This  is  the  problem,  therefore,  — 
whether  our  world  is  made  up  of  shad- 
ows of  images  merely,  or  whether  it  is 
a  world  of  reality?  The  answer  to  this 
question  may  be  of  a  psychological,  logi- 
cal, or  metaphysical  nature.  The  psy- 
chological answer  is  satisfied  with  an 
accurate  account  of  the  process  by  which 
the  outer  world  becomes  an  object  of  con- 
sciousness, tracing  the  external  stimuli 
through  the  nerve  channels  to  the  brain 

1  The  BepuUic,  VII,  514. 


THE   PROBLEM   OF    KNOWLEDGE       107 

tracts  and  to  the  final  mental  reaction 
in  consciousness.  From  the  standpoint  of 
special  psychology,  no  other  answer  seems 
relevant. 

The  logical  answer  is,  that  the  world 
within  and  the  world  without  are  corre- 
sponding worlds,  so  that  there  can  be  a 
constant  basis  of  reference.  The  idea  of 
invariability,  as  characterizing  the  world 
of  experience,  is  a  necessary  logical  postu- 
late, for,  without  it,  inference  would  be 
impossible.  The  world,  as  we  know  it, 
must  be  a  world  of  uniformity,  or  else  it 
would  be  impossible  to  reason,  as  we  do 
in  logical  inference,  from  the  functions 
of  a  part  to  the  nature  of  the  whole,  or 
vice  versa. 

The  metaphysical  answers  are  two,  form- 
ing the  opposed  schools  of  thought,  real- 
ism and  idealism. 

Realism.  - —  Realism,  or,  as  it  is  gener- 
ally styled,  natural  realism,  is  that  the- 
ory which  regards  the  world  of  perception 
as  a  true  representation  of  the  world  with- 
out, and  insists  also  that  the  world  with- 
out has   a   real   existence,    and   that    its 


108        THE  PKOBLEMS   OF  PHILOSOPHY 

plienomena  continue  to  manifest  them- 
selves in  their  physical  actions  and  reac- 
tions even  when  the  perceiving  mind 
ceases  to  observe  them. 

Realism  is  of  two  kinds,  a  na'ive,  and 
a  critical  realism.  The  former  is  the  re- 
sult of  a  common-sense  judgment  which, 
without  reflection,  accepts  a  theory  of 
crude  dualism,  and  does  not  seek  to  go 
behind  the  appearance  of  an  external 
world  without  and  an  internal  world 
within.  It  accepts  the  facts,  as  they 
seem  to  be,  from  the  standpoint  of  a 
practical  mind  which  is  but  slightly  in- 
trospective. Critical  realism  discrimi- 
nates between  the  crude  data  of  perception 
and  the  completed  product  to  which  the 
mind  is  a  contributing  factor  which  must 
be  reckoned  with  in  framing  a  theory  of 
knowledge.  It  nevertheless  maintains  a 
dualism  between  mind  and  matter,  al- 
though of  a  more  refined  type,  and  insists 
upon  the  reality  of  an  objective  world 
which  is  independent  of  the  mind,  which 
may  or  may  not  observe  it. 

The  theory  of  realism  is  associated  with 


THE  PROBLEM   OF  KNOWLEDGE       109 

the  Scottish  school  of  philosophy,  whose 
founder  was  Thomas  Reid,  followed  by 
Oswald,  Beattie,  Dugald  Stewart,  and 
McCosh. 

Idealism.  —  Idealism  insists  that  the 
only  world  which  is  known  to  us  is  the 
world  which  appears  in  consciousness. 
Whether  there  is  an  external  world  cor- 
responding, is  a  matter  of  surmise,  but 
never  of  certainty. 

One  of  the  most  eminent  of  the  ideal- 
ists, Bishop  Berkeley,  declared  that  noth- 
ing exists  except  as  it  is  an  object  of 
perception.  Esse  est  per  dpi,  Locke  had 
drawn  the  distinction  between  primary 
and  secondary  qualities  of  matter;  the 
former,  as  extension,  weight,  etc.,  he  re- 
garded as  objective  qualities  inhering  in 
the  object  perceived ;  while  the  latter,  the 
secondary  qualities,  as  color,  taste,  smell, 
were  subjective  reactions  and  not  qualities 
inherent  in  the  object.  Bishop  Berkeley 
went  a  step  farther,  and  said,  that  as  the 
color  red  is  an  affection  of  the  sensib-ili- 
ties  and  not  resident  in  the  object,  so, 
also,    form,    weight,    and    force    are    all 


110        THE  PROBLEMS   OF   PHILOSOPHY 

subjective  constructions  with  no  corre- 
sponding essences  that  can  be  regarded  as 
constituting  an  object  external  to  the 
subject,  i.e.  the  perceiving  self,  or  Ego. 
Hume  carried  Berkeley's  argument  a  step 
farther  still,  in  insisting  that  even  the 
varied  subjective  manifestations  appear- 
ing in  consciousness  were  mere  phenomena 
which  possess  no  more  trustworthy  assur- 
ances of  reality  than  do  the  phenomena 
of  the  world  of  matter.  Hume  pushed 
Berkeley's  argument  to  the  extreme  of 
absolute  scepticism. 

Kant's  phenomenalism  is,  in  a  way, 
a  form  of  idealism  in  that  he  held  that 
all  things,  whether  material  or  mental, 
appear  as  mere  phenomena,  adding,  how- 
ever, that  behind  every  phenomenon  there 
must  be  a  corresponding  noumenon,  that 
is,  a  real  entity,  referred  to  by  Kant  as 
the  thing-in-itself  to  distinguish  it  from 
the  thing-as-it-appears.  This  thing-in- 
itself,  however,  can  never  be  known;  it 
is  the  unknown  quantity  behind  every 
phenomenon,  the  x  of  the  equation  of 
knowledge.     In  Lange's  History  of  Mate- 


THE  PROBLEM  OF   KNOWLEDGE        111 

rialism  he  cites  Kant's  doctrine  in  sup- 
port of  materialism,  inasmuch  as  a  denial 
of  any  reality  that  can  be  known  leaves 
only  the  material  appearances  as  the  be- 
ginning and  end  of  our  knowledge.  It 
must  be  noticed  however,  in  passing,  that 
Kant,  in  his  Critique  of  Practical  Reason^ 
restores  the  world  which,  in  his  Critique 
of  Pure  Reason,  he  destroys.  For  Kant 
declares  that  in  the  intuitions  of  con- 
science, which  are  regulative  of  the  will, 
that  is,  of  the  practical  reason,  there  is 
evidence  of  a  world  of  law  and  of  order, 
which  pure  reason,  unaided,  is  not  able 
to  prove.  Kant  assigns  the  primacy  to 
the  will  and  not  to  theoretical  reason.  It 
is  the  will,  he  urges,  which  is  directly 
conscious  of  a  law  which  imposes  obliga- 
tion and  responsibility,  and,  therefore,  so 
far  forth,  gives  assurance  that  the  world 
in  which  the  will  must  fulfil  its  obliga- 
tions must  be  an  orderly,  self-consistent, 
law-obeying  world,  or  otherwise  law,  obli- 
gation, duty,  obedience,  could  have  no 
meaning  and  no  field  or  scope  for  their 
activities. 


112        THE  PROBLEMS   OF   PHILOSOPHY 

Another  form  of  idealism  is  the  doctrine 
of  the  relativity  of  knowledge,  as  ex- 
pressed by  Sir  William  Hamilton.  "  Our 
whole  knowledge  of  mind  and  of  matter 
is  relative  —  conditioned  —  relatively  con- 
ditioned. Of  things  absolutely  or  in 
themselves,  be  they  external,  be  they  in- 
ternal, we  know  nothing,  or  know  them 
only  as  incognizable;  and  become  aw^are 
of  their  incomprehensible  existence  only 
as  this  is  indirectly  and  accidentally 
revealed  to  us  through  certain  qualities 
related  to  our  faculties  of  knowledge. 
All  that  we  know  is,  therefore,  phenome- 
nal—  phenomenal  of  the  unknown." ^ 

In  Kant's  phenomenalism  as  well  as  in 
Hamilton's  doctrine  of  the  relativity  of 
knowledge  we  find  the  same  assumption 
that,  inasmuch  as  the  object  perceived 
sustains  certain  relations  to  the  subject 
perceiving,  therefore  the  perception  itself 
must  be  colored  by  the  nature  of  the  sub- 
ject, and  the  object  of  the  perception  there- 
fore is  not  apprehended  simply  as  it  is  in 

1  Metaphysics f  I,  p.  153. 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  KNOWLEDGE       113 

itself.  In  other  words,  we  look  at  Nature 
through  the  colored  glasses  of  the  Ego, 
the  self.  The  Scottish  philosophy,  on  the 
other  hand,  took  the  position,  that  while 
certain  principles  of  our  mind  are  opera- 
tive in  interpreting  the  nature  and  sig- 
nificance of  every  perception,  we  are 
nevertheless  not  deceived  in  such  inter- 
pretation, inasmuch  as  there  is  a  com- 
plete harmony  between  our  nature  and 
the  nature  of  things. ^ 

Prof.  T.  H.  Green  has  further  developed 
this  idea  and  given  it  more  exact  philo- 
sophical expression  in  declaring  that  the 
spiritual  principle  in  man,  constituting 
the  unity  of  his  consciousness,  is  one 
with  the  spiritual  principle  in  the  world, 
which  constitutes  the  law,  the  order,  and 
the  harmony  of  the  universe.  The  syn- 
thesis of  these  principles  in  perception 
assures  the  reality  of  our  world  of  knowl- 
edge. ^ 

It  must  be  observed,  moreover,  that  our 

1  On  the  Scottish  Philosophy^  Andrew  Seth,  pp. 
157-158. 

2  Prolegomena  to  Ethics,  Book  I,  chap.  i. 


114        THE  PROBLEMS   OF  PHILOSOPHY 

knowledge  of  phenomena  is  still  real 
knowledge.  There  is  a  sneer  in  the 
phrase  "mere  phenomena"  which  is  mis- 
leading. Objects  in  themselves  and  ob- 
jects as  they  appear  are  not  necessarily 
two  distinct  things.  The  thing-in-itself 
can  manifest  itself  only  through  its  attri- 
butes and  through  the  manifold  relations 
which  these  attributes  sustain.  It  is  a 
violent  assumption  that  the  thing-in-itself 
is  one  thing,  and  the  manifestation  of  it 
something  different,  and  therefore  illusive. 
We  are  rather  to  think,  with  Hegel,  that 
"thoughts  do  not  stand  between  us  and 
things  shutting  us  from  things,  they 
rather  shut  us  together  with  them."  And 
it  may  be  added,  that  the  resulting  knowl- 
edge is,  therefore,  of  real  things  in  a  real 
world. 

Absolute  Idealism.  —  The  doctrines  of 
Hegel,  as  well  as  those  of  Fichte  and  Schel- 
ling,  are  a  form  of  so-called  absolute  ideal- 
ism. These  doctrines,  however  they  may 
differ  in  the  details  of  representation,  rest 
upon  the  identity  hypothesis  concerning 
the  relation  of  matter  to  mind,  which  hy- 


THE   PROBLEM   OF   KNOWLEDGE        115 

pothesis,  it  will  be  recalled,  regards  mat- 
ter and  mind  as  related  phases  of  one  and 
the  same  underlying  substance  which  uni- 
fies the  two  seemingly  discrepant  phenom- 
ena in  their  mutual  interaction ;  moreover, 
absolute  idealism  considers  this  unifying 
substance  to  be  a  spiritual  principle, 
which  is  at  the  same  time  the  absolute 
principle  of  the  universe.  The  antithesis 
of  subject  and  object  in  the  process  of 
perception  is  resolved  in  a  higher  synthe- 
sis of  a  universal  consciousness,  of  which 
subject  and  object  are  different  modes. 
In  Germany,  the  doctrines  of  Spinoza  and 
a  pantheistic  philosophy  were  revived 
under  the  influence  of  Lessing  and  Her- 
der. After  Kant,  we  find  Hegel,  Fi elite, 
and  Schelling  developing  these  ideas  in 
various  forms.  Fichte  emphasized  the 
subjective,  spiritual  principle  as  the  pri- 
mal and  all-comprehending  essence  of  the 
universe  wdiich  manifests  itself  in  the 
various  activities  of  the  human  will,  con- 
serving law,  order,  and  moral  force.  On 
the  other  hand,  Schelling  insisted  upon 
an  objective  idealism,  as  well  as  a  sub- 


116        THE  PROBLEMS   OF  PHILOSOPHY 

jective,  the  manifestation  in  nature  of 
the  spiritual  principle,  whereby  the  ideal 
finds  expression  in  the  concrete  real,  the 
two  being  essentially  one.  Hegel's  ideal- 
ism is  a  logical  system  based  upon  the 
proposition  that  the  necessities  of  thought 
determine  rigidly  the  necessities  of  being. 
His  dictum  is  that  the  rational  is  the 
real.  The  necessary  thought  relations 
therefore  determine  a  definite  programme 
to  which  the  actual  phenomena  of  the 
universe,  in  their  unfolding,  conform. 
Everything  that  exists  was  originally  an 
idea  in  the  Divine  Mind.  The  Absolute 
Being,  or  the  Idea,  as  Hegel  designates 
the  supreme  principle  of  all  being,  mani- 
fests Himself  in  nature,  in  man,  in  his- 
tory, art,  law,  ethics,  religion,  and  all  the 
manifold  phases  of  existence.  The  sys- 
tems of  absolute  idealism,  it  will  be  seen, 
are  essentially  pantheistic,  panlogistic,  or 
pamphysical,  according  as  there  is  em- 
phasized severally  the  personal  nature  of 
the  All-Being,  or  the  nature  of  the  same 
regarded  as  impersonal  reason,  or  as  a 
material  force. 


THE  PROBLEM   OF  KNOWLEDGE       117 

In  the  philosophy  of  Herhart,  we  find 
a  natural  reaction  from  the  dogmas  of 
Hegel;  for  he  insists  that  things  cannot 
be  identified  with  thought,  but  that  they 
exist  independent  of  the  reason  which 
cognizes  them.  The  business  of  pliiloso- 
phy,  according  to  him  therefore,  is  to 
seek  a  more  exact  and  adequate  formula- 
tion of  the  concepts  which  express  the 
underlying  principles  of  the  different  sci- 
ences. Herbart  recognizes  a  number  of 
distinct  realities  in  the  world,  and  these 
it  is  our  duty  to  know  and  understand. 
The  tendency  of  thought  to  react  from  an 
absolute  idealism  is  a  most  natural  one 
and  has  many  illustrations ;  on  the  other 
hand,  a  tendency  towards  a  crude  realism, 
and  a  radical  dualism,  meets  the  same 
reactive  tendency  in  the  opposite  direc- 
tion. The  truth  must  lie  somewhere 
between  the  two  extremes. 


CHAPTER  VII 

THE  PEOBLEM   OF   REASOJ^T 

THE  normative  sciences,  logic,  ethics, 
and  aesthetics,  form  a  single  group 
in  virtue  of  the  common  feature  that  each 
refers  to  a  norm,  or  standard,  by  which 
reason,  conduct,  or  taste  is  to  be  judged. 
We  find  ourselves  in  the  realm  of  law; 
its  interpretation  and  application  consti- 
tute in  this  sphere  the  offices  of  phi- 
losophy. 

Of  the  normative  sciences,  logic  is  the 
one  Avhich  deals  with  the  problem  of 
reason.  Reason  may  be  regarded  in  the 
special  significance  of  the  term  as  equiva- 
lent to  the  process  of  reasoning,  and  there- 
fore as  synonymous  w^ith  inference,  one  of 
the  departments  of  logic  proper.  Reason, 
however,  may  have  a  more  general  and 
comprehensive  meaning  as  synonymous 
with  the  understanding,  and  including  the 

concept  and  the  judgment  as  well  as  in- 
118 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  REASON     119 

ference.  The  science  of  logic,  therefore, 
embi-aces  these  three  modes  of  thought, 
the  concept,  judgment,  and  inference. 

The  Concept.  —  Of  these  the  concept 
is  the  simplest  form;  the  judgment  is  a 
developed  form  of  the  concept,  and  in- 
ference, a  further  development  of  the 
judgment.  Moreover,  back  of  the  con- 
cept there  is  still  a  simpler  psychical 
phenomenon,  namely,  the  percept  which 
forms  the  foundation  of  the  concept. 
The  percept  is  the  finished  product  in 
the  process  of  perception.  When  a  num- 
ber of  percepts  are  observed  to  possess 
certain  common  characteristics,  the  mind 
seizes  upon  these  common  marks  and 
frames  them  into  one  general  idea,  which 
represents  a  class  or  a  group  of  objects  of 
which  each  separate  percept  in  question 
stands  as  an  individual  example.  After 
we  have  perceived  a  number  of  roses,  we 
will  find  that  the  resulting  percepts  are 
distinctly  different  as  regards  size,  color, 
fragrance,  and  many  other  qualities.  Each 
individual  rose  preserves  a  marked  indi- 
viduality,   and   yet   from    the   group    of 


120        THE  PROBLEMS   OF  PHILOSOPHY 

differing  individual  cases,  the  mind  con- 
structs a  general  idea  of  a  rose  which 
embodies  the  common  marks,  or  general 
characteristic  features,  of  all  the  roses 
which  we  have  ever  observed.  The  gen- 
eral idea  is  not  visualized  as  a  picture  in 
the  mind's  field  of  vision;  it  is  intellect- 
ually, not  sensibly,  discerned.  The  Ger- 
man word  for  concept,  Begriff^  gives  the 
significance  of  the  term  more  strikingly; 
it  is  the  mind's  hegreifen^  the  grasping 
the  common  and  essential  characteristics 
of  a  class-idea,  and  holding  them  together. 
The  concept,  by  itself  however,  is  a  float- 
ing idea  in  the  mind,  needing  an  anchor- 
age to  some  definite  and  explicit  form  of 
thought  which  we  find  in  the  judgment. 
The  judgment  is  the  direct  reference  of  a 
concept  to  reality ;  it  is  the  saying  some- 
thing about  the  concept  in  the  form  of  an 
assertion  which  may  be  either  affirmative 
or  negative.  The  judgment  is  a  state- 
ment that  the  concept  in  the  mind  actu- 
ally describes  and  represents  the  world  of 
reality  as  we  know  it.  The  judgment,  all 
metals  are  conductors,  signifies  that  the 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  REASON     121 

attribute  of  conductivity  is  so  essential  to 
the  integrity  of  our  idea  of  a  metal  as  to 
form  one  concept  with  it,  to  which  reality 
in  general  must  always  correspond,  to  the 
extent  that  wherever  in  the  world  of  real- 
ity we  find  a  metal,  we  will  always  find 
the  attribute  of  conductivity.  While  judg- 
ment is  a  direct  reference  of  a  concept  to 
reality,  inference,  on  the  other  hand,  may 
be  defined  as  an  indirect  reference  of  a 
concept  to  reality.  I  assert  that  a  hand- 
ful of  black  sand  contains  iron;  I  vent- 
ure this  assertion  because  I  have  held 
a  magnet  in  close  proximity,  and  imme- 
diately the  sand  particles  attached  them- 
selves to  it.  My  knowledge  in  such  an 
experiment  is  gained  indirectly  and  there- 
fore is  of  the  nature  of  inference ;  for  that 
part  of  reality  under  investigation  is  char- 
acterized by  me  as  containing  iron  by 
virtue  of  two  judgments,  and  therefore 
discovered  in  a  roundabout  way.  The 
one  judgment  is  of  a  fact,  that  the  mag- 
net did  actually  attract  the  sand  parti- 
cles, and  the  other  is  a  judgment  of  a 
universal    nature,    namely,  that  magnets 


122        THE   PROBLEMS   OF  PHILOSOPHY 

will  attract  only  substances  of  iron. 
Through  these  judgments,  therefore,  we 
reach,  by  an  indirect  process,  the  conclu- 
sion or  inference  that  the  sand  in  ques- 
tion contains  iron  particles. 

The  three  divisions  of  logic,  the  con- 
cept, judgment,  and  inference,  each  present 
certain  problems  of  general  philosophical 
interest  in  addition  to  the  more  special 
problems  of  a  distinctively  logical  nat- 
ure. 

The  consideration  of  the  theory  of  the 
concept  suggests  a  question  concerning  the 
nature  of  the  universal  idea  which  a  con- 
cept expresses,  —  that  is,  in  such  general 
ideas  as  rose,  dog,  man,  in  what  sense 
may  these  terms  be  regarded  as  univer- 
sal? It  is  an  old  controversy,  this  sub- 
ject of  the  nature  of  universals,  waged 
with  much  bitterness  and  tedium  among 
the  schoolmen  of  the  middle  ages. 

There  are  three  answers  to  this  ques- 
tion, that  of  realism,  of  nominalism,  and 
of  conceptualism. 

Realism.  —  In  this  connection,  realism 
is  used  in  quite  a  different  sense  from  the 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  REASON     123 

term  realism  with  which  we  are  familiar 
in  the  problem  of  knowledge.  The  real- 
ist, as  regards  the  nature  of  the  universal, 
insisted  that  corresponding  to  every  gen- 
eral class  notion,  there  was  a  real  being 
in  which  all  the  common  marks  which 
constituted  the  class  characteristics  were 
actually  embodied.  The  general  notion, 
man,  therefore,  would  be  incarnated  in 
some  essence  possessing  all  the  salient 
features  by  virtue  of  which  man  is  man, 
and  which  exist  therefore  as  an  archetype 
of  all  mankind.  The  most  eminent  rep- 
resentative of  this  theory  was  Anselm. 
His  famous  argument  on  the  being  of 
God  was  based  on  realistic  preconcep- 
tions. "  When  Anselm  believed  that  with 
the  help  of  the  mere  conception  of  God 
he  could  arrive  at  the  proof  of  His  exist- 
ence, he  exemplified  in  a  typical  manner 
the  fundamental  idea  of  realism  which 
ascribed  to  conceptions  without  any  re- 
gard to  their  genesis  and  basis  in  the 
human  mind  the  character  of  truth,  i.e. 
of  Reality.  It  was  on  this  ground  alone 
that  he  could  attempt  to  reason  from  the 


124        THE  PROBLEMS   OF  PHILOSOPHY 

psychical  to  the  metaphysical  reality  of 
the  conception  of  God.''^ 

From  this  quotation,  it  will  be  seen 
that  the  realist,  in  the  discussion  of  the 
schoolmen,  was  a  veritable  idealist,  ac- 
cording to  the  modern  terminology  in 
usage  in  the  discussion  of  the  theory  of 
knowledge,  for  the  scholastic  realist  main- 
tained that  reality  could  be  found  only  in 
ideas. 

Nominalism.  —  On  the  other  hand,  how- 
ever, the  nominalist  insisted  that  the  uni- 
versal was  merely  a  name,  and  that  all  the 
common  attributes  of  a  class  gather  round 
the  name  as  a  nucleus,  and  being  thus 
held  together  in  common  verbal  associa- 
tion, are  presented  to  the  mind,  when  oc- 
casion offers,  through  this  verbal  medium. 
Roscellinus  is  the  chief  representative  of 
nominalism. 

Conceptualism.  — The  conceptualist 
urged  that  the  individuals  of  a  class 
have  more  than  the  name  in  common; 
that   they  have   the   name  plus  the   sig- 

* 

1  Windelband,  A  History  of  Philosophy,  p.  293. 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  REASON     125 

nificance  of  which  the  name  itself  is  a 
symbol.  The  mind's  idea,  the  concept, 
is  regarded  by  the  conceptnalist  therefore 
as  the  universal;  of  this  doctrine  Abelard 
is  the  mediaeval  champion. 

Plato's  doctrine  of  ideas  is  often  referred 
to  as  Platonic  realism, —  but  realism  how- 
ever, in  the  scholastic  significance  of  the 
word,  and  therefore  actually  an  idealistic 
theory.  According  to  Plato,  every  uni- 
versal idea  has  a  real  counter]3art  in  the 
world  of  reality.  Commenting  upon  Pla- 
tonism,  Mr.  Pater  remarks :  — 

"  It  was  like  a  recrudescence  of  polythe- 
ism in  that  abstract  world;  a  return  of 
many  gods  of  Homer  veiled  now  as  ab- 
stract notions.  Love,  Fear,  Confidence, 
and  the  like;  and  as  such  the  modern 
anthropologist,  our  student  of  the  natural 
history  of  man,  would  rank  the  Platonic 
theory  as  but  a  form  of  what  he  calls 
'animism.'  Animism,  that  tendency  to 
locate  the  movements  of  a  soul  like  our 
own  in  every  object,  almost  in  every  cir- 
cumstance, which  impresses  one  with  a 
sense  of  power,  is  a  condition  of  mind, 


126        THE  PROBLEMS   OF   PHILOSOPHY 

of  which  the  simplest  illustration  is  prim- 
itive man  adoring,  as  a  divine  being  en- 
dowed with  will,  the  meteoric  stone  that 
came  rushing  from  the  sky.  That  condi- 
tion ^survives,'  however,  in  the  negro,  who 
thinks  the  discharging  gun  a  living  creat- 
ure; as  it  survives  also,  more  subtly,  in 
the  culture  of  Wordsworth  and  Shelley, 
for  whom  clouds  and  peaks  are  kindred 
spirits ;  in  the  pantheism  of  Goethe ;  and 
in  Schelling,  who  formulates  that  panthe- 
ism as  a  philosophic,  a  Platonic  theory,  — 
such  'animistic '  instinct  was,  certainly, 
a  natural  element  in  Plato's  mental  con- 
stitution,—  the  instinctive  effort  to  find 
anima,  the  conditions  of  personality,  in 
whatever  preoccupied  his  mind."^ 

I  have  quoted  from  Mr.  Pater  somewhat 
at  length  in  order  to  illustrate  a  tendency 
of  thought  which  has  characterized  the 
ancient,  mediaeval,  and  modern  philo- 
sophical speculations  alike. 

The  Pkilosophy  of  Judgment.  —  The 
problem   which   arises    in   the    theory   of 

^  Flato  and  Flatonism,  Walter  Pater,  p.  153. 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  REASON     127 

judgment  is  suggested  in  the  definition 
of  judgment  itself;  judgment  being  the 
direct  reference  of  the  concept  to  reality, 
we  are  confronted  with  the  familiar  epis- 
temological  difficulty  as  to  the  precise 
nature  of  the  relation  of  the  idea  in  the 
mind  to  reality.  The  problem  in  its 
strictly  logical  significance  is,  however, 
somewhat  simplified  inasmuch  as  logic 
has  to  do  only  with  the  content  of  con- 
sciousness. A  judgment  asserts  as  true 
certain  concepts;  truth,  in  this  connec- 
tion, means  a  correspondence  to  facts,  and 
the  facts  with  which  logic  deals  are  the 
elements  of  reality  as  they  appear  in  con- 
sciousness.    They  are  thought-facts. 

The  so-called  thing-in-itself  is  never  an 
object  of  consciousness,  and,  therefore,  the 
world  of  reality,  of  which  our  judgments 
testify,  is  the  world  as  we  know  it.  And 
this  world  is  characterized  by  a  uniform 
experience,  so  that  we  are  convinced  that 
there  must  be  a  universal  validity  in  all 
relations  once  conclusively  established  and 
adequately  formulated  in  our  judgments. 
This  universality  may  be  described  as  an 


128        THE  PROBLEMS   OF   PHILOSOPHY 

identity  in  the  midst  of  differences,  that 
is,  the  world  of  knowledge  is  indefinitely- 
variable  in  its  manifold  manifestations, 
and  yet  throughout  all  the  possible  va- 
riations of  experience  there  remain  cer- 
tain constants.  These  constants  form  the 
ground  of  our  judgments;  they  are  de- 
pendable, so  that  upon  them  we  may  build 
various  thought  structures,  with  the  ab- 
solute confidence  which  is  inspired  by  the 
conviction  that  we  are  logical  creatures, 
and  that  our  world  of  knowledge  is  a  self- 
consistent,  uniformly  related  whole.  We 
believe,  therefore,  that  our  judgments 
once  true  will  be  found  always  true;  in 
the  midst  of  many  shifting  uncertainties, 
this,  at  least,  is  solid  ground. 

The  Philosophy  of  Inference. —  The  prob- 
lem which  presents  itself  for  consideration 
in  the  theory  of  inference  relates  to  the 
ground  upon  which  the  inferential  process 
is  based.  What  is  the  warrant  for  a  pro- 
cedure in  inference  from  something  known 
to  an  assertion  concerning  the  unknown? 
We  found  that  the  essence  of  inference 
lies  in  an  indirect  reference  of  a  concept 


THE  PEOBLEM  OF  EEASON     129 

to  reality ;  but  what  ground  have  we  for  an 
indirect  reference  of  our  ideas  to  a  sphere 
of  reality  which  does  not  lie  directly 
within  our  ken?  The  answer  to  this 
question  we  may  find  in  the  nature  of 
our  body  of  knowledge  considered  as  a 
whole.  We  must  regard  our  knowledge 
in  its  totality  as  forming  a  system  of  in- 
terrelated and  orderly  connected  parts,  so 
that  a  knowledge  of  any  part  necessitates 
a  knowledge  of  all  its  nearly  related  parts. 
The  known  which  is  given  in  con- 
sciousness, and  the  unknown  which  is 
inferred,  must  so  hang  together  that  the 
one  implies  the  other.  From  the  seed, 
we  infer  a  certain  kind  of  flower,  or  of 
grain,  which  the  future  in  time  reveals, 
thereby  verifying  the  early  prophecy  which 
was  born  of  reason.  Regarding,  therefore, 
the  world  of  our  knowledge  as  a  system 
of  interrelated  parts,  the  characteristic 
and  essential  features  of  the  system  must 
remain  the  same  from  time  to  time; 
otherwise  inference  would  be  impossible. 
These  relations  may  be  depended  upon 
so  far  as  they  hold  universally.     The  dis- 


130        THE  PROBLEMS   OF   PHILOSOPHY 

covery  of  a  truth,  therefore,  is  the  discov- 
ery of  a  relation  which  holds  universally ; 
and  this  is  the  significance  of  the  phrase, 
once  true,  always  true.  A  fact,  however, 
is  a  particular  happening  Avithout  reference 
to  the  conditions  which  produced  it,  and 
with  no  analysis  of  their  nature  so  as  to 
reveal  the  existing  relations  of  a  univer- 
sal character  which  lie  at  the  basis  of  the 
fact  in  question.  A  formulation  of  these 
universal  relations  constitutes  the  general 
truth  of  which  the  fact  is  a  concrete  par- 
ticular example. 

Deduction  and  Induction.  —  In  infer- 
ence, therefore,  when  we  have  given  a 
knowledge  of  the  universal  relations  which 
characterize  any  system  as  it  always  ap- 
pears in  consciousness,  then  we  may  infer 
certain  particular  facts  which  such  uni- 
versal relations  necessitate.  Such  a  proc- 
ess of  reasoninof-  is  known  as  deduction. 
This  is  the  logic  of  Aristotle.  If,  on  the 
other  hand,  however,  we  have  given  a 
number  of  facts,  and  proceed  from  them 
to  infer  the  universal  characteristics  and 
general  features  of  the  system  in  which 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  REASON     131 

alone  such  facts  could  possibly  inhere,  then 
we  have  a  process  of  inference  known  as 
induction.  Francis  Bacon  is  the  father  of 
inductive  logic.  If  from  our  knowledge 
of  the  planetary  system  we  infer  the  par- 
ticular position  of  sun,  moon,  and  earth  at 
any  given  time,  as  in  the  calculation  of  an 
eclipse,  the  procedure  is  deductive.  But, 
if  we  investigate  the  several  movements 
of  the  different  planets,  and  from  them 
infer  the  necessary  nature  of  the  system 
of  which  they  are  parts,  we  have  the 
process  of  induction. 

The  Problem  of  Causation.  —  The  uni- 
versal relations  existing  between  parts  of 
one  and  the  same  harmonious  system,  and 
furnishing  a  basis  for  our  inferences,  are 
largely  the  relations  of  cause  and  effect. 
The  doctrine  of  causation  presents  a  prob- 
lem of  general  philosophical  interest.  This 
problem  is  virtually  a  special  case  of  the 
general  problem  concerning  the  empirical, 
or  the  a  priori  origin  of  knowledge.  Is 
the  idea  of  causation  the  result  of  experi- 
ence or  is  it  prior  to  experience?  Such 
is  the  problem  of  causation,  in  its  gen- 


132        THE  PROBLEMS   OF   PHILOSOPHY 

era!  philosophical  significance ;  in  its  more 
strictly  logical  bearings,  the  essential  ques- 
tion seems  to  be,  "  Is  there  an  element  of 
invariability  in  causation  ?  "  The  invari- 
ability of  the  cause  and  effect  relation, 
that  like  antecedents  under  precisely  the 
same  conditions  produce  like  effects,  alone 
makes  inference  possible.  General  phi- 
losophy may  discuss  the  question  as  to  the 
origin  of  our  assurances  of  the  existence 
of  such  a  constant  element  in  the  world 
of  experience ;  that  is,  whether  our  belief 
in  the  uniformity  of  nature  and  conscious- 
ness arises  empirically  or  in  an  a  priori 
manner.  Logic,  however,  demands  only 
that  the  fact  of  this  invariability  be 
assured. 

Reasoning,  if  it  is  possible  at  all,  must 
assume  as  a  fundamental  postulate,  there- 
fore, that  nature,  as  it  is  represented  in 
our  world  of  knowledge,  is  uniform  and 
self-consistent  throughout. 

Logic  and  Epistemology. —  In  the  theory 
of  logic,  the  problems  are  largely  those 
which  confront  us  in  the  theory  of  knowl- 
edge.    Indeed,  with  some   philosophical 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  REASON     133 

writers,  especially  in  recent  times,  the 
study  of  logic  has  been  merged  in  the 
science  of  epistemology.  Logic,  how- 
ever, may  not  be  thus  absorbed.  It  is 
related  most  intimately  to  ejDistemology, 
but  retains  its  individual  nature  as  a 
distinct  philosophical  discipline.  Logic 
in  its  scope  embraces  a  large  field  which 
is  foreign  to  the  general  subject  matter 
of  epistemology;  for  logic  is  a  technical 
science,  treating  not  merely  the  philo- 
sophical ground  of  the  conceptual  and 
inferential  processes,  but  developing  a 
method  of  discovering  and  formulating 
universal  relations,  which,  in  turn,  may 
be  applied  to  the  determination  of  par- 
ticular problems  in  concrete  cases.  Logic 
provides  also,  on  its  practical  side,  scien- 
tific methods  of  investigation,  rules  of 
experimentation,  and  laws  which  govern 
the  interpretation  of  results.  There  is 
consequently  not  only  a  philosophy  of  our 
reasoning  powers,  there  is  an  art  of  rea- 
soning as  well. 


CHAPTER   VIII 

the  problem  of  conscience 
("ethics") 

THE  problem  of  conscience  falls  within 
the  province  of  ethics,  and  is  con- 
cerned with  the  inquiry  as  to  the  origin 
and  nature  of  the  principles  which  under- 
lie right  conduct.  The  term,  Ethics,  is 
from  the  Greek,  rjOLKci,  meaning  customs, 
or  manners.  The  term,  morals,  is  from 
the  Latin  mores,  which  has  a  like  sig- 
nification; so  also,  the  German  word  for 
morals,  Sitten.  In  the  growth  of  lan- 
guage, the  general  meaning  of  morals  has 
become  restricted  so  as  to  apply  solely  to 
the  specific  sphere  of  commendable  cus- 
toms. A  radical  distinction  between  cus- 
toms right  and  wrong  has  thus  become 
crystallized  in  language.  The  import  of 
this  is  significant,  for  it  indicates  a  natu- 
ral trend  of  thought  which  differentiates 

conduct  as  right  and  wrong.     The  ques- 
134 


THE  PROBLEM   OF   CONSCIENCE      135 

tion  naturally  suggests  itself,  What  is 
the  ground  of  this  distinction  ?  A  philo- 
sophic spirit  refuses  to  accept  this  distinc- 
tion as  a  matter-of-course  or  to  regard  it 
as  one  of  the  commonplaces  of  our  mental 
store,  which  is  to  be  assumed  and  not 
explained.  A  reason  for  this  classifica- 
tion of  conduct  is  naturally  demanded, 
and  in  the  various  attempts  to  render  a 
satisfactory  account  of  so  evident  and 
universal  a  distinction,  two  tendencies  of 
thought  are  evident.  The  one  would  ex- 
plain the  recognized  difference  between 
right  and  wrong  conduct  as  an  immedi- 
ate deliverance  of  consciousness ;  that  is, 
knowledge  which  is  intuitively  discerned. 
The  opposed  school  of  thought  would  in- 
sist that  such  a  distinction  is  obviously 
the  outcome  of  experience,  and  the  grad- 
ual growth  of  an  ethical  consciousness 
which  is  capable  of  discerning  ever  more 
clearly  between  right  and  wrong,  the  good 
and  the  evil.  We  are,  therefore,  at  the 
very  threshold  of  ethical  inquiry,  con- 
fronted with  the  general  problem  of  knowl- 
edge in  one  of  its  special  phases,  namely: 


136      THE  PEOBLEMS   OF  PHILOSOPHY 

Is  the  source  of  knowledge  to  be  re- 
garded as  a  priori  or  a  posteynori?  in- 
tuitive or  empirical?  Here  the  problem 
concerns  the  ethical  consciousness  solely, 
and  not  consciousness  in  general. 

The  a  priori  point  of  view  leads  to 
certain  characteristic  conclusions,  as  also, 
on  the  other  hand,  the  empirical  point  of 
view.  One's  general  philosophical  posi- 
tion, therefore,  will  naturally  determine 
in  advance  the  lines  of  attempted  solution 
as  regards  the  more  special  problem  which 
arises  in  the  sphere  of  ethics.  As  to  the 
origin  of  the  ethical  concept,  there  are 
four  distinct  schools  of  thought:  the  in- 
tuitional, transcendental,  utilitarian,  and 
evolutional.  Of  these,  the  two  first  trace 
the  ethical  ideas,  which  are  the  present 
possession  of  mankind,  to  an  a  priori 
source ;  the  two  last  refer  the  same  to  an 
empirical  source. 

The  intuitional  position  regards  the 
ethical  concept  of  the  right  in  distinc- 
tion from  the  wrong  as  innate,  and  prior 
to  the  knowledge  which  is  derived  from 
experience,  and  therefore  as  superior  to, 


THE   PROBLEM   OF   CONSCIENCE      137 

and  regulative  of,  the  suggestions  of  sense 
in  appetite,  passion,  or  desire.  The  tran- 
scendental theory,  or  transcendental  evo- 
lution, insists  that  there  is  a  gradual 
unfolding  of  the  ethical  concept  in  the 
development  of  mental  life,  but  that 
this  evolution,  however,  has  proceeded 
from  certain  fundamental  and  germinal 
ideas  of  consciousness,  and  not  from  the 
data  of  sense-perception.  The  universal 
consciousness  comes  to  its  gradual  mani- 
festation in  the  developing  conscience  of 
each  individual.  This  development  is 
transcendental  in  the  sense  that  it  occurs 
in  a  sphere  above  the  natural  series  of 
sensuous  experiences.  The  utilitarian 
position  regards  all  our  ethical  ideas  as 
the  result  of  an  experience  which  indi- 
cates the  kind  of  conduct  which  in  times 
past  has  proved  useful  in  producing 
pleasure  and  avoiding  pain.  The  idea 
of  utility,  whence  the  name  of  the  school, 
is  thus  associated  with  a  pleasure-pain 
theory  as  to  the  ends  of  conduct,  and  the 
impulses  to  action.  The  evolutional  the- 
ory, or  the  theory  of  natural  evolution,  as 


138       THE  PROBLEMS    OF  PHILOSOPHY 

it  is  sometimes  styled  to  distinguish  it 
from  transcendental  evolution,  differs  from 
utilitarianism  in  insisting  that  the  ideas 
of  utility  cannot  form  and  develop  in  the 
brief  lifetime  of  an  individual,  but  neces- 
sitate a  race  experience  which  in  the 
individual  consciousness  appears  as  a 
hereditary  possession,  but  with  the  seem- 
ing nature  and  force  of  an  intuition  of 
right  and  wrong. 

The  above  are  the  broad  and  general 
distinctions  in  ethical  theory.  There  are, 
however,  other  questions  which  emerge 
within  the  bounds  of  the  different  schools 
themselves,  and  which  arise  out  of  the 
relations  which  these  schools  sustain  to 
each  other. 

Intuitionalism.  —  The  intuitional  school 
is  divided  into  a  right  and  left  wing  ac- 
cording to  the  answer  which  is  given  to 
the  question  concerning  the  nature  of  our 
moral  intuitions  :  Are  they  judgments  of 
right  and  wrong,  or  are  they  feelings 
which  discriminate  between  the  right  and 
wrong  ?  Among  the  intuitionalists,  there- 
fore, we  have  this  division,  into  the  opposed 


THE   PROBLEM  OF  CONSCIENCE      139 

camps  of  the  intellectualists  and  the  sen- 
timentalists. The  former  say  that  we 
know  the  right  as  a  matter  of  pure  intel- 
lection; the  latter,  however,  declare  that 
we  possess  a  faculty  which  is  able  to 
sense  the  right,  and  that  just  as  we  are 
able  to  appreciate  the  flavor  of  a  fruit  or 
the  fragrance  of  a  flower,  so  there  is 
this  extraordinary  moral  sense  which  di- 
vines the  right,  and  appreciates  its  worth. 
The  intellectualists  are  represented  by  the 
British  moralists,  Clarke,  Cumberland, 
Cudworth,  and  Price;  also  by  Kant. 
The  sentimental  school  is  represented  by 
Adam  Smith,  Hutcheson,  Shaftesbury,  and 
Bishop  Butler. 

The  tendency  in  modern  writers  of  the 
intuitional  school  is  to  unite  the  cognitive 
and  emotional  elements  so  that  the  con- 
science is  regarded  as  a  synthesis  of  the 
two.  This  is  the  characteristic  feature  of 
Dr.  Martineau's  ethical  system,  in  which 
conscience  is  represented  as  an  arbiter  of 
conflicting  desires,  so  that,  when  the  mind 
judges  in  favor  of  a  higher  impulse  in  the 
presence  of  a  lower  there  is  right  action, 


140       THE  PROBLEMS   OF  PHILOSOPHY 

but  when  the  lower  is  judged  superior  in 
the  presence  of  a  higher  impulse  there  is 
wrong  action. 

The  strength  of  the  intuitional  position 
lies  in  its  insistence  upon  an  original  con- 
cept of  oughtness  which  renders  the  ethi- 
cal ideal  obligatory.  That  which  is  true 
to  reason  becomes  law  unto  the  will. 
Right  is  chosen  for  right's  sake.  The 
categorical  imperative,  to  use  Kant's  fa- 
mous phrase,  becomes  the  corner-stone  of 
the  intuitional  structure.  An  imperative 
which  is  categorical  is  a  command  uttered 
without  reservation  or  condition;  when 
duty  lays  upon  us  the  burden  of  obliga- 
tion, no  reason  need  be  assigned,  no  re- 
ward offered.  It  is  the  old-time  rigorism 
of  the  Stoics.  Kant  has  forcibly  expressed 
this  thought  in  his  eloquent  apostrophe :  — 

"O  duty!  Thou  great,  thou  exalted 
name!  Wondrous  thought,  that  workest 
neither  by  fond  insinuation,  nor  by  flat- 
tery, nor  by  any  threat,  but  merely  by 
holding  up  thy  naked  law  in  the  soul, 
and  so  extorting  for  thyself  always  rev- 
erence, if  not  obedience,  before  whom  all 


THE  PROBLEM  OF   CONSCIENCE      141 

appetites  are  dumb,  however  secretly  they 
rebel !     Whence  thy  original  ?  " 

The  position,  however,  where  the  intui- 
tionalist  is  especially  exposed  to  attack, 
is  his  claim  of  universality  for  the  ethical 
concept.       For  this  concept  being  intui- 
tive, it  must  follow  that  it  is  the  common 
possession  of  mankind,  and  therefore  must 
pos3ess  universal  validity.     In  opposition 
to  such  a  claim,  it  is  urged  that  there  is 
an  evident  diversity  of  opinion  concern- 
ing moral  judgments,  and  that  the  fact  of 
moral  progress  from  the  crude  ideas  of  the 
right   in  the  savage  mind  to  the  highly 
refined  moral  sentiments  and  practices  of 
a  civilized  community  cannot  be  harmo- 
nized with  an  intuitive  basis  of  morality. 
The  intuitionalist's  explanation  of  these 
evident  difficulties  is,  in  general,  an  ap- 
plication of  a  Kantian  distinction  to  the 
problem  in  question;  namely,   as  regards 
the   form    of    the    ethical    concept,    there 
are  present  certain  constant  and  universal 
characteristics,  but  as  to  the  precise  con- 
tent of  the  same  in  any  special  circum- 
stance,   there   may   be   variations    within 


142       THE  PROBLEMS   OF    PHILOSOPHY 

certain  limits.  That  we  are  under  a 
moral  law  imposing  obligation  upon  our 
wills,  it  is  held  we  do  not  need  to  wait 
for  experience  to  teach  us;  experience, 
however,  does  instruct  us  as  to  the  appro- 
priateness and  the  validity  of  applying 
such  a  law  to  concrete  cases. 

Transcendentalis7n.  —  The  transcenden- 
tal school  of  ethics  is  characterized  by 
the  general  features  of  the  larger  philo- 
sophical system  of  which  it  is  a  part. 
That  larger  system  regards  the  world, 
nature,  man,  history,  science,  art,  reli- 
gion, and,  in  a  word,  the  totality  of  all 
the  possible  phases  of  being  as  the  mani- 
festation in  continuous  development  of 
the  universal  reason,  which  is  operative 
in  and  through  all  things.  The  outer 
form  is  the  universe,  the  inner  architec- 
tonic spirit  is  the  creative  and  sustaining 
power  of  the  supreme  Being. 

The  moral  consciousness  of  man  is  there- 
fore to  be  regarded  as  one  phase  of  the  uni- 
versal manifestation  of  the  World-Spirit, 
the  eternal  consciousness.  Among  the 
many  possible  causes   of  conduct  at  any 


THE  PKOBLEM   OF   CONSCIENCE      143 

one  time  in  a  man's  experience,  there  is 
always  one  which  is  preeminently  the  best 
because  it  perfectly  mirrors  the  mind  of 
the  absolute  spirit.  It  is  the  privilege 
as  well  as  the  duty  of  the  individual  to 
know  and  to  realize  this  best  always  and 
under  all  circumstances,  and  so  fulfil  in 
his  history  the  complete  potential  of  his 
being.  The  ethical  doctrine  of  this  school, 
in  the  words  of  Hegel,  is,  "Be  a  person, 
and  respect  others  as  persons,"  or,  as  it 
is  otherwise  expressed,  as  the  ideal  of 
"self-realization";  that  is,  make  the  most 
and  best  of  self  to  the  full  measure  of 
one's  possibilities.  This  doctrine  is  some- 
times styled  very  appropriately  the  theory 
of  perfection.  The  dutj^  however,  of  per- 
fecting oneself  is  complemented  by  the 
duty  which  is  owing  to  one's  fellows. 
Man  is  to  develop  his  own  personality  to 
the  full,  and,  in  the  doing  of  it,  give 
scope  and  play  to  the  development  of 
other  personalities  which  may  be  associ- 
ated with  him  in  life's  interests  and 
activities.  In  this  theory,  the  duties 
owing   to  self  and   the  duties  owing   to 


144      THE  PROBLEMS   OF  PHILOSOPHY 

others,  are  coordinated  by  the  profound 
principle,  that  each  individual  conscious- 
ness is  a  part  of  the  eternal  conscious- 
ness, and  that,  therefore,  we  are  one  with 
our  fellows  by  virtue  of  a  common  rela- 
tion to  the  central  source  of  life  and 
thought.  Under  this  aspect,  the  phrase, 
the  solidarity  of  mankind,  takes  on  a  new 
and  deeper  significance.  In  the  sj^irit  of 
the  transcendental  theory  of  ethics,  Pro- 
fessor Green  has  summarized  the  content 
of  the  ethical  ideal  as  a  "will  to  know 
what  is  true,  to  make  what  is  beautiful, 
to  endure  pain  and  fear,  to  resist  the 
allurements  of  pleasure  in  the  interests 
of  some  form  of  society." 

There  is  a  danger  in  this  theory,  how- 
ever, despite  its  high  ideal,  that  the  self 
which  is  to  be  realized,  being  a  manifes- 
tation solely  of  the  eternal  conscious- 
ness, may  prove  to  be  not  a  real  self 
with  a  distinct  individuality,  but  only 
the  semblance  of  a  separate  personality, 
which  is  to  be  reabsorbed  in  the  Abso- 
lute. The  command,  therefore,  to  realize 
self  cannot  be  a   real   command   if   there 


THE  PROBLEM  OF   CONSCIENCE      145 

is  not  a  real  self  to  whom  it  can  be  ad- 
dressed. 

Utilitarianism.  —  The  school  of  utilita- 
rianism is  concerned  with  the  question  of 
the  good  rather  than  the  question  of  the 
right.  What  kind  of  conduct  will  pro- 
duce a  real  and  lasting  good?  Such  a 
question  leads  one  into  the  sphere  of  a 
philosophy  of  pleasure.  The  foundation  of 
such  a  philosophy  must  be  discovered  in 
the  nature  of  that  kind  of  pleasure  whose 
realization  characterizes  normal  conduct. 

The  earliest  form  of  the  pleasure  theory 
of  life  is  found  in  the  ancient  Greek  philo- 
sophical system  known  as  Cyrenaicism, 
whose  chief  representative,  Aristippus, 
taught  that  the  end  of  conduct  solely 
desirable  was  that  which  could  be  real- 
ized in  the  sphere  of  the  sensibilities. 
Pleasure,  with  him,  meant  the  pleasures 
of  comfort  and  ease,  of  gratified  appetite, 
and  satisfied  desire.  It  is  the  crudest 
form  of  the  pleasure  theory,  known  as 
pure  hedonism,  a  term  derived  from  the 
Greek  rjhovr],  pleasure. 

A  more  serious  consideration,  however, 


146       THE  PROBLEMS   OF  PHILOSOPHY 

forced  itself  upon  the  Greek  mind.  Epi- 
curus regarded'  pleasure  as  an  idea  which 
must  be  refined  in  the  crucible  of  reason. 
He  insisted,  therefore,  that  not  all  pleas- 
ures should  be  indiscriminately  sought 
after  as  the  impulse  of  the  fleeting  pres- 
ent might  dictate,  but  only  those  pleas- 
ures which  experience  proves  will  leave 
no  painful  after-effects  in  their  train,  and 
which  are  wisely  tempered  by  modera- 
tion. In  short,  the  doctrine  of  E^^icurus 
was,  that  the  pursuit  of  pleasure  must 
be  guided  by  prudence.  This  idea  be- 
came the  fundamental  article  of  belief 
in  the  early  English  utilitarianism  as 
represented  by  Hobbes.  Ethics  is  thus 
reduced  to  a  "  calculus  of  pleasure  "  from 
the  standpoint  of  the  individual,  and  is 
known  as  egoistic  utilitarianism,  or  ego- 
istic hedonism.  There  was  still  a  further 
differentiation  as  urged  by  Jeremy  Ben- 
*  tham,  which  regards  the  pleasure  to  be 
sought  in  conduct  as  that  which  is  con- 
ducive to  the  greatest  happiness  of  the 
greatest  number,  and  in  this  form  the 
theory  is  known  as  altruistic   hedonism, 


THE   PROBLEM  OF   CONSCIENCE      147 

or  altruistic  utilitarianism.  Benthain's 
fundamental  conception  of  the  relation  of 
man  to  society  was  expressed  in  the  prin- 
ciple that  "every  man  should  count  for 
one,  and  no  one  for  more  than  one.'*  The 
political  discussions  of  the  day  concern- 
ing the  rights  of  man  no  doubt  contrib- 
uted to  the  formulation  of  this  dictum. 

A  further  contribution  to  the  theory  of 
utilitarianism  we  find  in  the  waitings  of 
John  Stuart  Mill.  He  insists  that  in 
estimating  the  worth  of  any  pleasure,  one 
must  consider  not  only  the  quantity  of 
pleasure  which  may  accrue  either  to  the 
individual  or  to  society,  but  also  the 
quality  of  the  pleasure  as  well,  inasmuch 
as  there  is  among  pleasures  a  rank  of 
nature.  This  qualitative  difference,  in- 
sisted upon  by  Mill,  constituted  a  modi- 
fication of  the  utilitarian  concept  so 
radical  that  Mill  has  been  very  severely 
censured  as  a  recreant  to  the  sanctioned' 
traditions  of  the  utilitarian  school.  For 
the  ethical  concept,  reduced  to  its  lowest 
terms  as  experiences  of  pleasure  and  pain, 
may  be  determined  in  a  quantitative  man- 


148       THE  PROBLEMS   OF  PHILOSOPHY 

ner  by  a  purely  psychological  analysis, 
but  psychological  methods  of  interpreting 
experience  cannot  estimate  differences  of 
a  qualitative  nature,  or  determine  the 
comparative  worth  of  two  pleasures  upon 
a  basis  merely  of  quantitative  value.  A 
distinction  between  kinds  of  pleasure,  as 
high  or  low,  implies  in  itself  a  qualita- 
tive standard  of  comparison,  that  is,  an 
ideal  having  certain  constant  and  uni- 
versal characteristics,  and  this  conception 
brings  utilitarianism,  in  its  most  refined 
form,  within  the  borderland  at  least,  of 
the  intuitional  territory. 

The  presence  of  these  qualitative  differ- 
ences among  our  various  pleasures  is  im- 
plied in  the  expression,  eudsemonism,  — 
a  term  which  is  used  in  contrast  with 
hedonism.  The  former  signifies  happi- 
ness in  its  most  comprehensive  sense,  so 
that  the  pleasures  of  the  intellect,  the 
satisfaction  arising  from  moral  approba- 
tion, the  glow  of  feeling  in  the  conscious- 
ness of  duty  performed,  all  are  embraced 
within  the  one  concept  as  well  as  the 
lower  round  of  sensuous  pleasures,  which 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  CONSCIENCE      149 

can   be   assessed   simply   in   quantitative 
terms. 

The  Theory  of  EvolutioJi.  —  This  tlieorj^, 
in  its  ethical  aspects,  is  a  natural  out- 
growth of  utilitarianism.  The  two  the- 
ories have  this  in  common:  they  both  hold 
that  the  distinction  between  right  and 
wrong  is  derived  from  an  original  dis- 
tinction between  pleasure-provoking  and 
pain-producing  phenomena.  The  point  of 
departure,  however,  of  the  evolutionist 
is  his  insistence  that  the  lifetime  of  an 
individual  is  too  short  to  ground  the 
association  between  pleasure  giving  and 
right  actions,  and  that  the  derivation  of 
the  idea  of  right,  from  an  original  hedo- 
nistic source,  is  not  as  apparent  as  it  would 
be  if  this  derivation  occurred  in  the  brief 
span  of  an  individual  life.  We  have, 
therefore,  Herbert  Spencer's  succinct  ac- 
count of  the  evolution  of  the  ethical 
concept  in  the  following  paragraph:  "Ex- 
periences of  utility  organized  and  consoli- 
dated during  all  past  generations  of  the 
human  race,  have  been  producing  nervous 
modifications,  which,  by  continued  trans- 


150       THE  PROBLEMS   OF  PHILOSOPHY 

mission  and  accumulation,  have  become 
in  us  certain  faculties  of  moral  intuition, 
certain  emotions  responding  to  right  and 
wrong  conduct,  which  have  no  apparent 
basis  in  the  individual  experience  of 
utility."! 

The  claim  of  the  evolutionist,  there- 
fore, is  that  our  knowledge  of  right  and 
wrong  is  only  a  seemingly  original  pos- 
session of  consciousness.  It  is  urged, 
moreover,  that  our  ancestors  in  imme- 
morial ages  found  certain  actions  to  be 
advantageous,  in  the  long  run,  to  the 
individual,  or  to  the  family,  or  to  the 
tribe.  Therefore,  in  the  tribes  where 
such  actions  became  established  customs, 
or  morals^  the  advantages  gained  would 
result  in  the  survival  of  the  tribes  when 
brought  into  competition  or  conflict  with 
their  less  highly  favored  neighbors.  The 
subsequent  generations  would  inherit  these 
life-conserving  customs  as  predispositions 
of  conduct,  to  which  would  attach  them- 
selves   naturally    certain    sentiments    of 

1  Spencer's  Letter  to  Mill :  Bain's  Mental  and 
Moral  Science^  p.  721. 


THE   PROBLEM   OF   CONSCIENCE      151 

fear,  or  reverence,  or  tribal  loyalty;  and 
thus  there  would  develop  a  kind  of  mys- 
terious sanction  whose  very  indefiniteness 
would  grow  finally  into  the  seemingly 
sacred  and  authoritative  voice  of  con- 
science. 

In  the  account  of  the  evolution  of  con- 
science special  stress  is  laid  upon  the 
duties  owing  to  the  tribe  or  to  society. 
In  the  evolutional  doctrine,  society  is  re- 
garded as  an  organism,  of  which  the  indi- 
vidual is  a  living  cell,  so  that  the  health 
of  the  whole  depends  upon  the  healthful 
functioning  of  every  part.  Leslie  Stephen, 
a  follower  of  Spencer,  has  most  strenuously 
championed  the  doctrine  of  the  social  fac- 
tor as  the  essential  characteristic  of  the 
ethical  concept.  He  insists  that  the  indi- 
vidual is  one  with  the  social  organism, 
united  with  society  of  the  past  through 
the  ties  of  heredity,  and  with  society  of  the 
present  through  the  manifold  bonds  of 
one's  environment.  "We  are  born,"  says 
Stephen,  "not  into  a  chaotic  crowd,  but 
into  an  organized  army,  and  we  must  learn 
to  keep  step  and  rank,  and  to  obey  orders. " 


152       THE  PROBLEMS   OF  PHILOSOPHY 

The  evolutionist's  view  of  the  relation 
of  man  to  his  fellows  differs  substantially 
from  that  of  the  transcendentalist,  in 
that  the  latter  regards  the  bond  of  union, 
which  is  the  basis  of  a  common  interest, 
as  a  spiritual  fraternity  rather  than  an 
organic  tissue  of  vitally  coordinated  hu- 
man cells.  The  bond  of  one  is  metaphysi- 
cal ;  of  the  other,  physical. 

In  the  various  controversies  which  have 
arisen  among  the  several  schools  of  ethics, 
there  are  two  questions  which  possess 
general  philosophic  interest.  One  is  the 
question  concerning  the  freedom  of  the 
will;  the  other,  concerning  the  relation 
of  the  ethical  consciousness  to  the  su- 
preme  Being  of  the  universe. 

Freedom  of  the  WilL  —  The  problem  of 
the  freedom  of  the  will  has  given  rise 
to  two  opposed  schools  of  thought,  known 
as  the  determinists  and  the  indetermi- 
nists.  The  former  hold  that  the  will  in 
any  seeming  choice  is  determined  by  pre- 
ceding psychical  states  as  antecedents. 
The  mechanical  sequences  of  the  physi- 
cal world  find  analogous  relations  in  the 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  CONSCIENCE      153 

mental  world.  Volition  is  held  to  be 
the  result  of  motives  which  determine 
the  CQiirse  of  action,  both  as  to  its  nature 
and  direction. 

The  indeterminist,  on  the  other  hand, 
contends  that  man  has  the  consciousness 
of  initiating  action,  and  this,  often  in  the 
face  of  opposing  desires  which  are  resisted 
and  dominated ;  moreover,  that  the  motive 
cannot  be  said  to  determine  the  self,  the 
Ego,  for  the  motive  is  merely  the  Ego  in 
the  act  of  desiring,  and  should  not  be 
considered  as  a  separate  force  centre  by 
which  the  Ego  is  affected. 

The  Kantian  explanation  of  the  point 
at  issue  in  this  protracted  controversy 
between  determinists  and  indeterminists 
consists  of  two  propositions:  the  first  will 
recommend  itself  at  once  to  the  man  of 
common  sense;  the  second  perhaps  will 
be  appreciated  only  by  the  idealist  of  an 
ultra  type.  The  former  is,  that  man  feels 
himself  to  be  a  responsible  creature  under 
a  law  of  obligation,  but  that  this  feeling  of 
responsibility  can  have  significance  only 
upon  the  supposition  that  the  will  is  free. 


154       THE  PROBLEMS   OF  PHILOSOPHY 

The  second  part  of  the  explanation  is 
more  metaphysical.  Kant  draws  the  dis- 
tinction between  the  so-called  phenomenal 
and  noumenal  aspects  of  the  self,  the  Ego ; 
that  is,  the  mental  phenomena,  as  feeling, 
desire,  or  volition,  as  they  are  discerned 
by  us,  seem  to  form  a  causal  series  sub- 
ject to  the  law  of  an  invariable  sequence, 
but  the  real  nature  behind  this  phenome- 
nal appearance,  if  adequately  cognized, 
would  disclose  the  real  initiating  power 
of  the  Ego.  This  explanation  implies  a 
self  which  is  other  than  the  sum  of  our 
cgipscious  states.  While  every  psychical 
state  may  be  conceived  as  determined  by 
previous  psychical  states,  still,  if  there  is 
a  belief  that  there  is  a  self  which  con- 
structs these  states  into  a  unitary  whole, 
then  there  is  room  for  a  self-determination 
which  is  a  real  freedom  of  the  Ego  in 
willing. 

The  general  theory,  therefore,  which  one 
holds  concerning  the  nature  of  the  Ego, 
will  largely  determine  his  special  view 
regarding  the  freedom  of  the  will;  the 
materialist  will  naturally  deny  the  possi- 


THE  PROBLEM   OF   CONSCIENCE      155 

bility  of  such  a  freedom,  and  the  pan- 
theist will  acknowledge  only  a  seeming 
freedom  whose  reality  is  illusive. 

Ethics  and  the  Theistic  Problem.  —  There 
is  still  the  further  problem  to  consider, 
whether  in  the  moral  consciousness  there 
are  intimations  of  the  Divine  Being. 
Such  intimations  are  explicit  in  the  writ- 
ings of  the  intuitional  and  transcen- 
dental schools.  The  former  affirms  that 
in  man's  constitutional  consciousness  of  a 
right  for  right's  sake,  of  a  law  of  duty  com- 
manding obedience,  and  of  a  responsive 
feeling  of  obligation,  we  find  abundant 
evidence  of  a  God;  as  Browning  has  said, 

"  The  truth  in  God's  breast 
Lies  trace  for  trace  upon  ours  impressed." 

The  relation  between  man  and  God  is 
further  explained  by  the  transcendentalist 
who  insists  that  the  individual  conscious- 
ness is  merely  a  manifestation  of  the 
universal  consciousness.  Thus  God  is 
reached  through  an  apotheosis  of  man. 
The  intuitionalist  saves  the  autonomy  of 
man  by  affirming  that   a  relation    exists 


156       THE  PROBLEMS   OF  PHILOSOPHY 

between  God  and  man  so  that  there  is 
mirrored  in  the  consciousness  of  man  the 
divine  attributes  as  the  ethical  ideal,  and 
yet  at  the  same  time  man's  individuality 
is  not  absorbed  in  the  Absolute  All. 

In  the  systems  of  naturalism,  that  is, 
utilitarianism  and  utilitarian  evolution, 
we  find  a  theory  of  the  origin  of  the  ethi- 
cal consciousness  which  seems  to  leave  no 
place  for,  and  to  express  no  need  of,  a 
supreme  Being.  But,  in  whatever  way 
the  process  of  development  may  be  ex- 
plained without  a  supplementary  hypothe- 
sis of  a  theistic  character,  nevertheless  the 
inquiry  forces  itself  upon  our  considera- 
tion concerning  the  end  which  this  proc- 
ess is  destined  to  attain;  and  this  will 
lead  to  a  profounder  speculation,  which 
may  discern  in  the  progress  of  evolution, 

"  One  God,  one  law,  one  element 
And  one  far-off  divine  event 
To  which  the  whole  creation  moves." 

Dr.  Martineau  has  most  graphically  in- 
dicated the  implied  presence  of  God  in 
the  ethical  concepts  which  may  seem  to 
be  constructed  upon  other  lines:    "With 


THE  PROBLEM  OF   CONSCIENCE      157 

a  noble  inconsistency,  all  the  great  writ- 
ers, whose  doctrine  we  have  studied, 
betray  the  tenacious  vitality  of  the  intui- 
tive consciousness  of  duty,  throughout  the 
very  process  of  cutting  away  its  philo- 
sophic roots;  and  Plato,  in  his  'divine 
wrath '  at  the  tyrant  flung  into  Tartarus ; 
Malebranche,  self-extinguished  in  the  Ab- 
solute Holiness ;  Spinoza,  lifted  from  the 
thraldom  of  passion  into  the  freedom  of 
Infinite  Love ;  Comte,  on  his  knees  before 
the  image  of  a  Perfect  Humanity,  are 
touching  witnesses  to  the  undying  fires 
of  moral  faith  and  aspiration." ^ 

1  Types  of  Ethical  Theory,  Vol.  I,  p.  512. 


CHAPTER  IX 

THE  PROBLEM  OF  POLITICAL   OBLIGATION 
("  POLITICAL   SCIENCE  ") 

THE  special  problem  which  concerns 
man's  political  obligations  is  one 
which  naturally  grows  out  of  a  considera- 
tion of  man's  ethical  relations  in  general. 
For,  regarded  as  a  moral  creature,  man  is 
essentially  a  political  animal,  as  Aristotle 
styled  him.  He  lives,  moves,  and  has 
his  being  in  the  society  of  his  fellows, 
to  whom  he  sustains  manifold  relations; 
whence  there  arise,  on  the  one  hand,  vari- 
ous obligations,  and,  on  the  other,  corre- 
sponding rights  and  prerogatives.  Many 
of  these  relations  find  permanent  form 
and  expression  in  certain  social  institu- 
tions, such  as  the  family,  the  church,  or 
the  state.  These  institutions  are  the  ex- 
ternal manifestation  of  the  moral  progress 
of  mankind,  and  therefore  an  inquiry  into 

their  nature  and  development  will  reveal 

158 


» 


PROBLEM  OF  POLITICAL  OBLIGATION     159 

the  fundamental  principles  of  social  ethics. 
This  is  especially  true  of  the  study  of 
those  social  relations  which  centre  in  the 
state.  The  chief  functions  of  the  state 
seem  to  relate  to  law  and  to  policy. 
Through  law  the  sovereign  power  enjoins 
certain  actions  and  prohibits  others; 
tln^ough  policy,  on  the  other  hand,  wise 
measures  of  government  are  conceived 
which  tend  to  conserve  the  public  health 
and  safety,  and,  at  the  same  time,  to  as- 
sure substantial  progress.  Public  policy 
is  essentially  practical;  it  has  to  do  with 
questions  of  ways  and  means.  It  is  an 
art  rather  than  a  science.  It  is  therefore 
to  the  rise  and  growth  of  law  that  we 
naturally  turn  in  order  to  discover  funda- 
mental principles  of  general  philosophical 
import. 

We  find  that  jurisprudence,  wliich  is 
the  science  of  law,  is  closely  related  to 
ethics,  and  yet  distinctly  differentiated. 
The  law  commands  obedience  in  respect 
to  the  outer  act  alone.  Such  obedience 
may  be  enforced  even  when  the  inner 
spirit  secretly  rebels,  or   openly  protests. 


160       THE  PKOBLEMS   OF  PHILOSOPHY 

In  ethics,  however,  that  imier  disposition 
which  manifests  itself  in  respect  for  the 
ethical  ideal  is  all  essential,  and  this  the 
legal  command  is  not  able  to  affect.  The 
philosophy  of  law  is  concerned  with  the 
question,  why  certain  external  acts  come 
to  be  enforced  by  a  sovereign  power  in  a 
tribe,  in  a  community,  or  in  a  state.  In 
this  general  question,  there  seem  to  be  im- 
plied three  special  questions  possessing 
some  philosophical  interest.  These  special 
questions  concern  the  origin  of  law,  the 
warrant  of  sovereignty,  and  the  province 
of  the  state's  control. 

The  Origin  of  Law.  —  As  to  the  origin 
of  law,  we  find  two  conflicting  theories  ^ 
one  insisting  upon  an  a  priori^  and  the 
other  upon  an  empirical  source.  A  like 
distinction  holds  here  which  we  found  to 
be  of  such  fundamental  significance  in  the 
discussion  concerning  the  origin  of  the 
ethical  concept.  This  similarity  is  not  a 
mere  coincidence,  however,  for,  while 
the  ethical  concept  refers  to  obligation  in 
its  general  aspect,  and  the  legal  concept 
to    obligation  of    a  specific    kind,   it  is. 


PROBLEM  OF  PC  LITICAL  OBLIGATION      161 

nevertheless,  the  philosophy  of  obligation, 
whicK  is  the  object  of  inquiry  in  each. 
That  which  is  conceived  as  the  ground 
of  the  moral  concept  will  determine  one's 
conviction  to  a  great  extent  concerning 
the  ground  of  the  legal  concept.  He  who 
is  convinced  that  the  ethical  concept  has 
an  a  priori  basis,  will  naturally  hold  a 
similar  view  in  reference  to  that  particu- 
lar phase  of  the  ethical  concept  which 
relates  to  obligations  which  have  become 
definitely  formulated  in  the  law  of  the 
land.  On  the  other  hand,  a  belief  in  the 
empirical  origin  of  duty  will  lead  to  a 
belief  in  the  empirical  origin  of  law.  We 
know  that  in  the  developing  social  life, 
certain  customs,  mores,  have  become  mor- 
als, that  is,  they  are  regarded  as  obligatory 
upon  all  and  receive  a  certain  social  sanc- 
tion; in  a  like  manner  certain  customs 
also  come  to  be  regarded  as  of  such  vital 
import  to  the  preservation  and  welfare  of 
society  as  to  associate  with  them  certain 
coercive  measures,  having  the  force  of  a 
legal  sanction.  As  in  ethics,  so  in  juris- 
prudence, a  fundamental  inquiry  takes  us 


162       THE  PKOBLEMS   OF  PHILOSOPHY 

back  to  these  original  customs,  and  the 
question  concerning  them  is  whether  they 
can  be  traced  to  an  a  prio7'i  or  an  empirical 
soiu'ce. 

The  a  priori  origin  of  law  is  designated 
by  a  time-honored  phrase,  the  laiv  of 
nature^  or  jus  naturale^  to  use  the  law 
language  of  the  Romans.  The  empirical 
origin  of  law  is  indicated  by  the  plirase, 
positive  law,  or  jus  civile.  The  law  of 
nature  implies  an  ideal  of  right,  or  law  as 
it  ought  to  be;  positive  law  refers  solely 
to  law  as  it  is.  The  ideal  and  the  actual 
are  here  opposed,  and  it  is  the  same  situa- 
tion precisely  which  we  met  in  the  dis- 
cussion as  to  whether  ethics  is  the  science 
of  that  which  is,  or  of  that  which  ought  to 
be.  The  idea  of  a  law  of  nature  as  the 
ground  of  all  positive  law  may  be  best 
indicated  perhaps  by  the  two  following 
quotations,  —  the  first  from  an  old  Roman 
lawyer  and  the  second  from  a  German 
philosopher  of  modern  times.  Cicero  says 
that  the  law  of  nature  is  "the  highest 
reason  implanted  in  nature,  which  com- 
mands  those   things  which  ought   to   be 


PROBLEM  OF  POLITICAL  OBLIGATION     163 

done,  and  prohibits  those  which  ought  not 
to  be."  1  And  Kant,  in  the  same  vein,  has 
remarked:  "  What  the  law  in  any  instance 
is,  the  jurisconsult  can  easily  tell,  but 
whether  it  is  Right  or  Just  that  it  should 
be  so,  is  what  he  wants  a  criterion  to  de- 
termine. But  this  criterion  can  only  then 
be  found  when,  abandoning  all  a  posteriori 
principles,  he  ascends  to  the  sources  of 
reason,  and  discovers  on  what  all  legisla- 
tion whatsoever  can  alone  be  based;  in 
which  analysis  positive  law  is  doubtless  a 
great  help  and  guide.  But  laws  founded 
singly  on  experience  are  like  the  mask  in 
the  fable  —  beautiful  but  hollow."- 

In  this  theory  of  an  original  law  of  nat- 
ure there  is  a  combination  of  Greek  and 
Roman  elements.  The  Greek  contribution 
to  this  idea  was  the  ancient  concept  of  the 
order  and  regularity  of  physical  nature, 
which  was  afterwards  extended  so  as  to 
embrace  the  moral  nature  as  well.  The 
Roman  contribution  was  the  idea  of  order 
and  uniformity  which  had  been  observed 

1  De  Legihus,  I.  6. 
^Metaphysics  of  Ethics  ^  p.  178. 


164       THE  PROBLEMS   OF   PHILOSOPHY 

among  the  various  customs  of  different 
races,  and  wliich  seemed  to  indicate  a 
common  origin  in  those  principles  which 
are  grounded  in  a  common  human  nature. 
In  the  Roman  Jurisprudence,  there  was 
one  law  for  the  Roman  citizen,  the  ju8 
civile^  and  another,  the  jus  gentium^  for  the 
alien  who  might  appear  as  litigant  in 
the  Roman  courts.  The  jus  gentium  was 
the  natural  result  of  the  existing  condi- 
tions of  Roman  polit}^,  for  the  rights  and 
prerogatives  of  the  citizen  did  not  per- 
tain to  the  foreigner,  and  therefore  there 
arose  a  system  of  legal  decisions  in  the 
form  of  Praetorian  edicts,  which  were 
based  upon  the  principles  common  to 
the  various  legal  codes  of  the  surround- 
ing peoples.  This  gave  a  mass  of  legal 
principles  which  were  founded  upon  com- 
mon customs,  and  which,  because  largely 
void  of  local  and  temporal  coloring,  were 
regarded  as  quite  independent  of  any 
particular  experience,  and,  therefore,  as 
possessing  the  character  of  natural  laws. 
In  these  edicts  we  find  the  first  model  of 
courts  of  equity.     The  original  meaning 


PROBLEM  OF   POLITICAL  OBLIGATION     165 

of  the  term,  equity,  was  that  of  a  "level- 
ling" process,  or  the  reduction  of  the 
rights  of  man  in  general  to  a  common 
basis  of  human  nature.  Hence  the  phrase, 
the  rights  of  man,  was  early  associated 
with  that  other  watchword  of  the  a  priori 
school,  the  law  of  nature.  These  ideas 
have  been  made  the  basis  for  a  philosophy 
of  law  from  the  time  of  the  early  Greek 
philosophy  to  the  present;  among  the 
chief  representatives  of  this  school  of  po- 
litical thought  we  find  the  Stoics,  Cicero, 
Grotius,  Trendelenburg,  and  Kant. 

The  idea  of  the  law  of  nature  appeared, 
however,  in  a  distorted  form  in  the  writ- 
ings of  Hobbes,  Rousseau,  and  the  political 
philosophers  of  the  French  Revolution. 
The  old  formula  was  construed  as  indicat- 
ing an  original  state  of  nature  where  an 
unrestrained  liberty  of  the  individual  pre- 
vailed, and  where  each  man  did  that  which 
was  right  in  his  own  eyes.  Instead  of  an 
ideal  principle  of  right  and  of  liberty  there 
was  substituted  a  materialistic  conception 
of  a  primitive  society  whose  members  were 
engaged  in  a  struggle  for  existence  under 


166       THE  PROBLEMS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

the  impulse  of  unbridled  desire,  and  of  a 
license  which  had  not  yet  known  the 
meaning  of  law.  The  later  German  phi- 
losophers, as  Kant,  Hegel,  Ahrens,  Krause, 
and  in  England  Prof.  T.  H.  Green,  have 
grounded  the  law  of  nature  upon  a  more 
philosophical  foundation  in  insisting  upon 
the  fundamental  conception  of  personality 
as  the  source  of  all  so  called  natural  rights. 
Man,  as  a  person,  is  to  be  regarded  not 
merely  as  a  self-seeking  individual,  but 
as  a  member  of  a  society  of  organically 
related  persons,  so  that  true  self-realiza- 
tion is  to  be  attained  only  through  a  self- 
sacrificing  ministration  to  the  general  weal 
of  the  social  organism.  Natural  rights, 
therefore,  imply  and  necessitate  corre- 
sponding duties,  so  coordinated  that  the 
good  of  each  may  redound  to  the  good  of 
all.  The  right  which  one  may  urge  as 
truly  inalienable  is  the  right  to  realize 
oneself  without  let  or  hindrance  in  the 
performance  of  duties  which  devolve  upon 
man  as  a  participant  in  the  communal  life 
of  a  tribe  or  of  a  nation.  This  is  a  right 
which  can  be  maintained  not  as  against 


PROBLEM  OF  POLITICAL  OBLIGATION     167 

the  social  organism,  but  as  making  for  its 
highest  interests  and  weKare,  as  well  as 
for  the  welfare  and  interests  of  the  indi- 
vidual himself. 

The  exclusively  empirical  origin  of  law, 
on  the  other  hand,  has  been  stoutly  urged. 
This  theory,  as  might  naturally  have  been 
expected,  has  received  most  enthusiastic 
support  from  the  representatives  of  utili- 
tarianism, Hobbes,  Bentham,  and  Mill.  It 
was  Hume  who  first  applied  the  doctrine 
of  utilitarianism  to  a  theory  of  political 
science.  Moreover,  the  eminent  jurist, 
Austin,  a  pronounced  follower  of  Ben- 
tham, has  based  his  system  of  juris- 
prudence upon  utilitarian  principles. 
From  this  point  of  view,  law  is  regarded 
solely  as  the  result  of  a  wide  experience 
concerning  those  customs  which  have 
proved  conducive  to  the  general  good 
of  past  races,  tribes,  and  nations.  The 
prince  of  utilitarians  is  Macchiavelli  who 
would  not  only  sacrifice  moral  principles, 
but  would  even  ignore  the  actually  exist- 
ing laws,  if  only  the  interests  of  the  state 
might  be  conserved.     His  theory  is  utili- 


168       THE  PROBLEMS   OF  PHILOSOPHY 

tarianism  pushed  to  the  extreme;  just  as 
the  doctrine  of  natural  rights  in  the  days 
of  the  French  Revolution  was  the  extreme 
and  distorted  form  of  the  theory  of  natural 
law.  Of  Macchiavelli  and  his  theory  we 
have  the  following  estimate  by  Bluntschli : 
"He  has  adorned  an  immoral  and  unjust 
policy,  has  put  prudent  counsel  at  the  dis- 
posal of  tyranny,  and  has  thus  helloed  to 
corrupt  the  political  practice  of  the  last 
three  centuries."^  It  should,  however, 
be  conceded  that  utilitarian  considerations 
must  necessarily  prove  operative  in  ques- 
tions of  governmental  policy,  in  legislation, 
and  in  all  agitation  and  discussion  con- 
cerning public  affairs.  In  this  respect 
political  ethics  differ  from  individual 
ethics,  inasmuch  as  the  individual  ethic 
concerns  the  inner  disposition,  while  the 
political  ethic  concerns  necessarily  the 
outer  acts  which  can  be  enjoined  or  pro- 
hibited. Now  the  point  of  view  of 
utilitarianism  is  such  that  the  outer  act 
and  its  consequences  seem  all  important ; 

1  The  Theory  of  the  State,  Eng.  Trans.,  p.  62. 


PKOBLEM  OF  POLITICAL  OBLIGATION     169 

the  natural  affinity,  therefore,  between 
political  ethics  and  utilitarian  considera- 
tions is  evident.  It  is  very  strenuously 
urged,  however,  by  those  who  favor  some 
a  priori  foundation  of  legal  principles, 
that  utilitarianism  without  a  check  will 
run  into  wild  Macchiavellianism,  and  that 
it  needs  precisely  that  conservative  control 
which  the  idea  of  a  natural  law  of  right 
and  of  justice  supplies. 

It  would  be  surprising,  indeed,  if  there 
were  not  an  application  of  the  theor}^  of 
evolution  to  the  problem  of  the  rise  and 
growth  of  the  legal  concept,  a  theory  cor- 
responding in  the  main  to  the  general 
theory  of  evolution  as  regards  the  ethical 
concept.  Not  only  is  there  such  a  theory 
in  fact,  but  it  is  forging  more  and  more  to 
the  front,  and  proclaiming  its  doctrines 
with  vigor  and  insistence.  The  evolu- 
tionist contends  that  states  are  not  made, 
but  grow,  and  that  the  law  like  language 
is  the  result  of  a  gradual  development.  In 
this  school,  there  are,  on  the  one  hand,  those 
who  emphasize  the  physical  factors  in  this 
evolution,  such   as   climate,  geographical 


170       THE  PKOBLEMS   OF  PHILOSOPHY 

position,  soil,  water-ways,  etc.,  and  on  the 
other  hand,  there  are  those  who  lay  stress 
upon  the  mental  factors,  such  as  M.  Fouillee 
styles  "  idea  forces,"  ^  and  insist  that  they 
are  all  potent  in  modifying  and  determin- 
ing the  physical  surroundings.  The  one 
is  the  evolution  of  naturalism,  the  other  is 
essentially  an  idealistic  evolution,.  Per- 
haps the  most  eniinent  representative  of 
naturalistic  evolution  is  Montesquieu,  while 
Hegel  valiantly  defends  a  purely  idealistic 
evolution,  and  contends  that  in  the  state 
institutions  generally  and  in  the  law  of 
the  state  particularly  there  is  the  external 
manifestation  of  the  universal  conscious- 
ness, which  through  the  ages  is  thus 
gradually  objectifying  itself.  The  modern 
historical  method  of  inquiry  takes  account 
both  of  the  naturalistic  and  idealistic 
forces  in  the  evolution  of  law.  It  is  an 
inductive  study  of  law  as  it  is,  and  as  it 
has  been,  in  order  to  discover  certain 
universal  laws  of  tendency  in  the  consti- 
tutions and  codes  of  states.    The  founders 

1  Fouillee,  La  Psychologie  des  idees  forces. 


PROBLEM  OF  POLITICAL  OBLIGATION     171 

of  the  so-called  historical  school  of  jurists, 
Savigny  and  Puchta,  emphasize  the  "  idea 
forces  "  in  the  evolution  of  law,  which  they 
conceive  as  the  gradual  manifestation  of 
the  common  consciousness  of  a  people  as  it 
is  disclosed  in  the  detailed  study  of  the 
comparative  history  of  nations.  In  this 
connection,  it  is  to  be  observed  that  the 
historical  method  is  not  necessarily  at 
variance  with  an  a  priori  basis  of  the  idea 
of  right  and  of  liberty.  Concerning  this 
Bluntschli  has  said  that  "the  old  strife 
between  these  two  methods  has  altogether 
ceased  in  Germany.  Peace  was  made  as 
early  as  1840.  Since  then  it  is  recognized 
on  all  sides  that  the  experiences  and 
phenomena  of  history  must  be  illumined 
with  the  light  of  ideas,  and  that  specula- 
tion is  childish  if  it  does  not  consider  the 
real  conditions  of  the  nation's  life."  ^ 

Tlie  Ground  of  Sovereignty.  —  There 
is  a  second  question  of  general  philo- 
sophical interest,  concerning  the  warrant 
of  sovereignty.     Austin  defines   a  sover- 

1  The  Theory  of  the  State^  p.  70. 


172       THE  PROBLEMS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

eign  power  as  that  "which  is  not  in  a 
habit  of  obedience  to  any  determinate 
human  superior,  while  it  is  itself  the  deter- 
minate and  common  superior  to  which  the 
bulk  of  a  subject  society  is  in  the  habit  of 
obedience."  1  By  virtue  of  what  authority 
can  a  portion  of  society  compel  obedience 
to  its  commands,  while  acknowledging  no 
obedience  to  any  power  whatsoever  ?  To 
this  question  there  are  several  answers. 
The  first  is  the  theological  view,  that 
sovereign  power  has  been  delegated  to  the 
state  by  divine  investiture.  This  idea 
was  very  vigorously  challenged  by  the 
champions  of  the  church  prerogative. 
Thomas  Aquinas,  for  example,  contended 
that  the  state  must  be  subordinated  to  the 
church,  inasmuch  as  the  church  is  the  only 
institution  which  is  divinely  ordained. 
Dante  coordinated  the  two  powers,  while 
Macchiavelli  insisted  upon  the  state's  com- 
plete independence  of  the  church.  The 
writers  of  the  Reformation  period,  more- 
over, declared  that  the  state  was  divinely 

^  Jurisprudence,  I,  p.  171. 


PROBLEM  OF  POLITICAL  OBLIGATION     173 

ordained,  and  that  without  the  interven- 
tion of  church  dispensation.     Two  points 
seem  to  be  pretty  definitely  settled:  one 
is    the    entire    organic    independence    of 
church  and  state,  and  the  second  is  that 
sovereignty  has  not  been  a  direct  commis- 
sion  of    the   divine   will.     The   latter   is 
thoroughly   compatible,  however,   with   a 
theory  of  an  indirect  revelation  of  God's 
will  to  man  in  the  constitution  of  human 
nature,  and  in  the  progressive  experiences 
of  mankind,  so  that  in  this  sense  the  will 
of   God  maybe  regarded   as  the  primal 
source  of  law,  and,  as  such,  the  warrant  for 
sovereign  control. 

Another  theory  traces  sovereignty  to 
might,  pure  and  simple.  Might  is  right, 
it  is  urged;  and,  therefore,  there  is  no 
occasion  for  power  to  explain  its  own 
existence.  This  was  substantially  the 
theory  of  Spinoza,  who  identified  jus  na- 
turae with  potentta  naturae,  and  insisted 
that  the  only  thing  which  a  state  had  no 
right  to  do  was  that  which  might  in  any 
respect  lessen  its  power.  The  so-called 
analytical    school    of    jurists,   as  Austin, 


174       THE  PEOBLEMS   OF  PHILOSOPHY 

Holland,  and  Pollock,  insist  upon  a  like 
interpretation  of  the  warrant  of  sover- 
eignty. They  hold,  that  after  a  careful 
analysis  of  positive  law,  the  one  essential 
idea  which  is  revealed  as  an  ultimate  legal 
element,  is  the  idea  of  a  power  which  can 
compel  obedience,  and  which  can  create 
in  the  social  organism  what  Bagehot  calls  a 
"legal  fibre." ^  The  position  of  the  ana- 
lytical school  has  been  criticised  by  the 
historical  school  of  jurists  generally,  and 
in  particular  by  Sir  Henry  Sumner  Maine, 
who  insists  that  by  a  mere  process  of 
abstraction  the  legal  analysts  reach  a 
naked  sovereignty  stripped  of  all  its  co- 
ordinate attributes  which  are  essential  to 
the  very  integrity  of  the  ccmcept  itself. 
He  says  of  them  that  "  they  neglect  the 
vast  mass  of  influences  which  we  may  call, 
for  shortness,  moral,  and  which  perpetually 
shapes,  limits,  or  forbids  the  actual  direc- 
tion of  the  forces  of  society  by  its 
sovereign.  .  .  .  Just  as  it  is  possible  to 
forget  the  existence  of  friction  in  nature, 

i__       1  Bagehot,  Physics  and  Politics^  p.  30. 


PEOBLEM  OF  POLITICAL   OBLIGATION     175 

and  the  reality  of  other  motives  in  society 
except  the  desire  to  grow  rich,  so  the 
pupil  of  Austin  may  be  tempted  to  forget 
that  there  is  more  in  actual  sovereignty 
than  force,  and  more  in  laws  which  are 
commands  of  sovereigns  than  can  be  got 
out  of  them  by  merely  considering  them 
as  regulated  force.  ...  A  despot  with  a 
disturbed  brain  is  the  sole  conceivable 
example  of  such  sovereignty."^ 

Still  another  account  of  the  warrant  of 
sovereignty  is  that  of  the  social-contract 
theory,  which  has  been  so  vigorously  set 
forth  in  the  writings  of  Hobbes  and  of 
Locke,  and  so  brilliantly  expounded  in  the 
impassioned  utterances  of  Rousseau.  This 
theory  regards  each  individual  as  the  pos- 
sessor of  inalienable  rights,  which  he  alone 
can  delegate  to  another,  and  which  no  one 
may  wrest  from  him.  It  is  furthermore 
held  that  among  primitive  men,  there  was 
a  recognition  of  the  fact  that  individuals 
could  live  peaceably  and  harmoniously 
together  in  a  clan,  or  tribe,  only  by  making 

1  Maine,  Early  Histoi-y  of  Institutions,  pp.  359-361. 


176       THE  PROBLEMS   OF  PHILOSOPHY 

common  concessions  of  the  nature  of  a  so- 
cial contract  whereby,  on  the  one  hand,  cer- 
tain rights  of  the  individual  would  be  freely 
surrendered,  and,  on  the  other,  society  as 
a  whole  would  be  obligated  to  guarantee 
the  general  good  of  all.  The  criticism  of 
this  theory  is  that  it  is  not  historical,  inas- 
much as  the  state  has  been  a  growth  by 
imperceptible  degrees,  and  not  artificially 
founded  by  any  formal  contract.  More- 
over, this  theory  implies  that  man  has 
existed  with  certain  rights  outside  a 
society  of  his  fellows,  whereas  by  nature 
man  is  born  into  a  plexus  of  social  rela- 
tions and  cannot  be  rightly  conceived  as 
not  possessing  any  such  relations  at  all. 
The  social-contract  theory  led  to  the  idea 
of  popular  sovereignty  which  regarded 
law  as  an  expression  of  the  general  will, 
and  therefore  as  a  corollary  to  this  theory 
it  was  contended  that  the  people  had  a 
right  to  destroy  the  sovereignty  and  annul 
the  original  contract,  whenever  the  popular 
will  might  be  consistently  and  constantly 
frustrated.  This  was  the  philosophy  of 
the  French  Revolution.     Here  again  the 


PROBLEM  QF  POLITICAL  OBLIGATION     177 

German  philosophy  goes  deeper  than  the 
French,  for,  while  regarding  the  general 
will  as  the  basis  of  sovereignty,  it  insists 
that  such  a  basis  does  not  itself  rest  upon 
any  artificial  contract  but  upon  the  soli- 
darity which  characterizes  the  common  con- 
sciousness of  man.  This  forms  a  natural 
foundation,  and  its  expression  in  sovereign 
law  is  a  natural  manifestation.  In  accord 
with  this  latter  view.  Professor  Green  bases 
sovereign  right  upon  the  necessity  of 
preserving  the  integrity  both  of  the  in- 
dividual and  the  social  personality.  He 
says :  "  The  claim  or  the  right  of  the 
individual  to  have  certain  powers  secured 
to  him  by  society,  and  the  counter-claim 
of  society  to  exercise  certain  powers  over 
the  individual,  alike  rest  on  the  fact  that 
these  powers  are  necessary  to  the  fulfil- 
ment of  man's  vocation  as  a  moral  being, 
to  an  effectual  self-devotion  to  the  work 
of  developing  the  perfect  character  in 
himself  and  others."^ 

The  Province    of  State    Control.  —  The 


1  Green,  Works,  Vol.  II,  p.  347. 

N 


178       THE  PROBLEMS   OF  PHILOSOPHY 

third  general  question  concerns  the  scope 
of  the  state's  control.  There  are  two  op- 
posed theories  :  one  of  ancient  Greek  ori- 
gin, which  emphasizes  the  prerogatives  and 
power  of  the  state,  and  the  other,  which  re- 
flects the  eighteenth  century  spirit  in  insist- 
ing upon  the  rights  of  the  individual  as 
against  the  sovereignty  of  the  state.  It  is 
social  atomism  opposed  to  the  social  organ- 
ism. The  theory  of  individualism  in  its 
extreme  form  leads  to  anarchy,  which  is 
the  reduction  of  governmental  functions 
to  zero ;  the  theory  which  magnifies  the 
society  at  the  expense  of  the  individual, 
leads  logically  to  socialism,  which  insists 
that  society  is  to  take  charge  of  the  in- 
dividual and  is  itself  to  determine  how 
he  shall  be  trained,  what  he  is  fitted  to 
undertake,  and  what  he  has  earned  by  his 
effort. 

As  to  the  end  of  government  there  are 
two  tendencies  to  be  noted :  one  material- 
istic, which  regards  the  sole  function  of 
government  to  be  the  maintenance  of  or- 
der and  the  repression  of  crime,  and  the 
other,  which  is  idealistic,  takes  into  ac- 


PROBLEM  OF  POLITICAL  OBLIGATION     179 

count  tlie  ideas  of  humanity,  as  religion, 
science,  and  art.  Is  there  a  place  for  the 
so-called  Kulturstaat?  Should  the  state 
by  enactment  attempt  to  be  the  guardian 
of  culture  ?  Many  who  feel  the  yoke  of 
government  are  clamorous  for  a  laissez 
faire  policy,  less  legislation,  less  govern- 
mental interference  ,  let  the*  laws  of  supply 
and  demand,  of  competition,  of  invention, 
and  of  imitation,  work  out  the  salvation  of 
the  race.  On  the  other  hand  it  is  urged 
that  the  state  must  take  active  measures 
to  promote  the  public  weKare  both  directly 
and  indirectly.  Compulsory  education,  for 
instance,  only  indirectly  affects  the  public 
weal,  and  yet  it  is  maintained  that  it  is  es- 
sential to  public  health  and  public  safety. 
The  mean  may  perhaps  be  attained  by 
striving  in  all  legislation  to  preserve  the 
personality  of  each  individual  regarded  as 
a  contributor  to  the  general  good;  and 
this,  in  two  respects,  to  provide  for  the 
full  exercise  and  development  of  each  per- 
sonality without  over-restraint,  and  yet,  on 
the  other  hand,  to  avoid  dispensing  that 
kind  of  help  which  diminishes  self-respect 


180       THE  PEOBLEMS   OF  PHILOSOPHY 

and  paralyzes  effort.  The  idea  of  a  pater- 
nal government  implies  that  its  members 
fail  to  possess  those  elements  of  personality 
which  constitute  a  vigorous  manhood,  and 
give  power  and  prestige  to  the  state  which 
is  able  to  develop  them.  Here  again  we 
see  that  the  idea  of  a  personality  which  is 
not  merely  individual,  but  also  social,  rec- 
onciles the  two  conflicting  ideas  of  social- 
ism and  individualism  under  one  concept. 


CHAPTER  X 

THE  PEOBLEM  OF  THE  SENSE  OF  BEAUTY 
("  ESTHETICS  ") 

IN  the  sphere  of  aesthetics  there  are  sev- 
eral problems  of  general  philosophical 
interest.  The  term  cesthetics  is  one  which 
was  first  used  by  Baumgarten  in  his  ^s- 
thetica,  published  in  1750.  The  word  is 
derived  from  the  Greek,  aicrOdvofiat,  to 
perceive  through  the  senses;  hence  from 
its  derivation  it  means  a  study  of  the  sen- 
sibilities ;  not,  however,  of  the  sensibilities 
in  general,  but  only  of  those  feelings  which 
are  accompanied  by  appreciation  of  the 
beautiful  either  in  nature  or  in  art.  The 
question  at  once  suggests  itself,  "  What  is 
the  beautiful  ?  "  To  define  beauty  in  clear 
and  adequate  terms  is  indeed  a  most  diffi- 
cult task.  There  is  so  great  a  diversity 
of  opinion  as  to  the  essentials  of  beauty 
that  the  matter  of  simple  definition  is  the 

first  and  perhaps  the  most  serious  problem 
181 


182       THE  PROBLEMS  OP  PHILOSOPHY 

wliich  the  philosopliy  of  aesthetics  pre- 
sents. The  difficulty  lies  in  the  fact  that 
the  consciousness  of  beauty  is  so  simple 
and  so  common  an  experience  as  to  baffle 
all  attempts  to  analyze  the  resulting  con 
cept  into  any  simpler  elements.  A  con- 
cept which  is  framed  from  cognitive  or 
intellectual  elements  is  naturally  more  defi- 
nite and  clean  cut  than  a  concept  composed 
of  emotional  elements.  Goethe,  with  a 
poet's  sensitive  appreciation  of  the  fugitive 
nature  of  our  feelings,  has  expressed  the 
conviction  that  "  beauty  is  inexplicable,  it 
is  a  hovering  and  glittering  shadow,  whose 
outline  eludes  the  grasp  of  a  definition." 

Another  difficulty  in  reference  to  the 
concept  of  beauty  confronts  us  when  we 
attempt  to  define  the  sphere  in  which 
beauty  can  be  said  essentially  to  reside. 
Is  beauty  a  subjective  state,  a  pleasurable 
feeling  merely  which  objects  produce  in 
consciousness  ?  or  is  beauty  inherent  as 
well  in  the  objects  themselves,  so  that  the 
experienced  pleasure  within  may  be  re- 
garded as  a  reflection  of  the  indwelling 
beauty  without?      In  the  latter  case  the 


PEOBLEM  OF  THE  SENSE  OF  BEAUTY    183 

final  judgment  concerning  the  beautiful 
must  be  regarded  as  the  resultant  of  the 
qualities  of  the  object  observed,  and  of  the 
reactive  sensibility  of  the  observer.  It 
will  be  readily  recognized  that  the  funda- 
mental problem  in  the  theory  of  knowledge 
emerges  here  in  the  sphere  of  aesthetics, 
namely,  the  relation  of  that  which  is  within 
consciousness  to  reality.  Amidst  these 
many  difficulties  there  seems  to  be  one 
characteristic  of  beauty,  the  truth  of  which 
we  may  assume  without  further  discussion  ; 
that  the  consciousness  of  the  beautiful  is 
always  a  judgment  of  valuation.  Associ- 
ated with  the  idea  of  the  beautiful  there  is 
always  the  idea  of  worth  or  of  appreciation. 
This  places  the  aesthetic  judgment  in  the 
same  class  with  the  moral  and  logical  judg- 
ments. All  three  recognize  a  certain  ideal 
with  which  the  concrete  experience  in  each 
case  is  compared,  and  a  resulting  evalua- 
tion of  the  experience  constitutes  the  judg- 
ment of  morals,  or  of  reason,  or  of  taste. 

"Beauty,  Good,  and  Knowledge  are  three  sisters 
That  dote  upon  each  other,  friends  to  man, 
Living  together  under  the  same  roof, 
And  never  can  be  sundered  without  tears." 


184       THE  PROBLEMS   OF  PHILOSOPHY 

The  sesthetical  ideal  cannot  be  for- 
mulated; but  that  it  possesses  a  certain 
constant  and  universal  element  receives 
convincing  testimony  from  a  general  con- 
sensus of  taste  which  is  evidenced  in  the 
universal  appreciation  of  certain  forms  of 
beauty,  both  in  nature  and  in  art.  It 
must  be  acknowledged,  to  be  sure,  that 
there  is  an  indefinite  variety  in  taste ;  but 
in  the  midst  of  the  bewildering  chaos  of 
conflicting  appreciations  there  has  formed 
a  recognized  ideal  which  in  art  we  call 
classic.  It  is  universally  recognized,  if 
not  in  detail,  at  least  in  the  broad  lines  of 
its  imperious  commands. 

This  ideal  may  be  regarded  merely  as  a 
psychical  phenomenon,  the  combined  re- 
sult of  environment  and  of  the  schooling 
of  the  general  taste  through  certain  initial 
customs  of  criticism  which  originally  set 
the  drift  in  some  one  general  direction. 
On  the  other  hand,  it  may  be  urged  that 
there  is  a  metaphysical  foundation  under- 
Ijing  such  an  ideal  in  the  sense  of  there 
being  in  nature  manifestations  of  an  abso- 
lute beauty,  which  accounts  for  its  univer- 


PROBLEM  OF  THE  SENSE  OF  BEAUTY     185 

sal  appreciation.  It  is  to  be  noted  in  this 
connection  that  there  is  more  substantial 
agreement  concerning  the  beautiful  in 
nature  than  the  beautiful  in  art.  The 
problem  here  is  similar  to  that  which  was 
found  so  perplexing  in  the  sphere  of  ethics, 
as  to  whether  there  is  absolute,  or  only- 
relative  value  in  the  ideal  and  the  canons 
therein  prescribed. 

There  is  a  further  problem  of  aesthetics 
which  is  one  of  interest  because  of  its  bear- 
ings upon  the  more  general  problems  of 
philosophy.  It  is  this  :  "  Does  the  aesthetic 
judgment,  the  appreciative  consciousness, 
reveal  a  truer  and  deeper  knowledge  of 
nature  than  do  the  intellectual  and  moral 
judgments  ?  "  It  is  held  that  under  quick- 
ened sesthetical  sensibility  we  become  con- 
scious in  a  mystical  manner  of  the  spirit 
of  nature  which  breathes  and  lives  through 
all  things;  that  especially  the  poets,  in 
moments  of  rapt  ecstasy,  see  visions  and 
dream  dreams  which  iUumine  the  mystery 
of  existence  and  withdraw  apace  the  veil 
which  conceals  the  vast  unknown.  Kant 
found  in  the  sesthetical  judgment  a  solu- 


186       THE  PROBLEMS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

tion  of  the  difficulties  connected  with  the 
judgments  of  Pure  Reason  and  the  judg- 
ments of  Practical  Reason.  For  while 
the  former  are  purely  of  intellectual  origin 
and  the  latter  compose  that  mass  of  moral 
truths  which  stand  as  law  to  the  will,  yet 
neither  through  the  intellect  nor  through 
the  will  do  we  come  to  know  the  reality 
which  underlies  the  phenomena  of  experi- 
ence. Kant  insists,  therefore,  that  we  are 
able  to  apprehend  the  real  nature  of  the 
world  of  perception  only  through  a  bond 
of  sympathy  which  is  felt  to  exist  between 
reality  and  our  own  souls  in  the  apprecia- 
tion of  the  beautiful ;  and  that,  therefore, 
our  sesthetic  judgments  possess  an  element 
of  universality,  because  they  are  the  recog- 
nition of  the  universal  reason  in  nature. 
This  thought  Matthew  Arnold  has  ex- 
pressed in  substance  where  he  asserts  that 
"to  see  things  in  their  beauty  is  to  see 
things  in  their  truth." 

Closely  akin  to  the  appreciation  of 
beauty  is  the  recognition  of  the  teleologi- 
cal  or  the  purposeful  in  nature.  It  is  an 
intuition  of  the  order  and  harmony  of  the 


PROBLEM  OF  THE  SENSE  OF  BEAUTY     187 

world,  not  only  as  beautiful,  but  as  dis- 
closing a  profound  plan  and  a  vast  de- 
sign. The  sesthetic  sense,  therefore,  has 
that  poetic,  and  likewise  prophetic,  insight 
which  doubts  not  through  the  ages  one  in- 
creasing purpose  runs.  The  mind  that  is 
keenly  sensible  of  the  existence  and  the 
import  of  ideals  has  more  than  a  lively 
appreciation  of  their  worth ;  such  a  mind 
can  enter  into  the  creative  mind  of  the 
universe  to  the  extent  that  it  becomes 
itself  creative,  and  in  the  various  forms 
of  art  gives  expression  to  that  which 
is  seen  in  waking  dreams,  and  which  is 
the  "spirit  and  finer  sense  of  all  knowl- 
edge." Kant  defines  genius  as  the  intel- 
ligence which  works  like  nature.  And 
according  to  Schelling  the  Absolute  re- 
veals Himself  in  the  artist's  creative  work, 
disclosing  the  secrets  of  nature  and  the 
innermost  nature  of  reality.  It  is  thus 
by  the  esthetic  insight  that  man  pene- 
trates the  surface  show  of  phenomena,  and 
discovers  their  essential  significance  in  the 
spirit  of  reason,  which,  as  beauty  and  pur- 
pose, is  manifested  in  them.     While  this 


188       THE  PROBLEMS   OF   PHILOSOPHY 

is  substantially  the  conception  of  one  of 
the  most  prevalent  forms  of  modern  ideal- 
ism, it  is  a  thought  which  is  of  ancient  and 
honorable  lineage ;  it  may  be  traced  to  an 
early  Greek  origin.  It  is  essentially  Pla- 
tonic ;  it  finds  expression  also  in  the  writ- 
ings of  Plotinus,  who  was  imbued  with 
Platonic  ideas,  and  who  regarded  all  beauty 
as  the  outshining  of  the  inner  spirit  through 
the  imprisoning  shell  of  external  matter. 

In  this  connection,  Hegel's  conception 
of  art  must  not  be  overlooked.  He  re- 
gards art  as  the  triumph  of  mind  over 
matter,  because  it  impresses  upon  the  phe- 
nomenal a  "  reality  which  is  born  of  mind." 
While  the  living  idea  is  thus  embodied 
through  sensuous  media  and  forms,  still  all 
forms  of  art  do  not  embody  the  idea  in  an 
equal  degree  of  perfection.  In  architect- 
ure there  is  a  dualism  between  mind  and 
matter,  inasmuch  as  the  material  does  not 
satisfactorily  express  the  idea  but  is  rather 
a  symbol  which  stands  for  the  idea.  In 
sculpture  the  idea  is  more  adequately  ex- 
pressed through  the  material  medium.  It 
however  is  inferior  to  painting  in  this  re- 


PKOBLEM  OF  THE  SENSE  OF  BEAUTY     189 

spect,  because  the  soul  of  thought  glances 
in  the  eye  which  in  the  statue  is  ever  cold 
and  inert.  Music,  being  more  subjective, 
is  therefore  more  expressive  of  the  inner 
moods  and  feelings.  Poetry,  however,  is 
the  art  of  arts  ;  for  the  idea  finds  its  most 
complete  expression  in  words,  and  the  ma- 
terial as  vehicle  of  the  thought  is  most 
thoroughly  subordinate  to  the  idea.  In 
poetry,  moreover,  the  blending  of  form  and 
thought  realizes  an  ideal  synthesis  of  the 
subjective  and  objective.  Throughout  He- 
gel's conception  of  art,  as  thus  outlined,  it 
will  be  seen,  therefore,  that  there  is  a  crea- 
tive function  of  the  idea  which  produces 
the  beauty  of  thought  in  a  medium  which 
is  originally  without  form  and  void. 

The  sesthetical  concept  is  regarded  by 
Lotze,  also,  as  a  solvent  of  the  difficulties 
which  complicate  the  epistemological  prob- 
lem. He  holds  that  reality  is  manifested 
in  three  ways,  —  as  universal  laws  to  which 
the  real  in  its  various  aspects  is  necessarily 
subject ;  and  as  the  real  substances  and 
forces  which  are  the  material  content  of 
things  ;  and  again  as  a  plan  according  to 


190       THE  PKOBLEMS   OF   PHILOSOPHY 

which  the  manifold  elements  of  the  real  are 
brought  together  in  such  a  manner  as  to 
realize  a  specific  end  or  idea.  Lotze's  con- 
tention is,  that  reason  and  conscience  fail 
to  discern  that  these  three  moments  of 
reality  are  connected  through  any  underly- 
ing unity,  but  that  the  cognizance  of  beauty 
pledges  the  existence  of  such  a  unity, 
dimly  felt  and  vaguely  conceived,  yet  sat- 
isfactory withal.  Lotze's  definition  of 
beauty,  therefore,  is  "the  appearance  to 
immediate  intuition  pf  a  unity  amongst 
those  three  powers  (law,  matter,  and  idea), 
which  our  cognition  is  unable  completely 
to  unite."  ^ 

There  is  still  a  further  question  of  gene- 
ral interest,  —  the  relation  of  sesthetics  to 
ethics.  There  is  a  tendency  among  cer- 
tain writers  to  identify  the  good  and  the 
beautiful.  The  ethical  systems  of  Shaftes- 
bury and  Hutcheson  are  representative  in 
an  eminent  degree  of  this  general  doctrine. 
This  would  be  naturally  expected  and 
readily  inferred  from  their  appeal  to  a 
moral  sense  which  is  closely  akin  to  the 
1  Outlines  of  Esthetics,  p.  11. 


PROBLEM  OF  THE  SENSE  OF  BEAUTY     191 

aesthetic  sense,  as  the  source  whence  all 
knowledge  of  moral  distinctions  emanates. 
Evil  conduct  thus  proceeds  from  a  deficient 
or  abnormal  taste,  while  right  conduct  is 
good  taste.  Schiller,  with  a  half  poetic 
and  a  half  philosophic  insight,  has  laid 
special  stress  upon  the  practical  influence 
of  aesthetic  ideals  upon  the  evolution  of 
ethical  concepts  and  conduct.  He  con- 
tends that  man  through  contact  with  the 
beautiful  is  always  infused  with  its  re- 
fining spirit  to  the  extent  that  he  is  thereby 
rendered  less  susceptible  to  the  allurements 
of  evil,  and  thus  the  will  and  desire  are 
brought  into  harmony.  Schopenhauer,  who 
finds  the  essence  of  evil  in  the  unrestrained 
strivings  of  the  will,  suggests  that  in  the 
intuition  of  the  beautiful,  there  is  a  benign 
influence  which  calms  the  fever  of  the  will, 
and  restores  a  normal  self -poise.  The 
ideal,  according  to  Schiller,  is  the  Schone 
Seele,  the  "  beautiful  soul,"  which  experi- 
ences no  internal  struggle  between  the 
behests  of  duty  and  the  promptings  of  in- 
clination, but  in  which  the  "play  im- 
pulse,"  that   exuberance  of  vitality,  and 


192       THE  PROBLEMS   OF  PHILOSOPHY 

overflow  of  spirit,  instinctively  realizes 
itself  in  the  sphere  of  the  good  rather 
than  the  evil.  It  is  the  same  idea  which 
Wordsworth  has  expressed  in  his  "Ode 
to  Duty";  — 

"  Serene  will  be  our  days  and  bright, 
And  happy  will  our  nature  be, 
When  love  is  an  unerring  light 
And  joy  its  own  security." 

There  is  here  a  tempering  of  the  harsh 
rigorism  of  Kant,  who  insists  that  the 
very  essence  of  morality  lies  in  the  inner 
struggle,  the  strenuous  battling  of  the 
higher  with  the  lower  in  our  natures. 
The  Kantian  idea,  however,  must  not  be 
wholly  overlooked  in  one's  enthusiasm  to 
construct  an  ethic  along  the  lines  of  least 
resistance ;  for  often  through  sensuous 
struggle  a  freedom  of  spirit  is  wrought. 
The  idea  of  the  aesthetic  impulse  towards 
the  good  is  most  suggestive  if  it  be  not 
constrained  to  embrace  the  whole  range  of 
ethical  experience.  It  may  be  of  some  in- 
terest to  trace  this  idea  also  to  that  ancient 
source,  to  which  modern  thought  is  under 


PROBLEM  OF  THE  SENSE  OF  BEAUTY     193 

such  obligation,  and  to  find  in  Plato  its 
most  impressive  expression :  — 

" '  Right  speech,  then,  and  Tightness  of 
harmony  and  form  and  rhythm  minister  to 
goodness  of  nature  ;  not  that  good-nature 
which  we  so  call  with  a  soft  name,  being 
really  silliness,  but  the  frame  of  mind 
which  in  very  truth  is  rightly  and  fairly 
ordered  in  regard  to  the  moral  habit.' 

"  '  Most  certainly,'  he  said. 

" '  Must  not  these  qualities,  then,  be 
everywhere  pursued  by  the  young  men  if 
they  are  to  do  each  his  own  business  ? ' 

"'Pursued,  certainly.' 

" '  Now  painting,  I  suppose,  is  full  of 
them  [those  qualities  which  are  partly 
ethical,  partly  aesthetic],  and  all  handicraft 
such  as  that ;  the  weaver's  art  is  full  of 
them,  and  the  inlayer's  art,  and  the  build- 
ing of  houses,  and  the  working  of  all  the 
other  apparatus  of  life  ;  moreover  the  nat- 
ure of  our  own  bodies,  and  of  all  other 
living  things.  For  in  all  these,  rightness 
or  wrongness  of  form  is  inherent.  And 
wrongness  of  form,  and  the  lack  of  rhythm, 
the  lack  of  harmony  are  fraternal  to  f aulti- 


194       THE   PROBLEMS   OF  PHILOSOPHY 

ness  of  mind  and  character  ;  and  the  op- 
posite qualities  to  the  opposite  condition, 
the  temperate  and  good  character  ;  frater- 
nal, aye!  and  copies  of  them.' 

"  '  Yes,  entirely  so,'  he  said. 

" '  Must  our  poets,  then,  alone  be  under 
control,  and  compelled  to  work  the  image 
of  the  good  into  their  poetic  works,  or  not 
to  work  among  us  at  all ;  or  must  the 
other  craftsmen  too  be  controlled  and  re- 
strained from  working  this  faultiness,  and 
intemperance,  and  illiberality,  and  form- 
lessness of  character,  whether  into  the 
image  of  living  creatures,  or  the  houses 
they  build,  or  any  other  product  of  their 
craft  whatever  ;  or  must  he,  who  is  unable 
so  to  do,  be  forbidden  to  practise  his  art 
among  us,  to  the  end  that  our  guardians 
may  not,  nurtured  in  the  images  of  vice  as 
in  a  vicious  pasture,  cropping  and  culling 
much  every  day,  little  by  little  from  many 
sources,  composing  together  some  one 
great  evil  in  their  own  souls,  go  unde- 
tected ?  Must  we  not  rather  seek  for  those 
craftsmen  who  have  the  power,  by  way  of 
their  own  natural  virtue,  to  track  out  the 


PROBLEM  OF  THE  SENSE  OF  BEAUTY     195 

nature  of  the  beautiful  and  seemly,  to  the 
end  that,  living  as  in  some  wholesome 
place,  the  young  men  may  receive  good 
from  every  side,  whencesoever,  from  fair 
works  of  art,  either  upon  sight  or  upon 
hearing,  anything  may  strike,  as  it  were  a 
breeze  bearing  health  from  kindly  places, 
and  from  childhood  straightway  bring 
them  unaware  to  likeness  and  friendship 
and  harmony  with  fair  reason ? '" i 

This  passage  has  been  quoted  at  length 
because  it  strikingly  illustrates  the  old 
Greek  virtue  of  KaXoKct^aOia^  that  sesthetic 
impulse  towards  the  good,  and  because 
this  idea  has  reappeared  in  so  many  forms 
in  philosophy  and  in  poetry  alike.  It 
appeals  to  the  mind  of  the  poet  especially 
because  there  is  a  mystical  element  which 
characterizes  the  process  of  character  de- 
velopment tlirough  the  transmutation  of 
the  beautiful  into  the  good.  In  Shelley's 
"  Hymn  to  Intellectual  Beauty  "  there  is  a 
rehabilitation  of  the  old  Platonic  idea  in 
one  of  its  most  exquisite  expressions  ;  — 

1  Plato,  Bepublic,  III.  401. 


196       THE  PROBLEMS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

«  Spirit  of  Beauty,  *  *  * 
Thy  light  alone  —  like  mist  o'er  mountains 

driven, 
Or  music  by  the  night  wind  sent, 
Thro'  strings  of  some  still  instrument, 
Or  moonlight  on  a  midnight  stream. 
Gives  grace  and  truth  to  life's  unquiet  dream. 

Tf^  Tis  '^  ^  y^  ^  "Sft^ 

Thus  let  thy  power,  which  like  the  truth 
Of  nature  on  my  passive  youth 
Descended,  to  my  onward  life  supply 
Its  calm  —  to  one  who  worships  thee, 
And  every  form  containing  thee. 
Whom,  Spirit  fair,  thy  spells  did  bind 
To  fear  himself,  and  love  all  human  kind." 

It  must  be  observed  again,  however, 
that  while  fully  recognizing  the  fraternal 
kinship  of  the  good  and  the  beautiful, 
nevertheless  it  does  violence  to  the  integ- 
rity of  the  ethical  concept  to  derive  its 
significance  and  force  wholly  from  the 
sesthetic  concept. 

The  intimate  relation  between  these  two 
concepts  may  be  further  unfolded  through 
the  consideration  of  the  common  character- 
istic which  they  possess,  in  that  they  each 
mirror  the  Eternal  Spirit  of  the  universe 
through  kindred  though  different  modes 


PROBLEM  OF  THE  SENSE  OF  BEAUTY     197 

of  manifestation.  As  Emerson  says : 
"  Truth  and  goodness  and  beauty  are  but 
different  faces  of  the  same  All."  It  is  by 
no  means  necessary  to  interpret  Emerson's 
thought  in  a  pantheistic  sense.  It  com- 
mends itself  especially  to  the  theist.  The 
intimations  of  divinity  are  revealed  and 
yet  half  concealed  in  every  form  of  beauty. 
They  underlie  the  ancient  Hebrew  concep- 
tion of  the  worship  of  God  in  the  beauty 
of  holiness,  the  beatific  vision  of  Dante, 
the  sovereign  splendor  of  beauty  in 
Plato's  hierarchy  of  eternal  forms,  and 
Goethe's  characterization  of  nature  as  the 
garment  of  the  living  God. 


INDEX 


Actualists  79  f . 
Esthetics  28,  31,  181  f . 
Ahrens  166 
Anarchy  178 
Anaxagoras  61 
Anaximander  59 
Anaximenes  60 
A  posteriori  27,  97, 136,  163 
A  priori  27,  97,  131  f.,  136, 

160  f.,  165 
Aquinas,  Thomas  172 
Aristippus  145 
Aristophanes  1 
Aristotle  16,  78, 130, 158 
Arnold  186 
Art  181, 184,  188  f. 
Association,  Theory  of  89  f . 
Atheism  68 
Atomism  33  f .,  62,  63 
Austin  167,  171,  173, 175 

Bacon  2,  131 

Bagehot  174 

Balfour  10 

Baumgarten  181 

Beattie  109 

Beauty,  Philosophy  of  181  f . 

Begrif  120 

Bentham  146,  147,  167 

Berkeley  109 


Bluntschli  168,  171 
Browning  56,  155 
Biichner  47 
Buddha  80 
Butler  139 

Cabanis  39,  46 
Categorical  imperative  140 
Causation  43  f.,  131  f. 
Cicero  162,  165 
Clarke  139 
Comte  100  f.,  157 
Concept  119  f . 
Conceptualism  124  f . 
Condillac  97 
Conscience  134  f . 
Consciousness  44  f.,  50 
Conservation  of  energy  39  f . 
Cosmology    18,    20  f.,    30, 

59  f. 
Critical  school,  The  99 
Cudworth  139 
Cumberland  139 
Cyrenaicism  145 

Dante  172,  197 
Deduction  130  f . 
Deism  22,  65,  67 
Democritus  33,  34,  35,  46, 
49,  62,  63 


199 


200 


INDEX 


Descartes  35,  93,  99 
Determinism  152 
D'Holbach  46 
Diderot  46 
Dualism  19  f.,  33 

Edicts,  The  praetorian  164 
Emerson  197 
Empedocles  60,  61 
Empiricism  26  f .,  97 1, 131  f ., 

135  f.,  160  f.,  167 
Epicurus  63,  146 
Epistemology  24  f.,  30,  95  f., 

132  f.,  189 
Ethics  28  f.,  31,  1^4  f.,  160, 

190  f. 
Eudaemonism  148 
Evolution,  The   theory   of 

44  f.,  136  f.,  149, 156, 169 f. 

Fechner  54 

Feuerbach  39,  47,  77 

Fichte  9,  114  f. 

Flint  47 

Form  of  the  ethical  concept 

141 
Fouillde  170 
Freedom  of  the  will  152  f . 

Geulincx  37 

Gladstone  10 

Goethe  4,  10,  68,  126,  182, 

197 
Green  91,  113,  144,  166,  177 
Grotius  165 

Haeckel  47 
Hamilton  112 
Hedonism  145  f . 


Hegel  9,  77,  114  f.,  143,  166, 
170,  188 

Hegelians  of  the  Left  77 

Helvetius  46 

Heraclitus  60 

Herbart  93,  117 

Herbert,  Lord  67 

Herder  9,  115 

Historical  school  of  juris- 
prudence 171 

History,  The  philosophy  of 
12 

Hobbes  54,  146, 165,  167, 175 

Holland  174 

Homer  125 

Hume  86  f.,  99,  110,  167 

Hutcheson  139, 190 

Idealism  25  f.,  109,  114  f., 

170,  178 
Identity,  The  theory  of  38, 

51  f. 
Immanence,  Divine  66,  71, 

74 
Indeterminism  153  f . 
Individualism  178  f . 
Induction  130  f . 
Inference  119,  128  f . 
Innate  ideas  97  f . 
Intellectual    intuitionalism 

139 
Intellectualism  92  ff. 
Intuitional  theory  of  ethics 

135  f.,  155 

James  83 

Judgment  119, 126  f . 
Jurisprudence  159  f . 
Jus  civile  162, 164 


INDEX 


201 


Jus  gentium  164 
Jus  naturae  173 
Jus  naturale  162 

Ka\oK6.yadLa  195 

Kant  81,  91,  99,  110  f.,  115, 

139,  140,  141, 153, 154, 163, 

165,    166,    185,    18<J,    187, 

192 
Keats  1 
Kipling  7 
Knowledge,  Relation  of,  to 

reality  101,  112 
Krause  166 

Laissez-faire  policy  179 
La  Mettrie  4^5 
Lange  46,  110 
Law,  Natural  162  f . 
Law,  Positive  162 
Law,  The  origin  of  IfiO  f . 
Law,  The  science  of  159  f . 
Leibniz  34,  35,  36,  48, 49, 54, 

93,99 
Lessing  10,  115 
Locke  68,  95,  97,  99,  109, 

175 
Logic  28,  31,  118  f . 
Lotze  3,  94,  189,  190 

Macchiavelli  167,  168,  169, 

172 
McCosh  109 
Maine  174 
Malbranche  157 
Martineau    69,  75,  86,  139, 

156 
Materialism  38  f .,  61, 76,  77, 

154,  178 


Maurice  8 

Mechanical  explanation  of 

the  universe  21,  63 
Metaphysics  17  f.,  22,  23 
Mill  5,  99,  147,  167 
Mind  16,  78  f. 
Mind  and  matter  38,  49,  53 
Moleschott  47 
Monads  of  Leibniz  34,  49 
Monism  19  f. ,  33,  38,  49 
Monotheism  65 
Montesquieu  170 
Morley  10 

Naturalism  169  f . 
Natural  rights  175  f . 
Natura  naturans  75 
Natura  naturata  75 
Nature  16,  185  f . 
Neo-Spinozism  54 
Normative  sciences  28  f .,  118 

Occasionalism  37 
Ontology  18f.,22,  30,  32f., 
^  103 
Oswald  109 

Pantheism     22,   66,   68  f., 

197 
Parallelism  51  f . 
Parmenides  61 
Parsimony  of  causes  41 
Pater  125 
Paulsen  90 
Percept  119 
Perception  96,  102  f.,  112, 

119 
Perfectionism  143 
Personality  143  f.,  177, 179  f. 


202 


INDEX 


Phenomenalism  110 

Plato  5,  49,  104  f.,  125,  157, 
193  f.,  195,  197 

Plotinus  188 

Pluralism  33  f . 

Poetry,  Relation  to  philoso- 
phy 6  f , 

Politics,     The    science    of 
158  f. 

Pollock  174 

Polytheism  22,  64  f. 

Positivism  99  f . 

Potentia  naturae  173 

Preestablished      harmony 
36  f. 

Price  139 

Protestantism  and  philoso- 
phy 9 

Psychology    23  f.,    29,    30, 
78  f. 

Psychology,  Genetic  92 

Puchta  171 

Rationalism  27,  95  f . 
Reaction  theory  35  f . 
Realism  25  f.,  107  f. 
Realism,  Scholastic  122  f. 
Reality  13  f.,  101,  113,  121, 

123,    127,    129,    183,    186, 

189  f . 
Reason  118  f. 
Reid  109 
Relativity    of     knowledge 

112 
Res  cogitans  35 
Res  extensa  35 
Reymoud,  Du  Bois  58 
Rigorism'140 
Robertson  8 


Romanes  55 
Rousseau  165, 


175 


Savigny  171 

Schelling  9,  114  f.,  126,  187 

Schiller  10,  191 

Schopenhauer  49,  94,  191 

Science,  its  relation  to  phi- 
losophy 5 

Scottish  philosophy  109,  113 

Self,  Nature  of  the  79  f.,  154 

Self-realization  143  f . 

Sensationalism  97 

Sentimental  intuitionalism 
139 

Seth,  Andrew  113 

Shaftesbury  139,  190 

Shelley  126,  195 

Smith,  Adam  139 

Social-contract,  The  theory 
of  175  f . 

Social  factor  in  the  ethical 
concept  151  f.,  158  f. 

Socialism  178  f . 

Socrates  1 

Sovereignty  171  f . 

Spencer  54.  149 

Spinoza  54,  74,  93,  99,  115, 
157,  173 

Spiritualism  38,  48  f.,  61 

State,  The    theory  of    the 
159  f. 

State  control  177  f . 

Stephen  151 

Stewart  109 

Stoics  140,  165 
Substantialists  79 
System,  The  world  of  know- 
ledge regarded  as  a  129 


INDEX 


203 


Teleology  21,  72  f.,  186  f. 

Tennyson  8 

Thales  2,  59 

Theism  22,  66  f.,  155,  1%  f. 

Transcendence,  Divine  66, 

71 
Transcendental    theory   of 

ethics  136  f.,  142  f.,  155 
Trendelenburg  165 

Universal  relations  129  f . 
Universals,  The  nature  of 
122  f. 


Utilitarianism  imt.,  U5  f., 
156,  167  f. 

Vogt  47 
Voltaire  68 
Voluntaryism  92  f . 

Wallace  72 
Windelband  63,  124 
Wordsworth  69,  192 
World  regarded  as  eject  55 

Xenophanes  60 


